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PREFACE
This study is an investigation of the role of income taxation
since its first imposition as a temporary measure till it "became a
reformative tool for social ends.
It contains three parts dealing with income taxation, as part of
the fiscal structure in War and Peace; how it is technically conducted;
and what are its impacts, incidence and social effects.
The field of research is limited to the development of the
existing income taxes in Britain, Egypt and Prance.
Britain is the pioneer in imposing income taxation which has proved
to he of great economic as well as social significance. Prance
followed in the British footsteps hut only after a long time of
reluctance and hesitation. In Egypt the tax is a novelty in the
social framework and some people are taking it as an "Aladdin's lamp"
which can "bring them everything they need and take them along the
right path.
The subject is very wide and taxation development is in a dynamic
state in the three countries, as no Minister of Finance can ignore
such an important tool in shaping his policy. The writer has done
his hest to follow the recent changes as he holds the view that the
present-day problems should take first place in our attention as
society cannot now afford the luxuries of mere intellectual arguments.
This study is carried out mainly through an award from the
Egyptian Ministry of Education on behalf of Pouad I University, to
I
whom the writer expresses his deep gratitude.
It is supervised by Dr. M.L. Rankin, Reader in the Economic
Department and Professor A.G. Murray, C.A., Head of the Accounting
Department. The writer is greatly indebted to them for their
enduring help, their wise guidance, their patience and their
constructive criticism, without which this study could have never
been completed.
The writer's thanks are due to his colleagues in Egypt and
Prance who made it possible for him to obtain first-hand information
on the important changes in the taxation system of the two countries.
Finally, the writer owes a great debt to the efficient service
and help he received from the Library Staff of Edinburgh University.
EDIKBIIRGH, April 1952.
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VIII.
BTTRODUCTIGH
1. The last forty years have seen a tremendous increase in the
part absorbed "by taxation out of the national income. In Britain
this part increased from ifa in 1913 to 4Qfa in 1951. This is in
addition to what the local Bodies impose in rates. In Prance the
1
proportion increased from 12p> in 1 913 to less than 3w° in 1951*
In Egypt, taxation is still in its infancy and amounts to approx¬
imately 1Q% of the national income.
Such high taxation in Britain has its significance. It
embodies a far reaching effect of great magnitude upon the whole
economy of this country and in one way or another on international
economic relations. The taxes collected in Britain in 1 950 were
about half the figure of wages and salaries and nearly equalled
the whole expenditure on food and clothing in that year. The
importance of income taxes in the structure is clear from the fact
that they made up about 5Q^ of the whole tax revenue. The rate
of taxation on the upper reaches of income stands at 9^o, a rate
beyond anyone's imagination a century and a half ago, when people
of middle and high incomes during a time of emergency condemned the
contribution of 1Qo as ruinous, disturbing the political as well as
the socio-econcmic structure of society. What is more, high
income taxation is accompanied by excessive measures of taxation
in other directions which have no parallel in history and there is
no prospect of any relief in the future. The impact of taxation
1. Laufenburger, II: Finance Comparees, Annexes 1. and
Inventaire de la Situation Financiere, p.44
on the distribution of •wealth and income and its influence on
production and employment deserve much thought and careful analysis,
for the repercussions are complicated and far reaching.
The increase in the rate of taxation goes parallel to the
increase of State expenditure, and, pari passu, State activity.
It confronts us with a problem which necessitates decisive action.
We have to decide whether to call increasing State activity to a
halt, trusting that the individual is capable enough of dealing
with the growing problems of life, or to let the new currents take
their course as being the natural outcome of our economic develop¬
ment, If we agree on the first action, what assurances could be
given that individual behaviour would lead to the maximum welfare
of the public, which is generally accepted as a reasonable end, and
that society could develop and effectively progress in our conflict¬
ing world. If, on the other hand, we yielded to the second course,
how could we ccpe with the deep rooted traditions of individualism
with its symptoms of competition and freedom of choice? And if
this could be overcome, who could give an assurance that the
decisions taken by the State would lead to the former end? It
seems that we are faced with a peculiar and very awkward problem,
as the issues involved are not only economic but also social and
political with highly complicated features of domestic and inter¬
national consequence.
In our complicated affairs we have to be careful in drawing
3.
conclusions and ascertaining results. For instance a negative
corellation could be noticed between tax increases and the
deterioration of productivity per man. But this is not a
phenomenon from which one should make undue inferences. 'There
are distinct factors that determine the trend of taxation and
productivity. The gradual reduction in the purchasing power of
money, the mounting expenses of the services run by the State, the
growing of population and the tremendous expenses on war and its
outcome, are factors attributed to increasing taxation. On the
other hand, the development in Trade Unions' status with their
pressure for higher wages and shorter hours of work without due
regard to the prices of commodities and units produced in addition
to the inability of a group of capitalists to renew their plants,
have a marked influence on reducing productivity. That does not
mean that taxation has no impact upon productivity. In fact it
has, as we shall see later in this thesis. But the point to be
emphasised is that the interrelation between taxation and product¬
ivity is rather a politico-social and economic phenomenon more
than a directly economic one and has to be analysed accordingly
for any accurate result. When the rate of taxation is excessively
high this depresses the incentive to produce: there can be no
doubt about that. But it is very difficult to visualise what could
be done in a democratic system based on the possession by the
masses of decisive power to vote for whoever they think satisfies
4.
their demands.
4. High taxation may he an important problem, but it is not
the main one. There are other problems of social and economic
justice and there is after all the socio-economic development
which has to be enhanced. This might not be impressive, in a
highly developed country like Britain whose main worry now is to
keep in order her balance of payments, but this is more clear in
Egypt which is far behind other nations. In Britain and Prance
high taxation is blamed for their economic difficulties. In
Egypt the blame is placed on the low rates of taxation. Consider¬
ing these two types of case, one might wonder whether there is, in
reality, an absolute limit of taxation in relation to each one's
position. Whether such a limit exists or not we will discuss
later. But it seems quite clear that one cannot have development,
under the conditions of the World to-day, without paying dearly
for it. And society cannot attain a certain degree of economic
equality amongst its members without someone being called upon to
sacrifice for this purpose.
5. The politico-social development of the last two centuries
has resulted in giving a concrete concept to the State. It is
no longer considered as the will of the Sovereign, but rather as
the tool through which people function. It is not only expected
to restore order and defend the country from outside aggression,
but also to look after the welfare of individuals, to attain full
5,
employment and to realise a certain degree of equality in the
distribution of the community's resources and products. More¬
over, it has become the responsibility of the State to guard the
interests of the unborn generations against the selfishness of the
present one.
Small wonder then, that the broadening of the area of State
functions necessitated the appropriating of an increased share
of the nation's income and pressing demands on the individual.
Appreciating the results of such development, the under-developed
countries are following the same lead and no doubt will face the
same complicated problems. Whether or not this is a wise procedure
is very difficult to assess from a neutral basis and a value
judgment is unavoidable. In our state of affairs, nothing can
be termed perfect but one can choose between two given alternatives.
If it were a matter of choice between two communities where one is
highly developed with excessive taxation and the other is backward
with low rates of taxation, the majority and the rational would
choose the first one. This is in accord with the natural order Of
progress-,
6. Different writers have looked at the development of taxation
from different angles in their attempt to explain the changing
Horn of taxation. Wagner, for instance, looked at it from the
point of view of social development, noticing three eras; the
feudal, the individual and the social. In the first one taxes
6
are imposed on certain classes; in the second, expenses of the
State have to he distributed amongst the subjects without
exception, and in the last, the burden is borne by those who are
most able to carry it. Seligman looked at taxation from the
evaluation of the faculty principle, in other words, the logical
outlook of assessing the burden in a just way; from considering
the individual he progresses to considering property and income
as subjects of taxation. Another outlook on taxation is drawn
from the position of the individual in relation to the State.
In the 18th Century, Montesquieu, for instance, based his ideas
on the social contract, and defined the tax as the insurance
premium paid by the individual. In the 1 9th Century, Proudhon
1
defined the tax as the part paid by each citizen for the require¬
ment of the State. The word compulsory is but new in defining
taxation and this makes all the difference between light taxes
largely on commodities and heavy imposts mostly on income and
capital. It is thus considered as a compulsory contribution on
those who are able to pay, irrespective of the amount of service
rendered to them. Taxation was also treated from the viewpoint
of justice and this sacrifice had to be taken into consideration.
Adam Smith and J.S. Mill emphasised that equality of sacrifice
on different basis. The former considered it to be attained if
the individuals contributed in proportion to their respective
O
abilities; and the latter saw it when each individual should
1. Foraiery, L: Les Impots En France, Tom I, pp. 10 et seq.
2. Smith, A: Wealth of Nations, McCulloch Ed. p.373.
7.
"feel neither more or less inconvenience from his share of the
1
payment than every other person experiences from his."
Edgeworth "being rather more profound in his analysis favoured the
least aggregate sacrifice as the acceptable principle of taxation.
Most of these definitions as one can see, dealt with taxation
from the point of view of the Statesman, rather than that of the
taxpayer himself. The latter is not expected to be idealistic;
he is more or less emotional and looks at the tax according to
his mood. His conception of the State differs with his disposit¬
ion or rather his social and political group. If one understands
this point one can analyse individual reaction towards any specific
tax.
7. It is very important to notice the peculiar reaction to any
tax and how much reaction might have political, social and
economic repercussions. In Britain when income tax was first
introduced to finance war with France, some of its opponents went
as far as to denounce war altogether if it justified such a
measure. "If the continuance of the war was so indispensable"
2
added another opponent "the tax should be upon landed property".
"Remove these great proprietors of boroughs and peace may be
obtained" was a direct reaction to income tax which seemed at that
time as out of the question and irrelevant to the problem. This
is similar to what we are hearing now from the Socialist benches.
1, Mill, J.S: Principledof Political Economy, p.805
2. Cobbet: Parliamentary History of England, Yol. XXIII, p. 1082
In France the logic and persuasion of her Minister of Finance
to impose income tax, did not stop severe attacks on it as
oppressive, unconstitutional and a tool of tyranny in the hands
1
of the Government. In Sgypt, the levying of the schedular
income taxes was hailed by a large section cf the public. The
land-owners found in it the manna from heaven sent to relieve
them from part of their burden. The nationalists considered the
measure as a step forward towards the fulfilment of national
aspiration. These controversial outlooks have their bearing
upon the construction of any tax system and have to be taken into
consideration whatever the study.
In spite of all the obstacles that were raised against income
taxes and the objections to their imposition, they shortly gained
great reputation on account of their flexibility for finance and
became the backbone of most of the taxation structure of modem
countries. Depression and war have provided testing grounds for
income taxes and proved their accuracy. Normal conditions, on
the other hand, have emphasised their importance and necessity.
Adopting the benefit of the service principle, De Marco holds
the view that, assuming that the members of the community are all
consumers of the general public service, each income is taken as
an index for measuring their demand and accordingly, taxes have
p
been fixed as a percentage of income. Whatever the merits of
1. Seligman, E.R.A: The Income Tax, pp.281 et seq.
2. De Marco, A. de Viti; First Principles of Public Finance, p.114.
9.
such a view, the fact that the flow of income is continuous makes
I a Minister of Finance assured of a regular return which increases
i
simultaneously with that of national income. Besides, income taxes
are considered by their adherents as the means through which equal
distribution could be realised; though others would not go as far
as that and simply think that the superiority of such taxes over
others is their neutral and unprejudicial effect on the individual.
9. In spite of the fact that income taxation sprang from one
source, it took different shapes under different developed societies,
because of the differences in their economic structure and the
effect of the socio-economic forces in power. In Britain income
taxation developed from the temporary one imposed as a war tax,
later it was accepted as an auxiliary tax to meet the budgetary
deficit and lastly as a main factor in the fiscal structure. The
pressing needs of the last two wars called for the imposition of
profits tax and excess profits tax which are merely income taxes
of special kinds. In France, the imposition of the scheduler
income taxes and a tax on the general income was claimed to be a
triumphant success after a century of fight against the guardians
of the old system. As in Britain, other subsidiary taxes on
profits were imposed and the income tax system became rather com¬
plicated. Income taxation was levied in Bgypt just before the
World War II as a result of the termination of the Capitulation,
through which "foreigners" were exempted from all direct taxes
10,
except the traditional ones on land and dwellings. In its short
duration, it ran through the same channels as its counterparts
in Britain and Prance,
It is true that the British Income Tax is the oldest of the
modern types and it influenced the French authorities ■when they
constructed their system. It is also true that the Egyptian
income tax was a rough copy of the French one with some rules of
the British and Italian systems. But this is not enough to make
a comparative study of income taxes worth while. In any comparat¬
ive study there should he a certain degree of uniformity underlying
the different systems. This uniformity we find without difficulty
in Britain, France and Egypt. The structure of the three nations
is "based on individualism, the parliamentary system, and on the
acceptance of a certain degree of State control to organize the
economic behaviour of the individual. They all accept the present
pattern of society and respect private property and the acquired
rights. There are certain differences among the three countries
in their degree of economic development, and a consideration of
such differences will he of great help in assessing the accuracy
of any policy on production, distribution, and enployment. Fran
the experience of the three countries one might judge to what extent
income taxation succeeded in playing the role it was intended to
play.
11.
This thesis is an attempt to give a clear picture of the
existing systems of income taxes in Britain, ISgypt and Prance,
K
showing their mechanism and role in the national economy.
Political controversy will he avoided as it has no end. But,
in the meantime, one cannot avoid advocating certain measures,
approving a certain alteration, or adhering to a certain policy.
It is a fortunate or unfortunate part of the technique and art
of public finance that one has to commit oneself to certain views
and ideas. The writer is in complete agreement with what De
Marco stated, that, in public finance one "has recourse to one's
•I
personal ideals of social justice". This is the same trend
followed by Simons who emphasised frankly that "to dissemble any
underlying social philosophy and to maintain a pretence of
vigorous, objective analysis untinctured by mere ethical consider-
p
ations" has become conventional among students of public policy.
1, Ibid, p.15
2. Simons, H.C: Personal Income Taxation, p.1
PART X
INCOME TAXATION in the FISCAL STRUCTURE
in WAR and PEACE.
12.
CHAPTER I
DICQMS TAXATION in WAR TIME
There were three periods to cover the last three great wars in
which income taxation played a notable part in their finance. In the
first period, the tax ms imposed in Britain as a temporary measure to
finance the long war with France and suspended after the termination of
that war. In the second period, World War I, income tax was in a
perfect state in Britain after 72 years of its reimposition. In this
period France introduced her first modem income tax. By the third
period, World War II, income taxation was the backbone of the British
fiscal structure; France improved her system and Egypt introduced her
own tax for the first time in history. During the last two wars a
levy on the excess profits ms introduced in every country which had an
income tax. In most cases, when this extra tax had to come to an end,
it was replaced by a moderate tax on profits.
The following is an analytical discussion of the role of income
taxation in the last three great wars,
I. Income Taxation in the Anglo-French Wars.
a. The dominating ideas of the time;
When war between Britain and France broke out in the last decade
of the 1 8th Century, there were certain ideas and ideals dominating the
financial system of Britain. Such ideas were also accepted in France
with the difference that the Revolution gave them constitutional fixation.
It was agreed on all sides that taxation should be impersonal in order
13.
to stem any prejudicial "behaviour in its application. It should also
"be as little as possible and not go beyond what enabled the State to
realise its essential functions. If more expenditure was needed, it
should be met only by public loans. From the distributional point of
view the maxims upheld could be summarised as follows; firstly, every¬
one was subject to taxation so long as they all shared in the common
benefits furnished by the State: secondly, poor people could be
exempted on compassionate as well as administrative grounds; thirdly,
necessaries should not be taxed if possible to prevent wages from
rising to the detriment of trade and employment; fourthly, taxation
should be brought to bear on expenditure rather than on income and
property to comply with the principle of voluntary or optional sub¬
scription; fifthly, taxation based on direct assessment of income and
profits should be avoided for the interest of investment and accumulation;
and lastly, taxation should not contain any distributive criteria.
While the former principles were accepted in Britain and France,
the latter country relied more on direct imposts than the former. This
was mainly a result of the Revolution which adopted the Physiocratic
philosophy emphasising the principle that taxation should be on the
"produit net".
The main items of taxation in Britain at that time were customs
and excise duties which supplied in 1792 about 7Cfo of the whole State
revenue, and the taxes on land, houses, windows, supported by others on
14.
1
horses, coaches, servants, perfumery, dogs, etc. framed only about
In France, the main taxes were those on the estimated product of land
and dwellings as well as the tax "d1habitation" which was a poll tax
and considered as the price of the safeguard of the persons' human
rights. These taxes formed two-fifths of those imposed by the Act of
1791. On the other hand a tobacco duty superseded other indirect taxes
2
which were suspended by the Revolution.
State expenditure in Britain before the French wars was concentrated
on debt service and defence which absorbed autd J>j/0 respectively
and thus only 1 2?o was spared for administrative and other necessary
expenses.3 pn France, conditions were unstable and figures were in¬
accurate. This can be realised from the fact that only about half the
tax expected was paid into the State coffers in 1792.^
b. The force of events and the imposition of Income Tax.
In the first part of the war between the two countries, British
Chancellors of the Exchequer tried their best not to deviate from the
former principles. But war pressure, and the increasing need for
revenue obliged than to drop them one after the other in accordance with
the degree of resistence of the tax-payers and the administrative and
economic consideration. Land and property taxes were increased and
1. See figures in Silberling, N.J: Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 38, p. 213.
2. Allix, E: and Lecercle', M: Impot sur le Revenu, pp.79 et seq.
3. Silberling, op. cit.
4. The Constituent Assembly, being affected by the oppression of the
taxation department insisted on abolishing it. See Allix, op,
cit. p.86.
15.
those on articles of wide consumption were imposed to assure adequate
flow of resources for war needs. No drastic measure was taken and
loans were contracted to bridge the gap in the budget. In 1797, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer found himself in an awkward position, with
the expenditure increasing, the position of the enemy improving and no
signs of a quick ending of the war. Total revenue increased only by
£2.6 m. between 1792 and 1797, while expenditure expanded by £44 m.
The Chancellor not only had to pay for the increasing war expenses but
also for the gradual increase of the debt service which was augmented by
over £18 in, in interest and capital."'
Under these circumstances, Pitt introduced his famous plan of
"Triple Assessment" as a half-way measure between taxation of income
and the traditional system which was based on consumption. The "Triple
Assessment" as it was explained at that time was based mainly on, first,
its ability to diffuse the burden as extensively as possible, second,
its adequacy of being regulated as fairly and equally as possible without
any indulgence in wide investigation of property, and lastly, its justice
O
in excluding those who were least able to contribute.
Pitt did not disguise his intention that the contribution would
deduct a considerable sum from a large class of householders, whctn he
conceived to be both able and willing to pay. This was the unavoidable
course for the preservation of the people's existence and their security
1. Siberling, op. cit.
2. Cobbet's Parliamentary History of England, Vol.33, p.1043.
3. Ibid, p.1067.
2
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in the future. Pitt emphasised, and these necessary expenses could not
"be met hy loans alone, loans whose interest would remain a heavy burden
on future generations.
The tax: was not easily accepted and the opposition were aware of
the outcome if such a principle was approved. Nicholls considered the
A
tax as being unjust because of its compulsory nature and its being
based on expenditure which was by no means proportionate to property,
the tax, he added, was not expedient and was meant to crush the middle
classes, while it could be more just if it were imposed upon the landed
property. This critic went as far as considering the tax as unnecessary
O
because the war was not necessary. Eobhouse made similar allegations
and condemned the impost for being assessed upon past rather than
future expenditure, a principle which was defended as giving the most
impartial evidence that could be obtained of the ability of each
individual.^ Other objections raised against the tax were its effect
OR preventing the diffusion of "that philanthropy for which the nation
is justly distinguished"^ and the difficulty of its administration.
The "Triple Assessment" or the "Aid and Contribution*Act" as it
was officially known, divided the taxpayers into three categories,
the first comprising those who paid taxes on their establishments such
as carriages, men servants or horses; the second including those who
1. Ibid, p.1080
2. Ibid, p.1080
3. Ibid, p.1085
4. Marginal income exempted was £oQ a year; incomes between g6o and
£200 enjoyed a reduced rate and a claim for family support was
accepted.
17
did not keep such establishments but paid taxes on the assessment of
their houses, windows, clocks and watches; the third category comprising
the poor who paid taxes on their lodgings or shops. In assessing income
through expenditure in such a manner, the principle of exempting marginal
income and providing certain abatements, were preserved.
The yield of the tax was disappointing, it was only blfo of the
amount expected. This disappointment did not weaken Pitt's resolve.
In the following year he faced the Parliament with an uncompromising
project, namely changing the basis of the tax and imposing it directly
on general income as derived from its different categories. This was
taken to rid the former system of its grave inequality and of possibil¬
ities of evasion, and to reach other sources of income which had escaped
before and should justly be included. On the whole the new attempt was
expected"to approach as near as circumstances will permit to a fair and
1
equal contribution". The rate of the tax was proportional, 1Qo out
of the estimated national income after exempting the lower income groups
p
in the old system.
In parliament, controversy was keen. Tierney commented that
Pitt's project would put "a tenth of the property of England in a state
of requisition - a measure which the Prench have followed in their career
of revolutionary repine".3 The defects of the proportional income
taxation were explained clearly. It was stated that for the sake of
1. Cobbet's Parliamentary History of England, Vol. 34, p.5.
2. Scotland enjoyed a reduced rate.
3. Ibid, p. 22.
18,
equity, rates of the tax should differ according to the source of
income and its permanency and also according to its size. The basis
of taxation ms constantly discussed; whether it should be on
•1
expenditure, income or properly or mixture of them all. Hobhouse
suggested that "the individual should be rated according to the
property he possessed, the income it produced and the degree of ex¬
penditure, which his situation in life, the size of his family, or other
considerations might demand".'- Another critic even at such an early
period of fiscal development, went as far as to demand the imposition
of a capital levy.^ The wide discussion brought out a very important
forecast of the temporary nature of the tax and its limit. Sir J.
Sinclair wondered if this tax could ever be got rid of once it was
imposed and whether once the principle was established the whole
property of the country would not in future be at the mercy of the
government.^"
(c) The Ptdle which the Tax Played:
Income tax was imposed in spite of all the objections and was
operative till the termination of the War. Buxton thought that the
step was taken rather "too late to repair the laxity of earlier days".-'
The debt service swallowed a large part of a tax which was in fact
largely evaded. But we must avoid facile criticism which may arise
from not considering fully the possible courses of action available in
the period which we are examining. The imposition of the tax could
1. Ibid, p.24. 2. Ibid, p.25. 3. Ibid, p.76.
4. Ibid, pp. 76 and 77.
5. Buxton, S: Finance and Politics, Vol.1, p.7»
19, -
probably not have been accepted unless it had become clear that excessive
sacrifices were needed to end a long and tedious war. Considering the
politico-social conditions at that time the introduction of income tax
was a very progressive measure. Nevertheless, the yield of the tax
reached in 1 800 about 8tfo of the amount of that revenue derived from the
well established land and other assessed taxes. The yield of incometax
reached the £10 m, target in 1807, and then the amount gradually increased
up to £14,6 m. in 1815.
The tax had a marked success in reducing the budgetary deficit, and
while it did not stop borrowing it stabilised the amount of debt con¬
tracted every year as seen in the following table;
Main Items of State Revenue and Amounts of Loans in iSm.
Year x Cus tarns Excise & Land & Assessed Income Total Borrowing
Stamp Taxes Tax xx Revenue
1792 4.1 10.2 3.0 ... 18.9 31.0
1797 5.9 12.3 3.4 — 21.5 71.2
1798 4.7 13.8 4.6 - 27.2 57.6
1799 7.1 14.3 6.5 1.7 32.5 57.3
1800 6.8 13.2 5.1 4.5 33.0 58.5
1800 (4th
Quarter) 2.4 4.0 1.6 1.0 9.7 13.1
1801 8.8 14.6 4.6 5.8 35.9 52.2
1802 7.7 18.7 5.3 3.3 38.5 54.7
1803 8.2 22.2 5.8 0.4 40.4 44.9
1804 9*5 25.0 6.0 3.7 48.1 42.2
1805 10.2 27.3 6.3 4.6 53.2 51.4
1806 10.8 28.4 6.4 6.2 58.0 48.2
1807 10.6 29.2 7.0 10.2 62.3 46.O
1808 10.3 30.4 7.6 11.4 65.2 49.2
1809 11.9 28.7 8.4 12.4 66.5 48.4
1810 12.4 31.3 7.7 13.5 72.3 46.5
1811 10.9 31.2 7.4 13.2 70.4 49.4
1812 11.6 28.9 7.5 13.1 70.2 55.0
1813 11.9 30.8 7.9 14.3 76.7 59.2
1814 12.6 32.2 8.0 14.5 78.0 54.7
1815 12.0 32.3 9.5 14.6 82.8 54.9
1816 10.1 30.4 7.4 11.8 69.9 46.0
Source.; (Che'Quarterly-Journal of Economics, Vol.38, p.215
Silberling raised the point that taking the period when inccme
tax was imposed, it proved to be a "much less important source of
revenue ... than the excise and other duties". This seems to be
a rather unfair judgment. It was clear that the yield of customs
duties was gradually increasing till 1810 when it swung down. Such
is understandable considering that the blockade and war risks
restricted trade and were bound to cut the revenue from the duty
more and more. The excise duties, the only outlay taxes that
supplied the State with an increasing amount. However, the expectel¬
ation of continuous increase of their yield was doubtful. In the
last five years of the War the increase of the yield of excise and
stamp duties amounted to only £0.9 or about 3.5^ of the 1810
figure while the increase in income tax yield in the same period
was £1.1 m. being 8.2$. The average State revenue between 16o6-10
and 1811-15 increased by £10.9 , £3.8 m., or 35^ coming from
income tax alone and only £2.1 m. from the whole outlay taxes.
Land and assessed taxes supplied an ample figure, increasing from
£3 m. in 1792 to £9.5 m. in 1815; but the prospect of any further
increase was doubtful: firstly, because the rate reached 4 shillings
in the £, a figure commonly accepted as being for emergency: secondly
the tax was a redeemable rent charge: and thirdly, landowners were
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dominating the Parliament and could, not "be asked to pay more "while
others were exempt.
The productivity of income tax could be seen when its rate
increased from in 1805 to 1 (Jo in the following year, when the yield
jumped from £6.2m to £10.1m. Moreover, one has to remember the
implications of maldistribution of the tax burdens if income tax was
absent. The repercussions of abolishing the tax after war is clearly
noticeable in the social disturbances and the financial hardship which
followed that procedure. If the revenue from income taxation seems to
be small, it should be remembered that the tax was new and passionately
resisted by the taxpayers. Pitt himself argued that abandoning income
tax and confining on consumption taxes to yield the requisite amount of
revenue was not only impracticable, but would introduce "disturbing
evils ten times more severe than those which are imputed to this
measure". Seligman paid a tribute to the tax in declaring that "there
could be no doubt as to its success".
d. The Burden of the Tax and its Distribution;
The figures of national income given by Acworth"5 might give an
indication as to the part absorbed by taxation in this early period of
economic development, without our committing ourselves as to the
accuracy of such estimates.
1. Seligman, E.R.A: Income Tax, p.58.
2. Gobbet, op. cit.
3. Acworth, A.W: Financial Reconstruction in England, 1815-1822,
p. 136.
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In £M.
Year N. Income Revenue from % Income and °/o
Taxation Lard Taxes
1792 140 17.3 12 3.0 2.1
1814 335 67.4 20 22.6 6.7
This shows that while national inccme increased "by about one
and a half times, taxation increased only from 1^ to 2Q>o between
1792 and 1814. Such could be interpreted by the fact that the
community was in its early stage of industrial development which
necessitated encouragement without which progress would be stemmed
and enterprising faculties would be depressed. Taxation from income
and land, while increasing by more than three times, seemed to restore
a balance with outlay taxes, preventing them from aggravating the
conditions of the poor.
The value of incomes assessed under the five schedules was
£178.6m or 53^ of the national income if we rely on the former figure.
That means about 47& of incomes were exempted. The distribution of
valuation according to the schedules in comparison with 1 949-50 was as
follows:-
In IM.
Schedule 1815-1816 1949-1950
A 60.1 396
B 38.4 41
C 38.3 214
D 11.7 2540
E 30.0 6175 *
T78J3 9366
» Includes income of weekly wage earners who count about two-thirds
of the figure.
Source: McCulloch, op. cit. p.145 and Inland Revenue Report Cmd.8103
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Income from industry and frade Schedule D.^sub ject to income taxation
was very small in this stage of economic development compared with that
nowadays. The development of inccme from Schedules D and E measures
the elasticity of revenue from income tax because income from Schedules
A and B is largely inelastic and income from Schedule C is influenced
by foreign conditions.
The serious defect of the tax was in its having a proportional
rate and thus hitting income earners the more the less their inccme
was. At that time, the just tax was considered to be that which leaves
the individuals "in the same relative conditions in which it found
1 2
than", in other words it should be proportional. Accompanying this
defect was the widespread criticism that giving allowances for the poor
and abatements for children would encourage laziness and multiply the
number of children in poor families.^ These criticisms led to the
abolition of the abatements for children in 1806, increasing thereby
the burden of the taxpayers with families compared with others. Despite
these defects the imposition of income tax as an emergency measure for
war was significant. Taxation and especially that on income was
accepted for the first time to be superior to the incurring of a large
mass of debt. Moreover, income taxation did not die by its repeal
1. McCulloch, J.R: A Treatise on the principles and Practical Influence
of Taxation, p.141
2. Ricardo, D; On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,p,184
3. McCulloch, op. cit. p.419, and Malthus, T.R: An Essay on the
Principle of Population, pp. 460-476
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in 1816; it brought lively and historical discussions 'which revealed
most of the controversy concerning the tax. It raised the problem of
distributing the tax burden and the co-ordination in the whole fiscal
structure.
During these -wars Prance did not have an income tax. She was
levying the four non-personal taxes which were first introduced by the
Revolution and lasted with little alteration till 1917. These four
imposts were: The real estate tax, the business tax, the door and
window tax and the personal property tax. They were much superior to
the others which existed during "1'Ancien Regime", But as they are
not considered as income taxes, in the modern sense, we can pass over
them to the role of income taxation in the second period, World War I,
II Income Taxation in World War I.
a. The Dve of the War;
The outbreak of World War I did not find Britain financially
unprepared. Since the beginning of the Century her taxation system
was progressing steadily towards perfection. The contest over the
People's Budget affirmed the absolute authority of the Commons in the
matter of financial bills. The public was alive to the implication
of taxation on society's socio-economic structure and were well acquaint¬
ed with the theories of equity in its distribution, which were debated
in the election platforms. The differentiation of the rate of taxation
according to the source of income had been in existence since 1907,
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and "unearned income" was made to bear higher tax than the "earned".
The imposition of an extra rate on the part of income calculated to be
spent on non-essentials and luxuries was carried out by the finance Act
1909-10 when a super-tax on the higher incomes was levied. Moreover,
allowances for children were introduced. Zven the taxing of the
increment in land value had had a place in the Statute Book since 1911.
Last, but not least, a balance between direct and indirect taxation had
been well observed since Gladstone's well known simile of the two
attractive sisters. The proportions were already klfo and 53o respective¬
ly.
Income tax became a corner stone in the fiscal structure. In
1913 it paid about 12fi> of the State expenditure on welfare and debt
-f 1
services and about Gf/o of those on defence. In the meantime income
tax absorbed only 2fo of the national income, a fact which explains its
bright prospects.
While Britain had a well established taxation system, that could
bear any quick change without any serious economic or social disruption,
Prance was suffering from her inelastic and inequitable regime. Direct
taxation was based on the four old impersonal taxes which were designed
to assess profit on income according to the outward signs in a way to
cause the least contact with the fiscal administration. The system
was carefully analysed by Truchy who stated that it was of a more
suitable nature "for a nation of small proprietors, of manufacturers
1. Statistical Abstract of the U.K.
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and traders on a small or moderate scale, each one firmly entrenched
in his land or in his shop, very jealous of his rights and looking on
A
the State as an enemy".
The four old taxes supplied only 21$> of the French State revenue
and the property tax by itself yielded 42j& of the direct tax receipts
compared with 22fo from that on professions and trade, a clear indication
O
of the rigidity and the inequality of the system.
To change such a regime which had lasted since the Revolution and
survived after another (of 1848) was not an easy matter. The majority
of population was middle class and not proletarian"1 ana the land owning
power dominated the Parliament.^ They all worked hand in hand to defend
their individualism and privileges by every endeavour. There can be
little wonder that the introduction of income taxation, similar to that
of Britain, was resisted in spite of a French Minister of Finance claim¬
ing it to be the most just and the most efficacious compared with that
of France.^ Opposition to income taxation reminds one of what occurred
in Britain when it was first suggested. Political opposition portrayed
the tax as being disguised socialism and a weapon of tyranny. In
1. Pruchy, H; The War Finance of France, p.205.
2. Annuaire Statistique, France, 1959.
3. Haney, L: History of Economic Thought, pp.330 and 603.
4. In some cases agricultural profits were estimated at about 1C$ or
even less of their real value. See Truchy, op. cit. p.226.
5. Caillaux in one of his speeches tearing the French system down, stated
that "the land tax falls with crushing severity on the peasant;...
the patients...give rise in practice to the most shocking inequal¬
ities; the door and window tax is a tax on air and light...,"
Seligman, op, cit. p.311.
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reality, according to Jeze "the ruling classes with fierce selfishness
opposed all fiscal reforms which would increase their share in the
„ 1
public burden . But the persistence of Caillaux won for him an
approval of income tax reform which was legislated for 1914 shortly
before the outbreak of hostilities. It thus took Prance a century and
a half to accept the principle of income as a real indication of
faculty for taxation.
As to Egypt, she was in a pitiful position. The only source of
direct taxation at her disposal were those on land and houses; no
other tax could be imposed that might affect the "Foreigners" without
consulting the Capitulary Bowers. Even the customs duties were
governed by a chain of Commercial Conventions and the rates of the
duties could not be increased without approval by the signatories before-
2
hand. In 1913 the State revenue was £217.4 m., 3^o of it was supplied
by land and house taxes and other minor direct taxes, 22?o was supplied by
customs and excise duties and other small items of indirect taxes and
the remaining k&/o came from State Railways, Telegraph and Telephone as
well as postal services, public domain, fisheries and profits on the
money in circulation.
b. A period of hesitation;
In spite of the maturity of the British fiscal system, and its
1, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.35, p.192
2. The Capitulation system and the Commercial Treaties will be
explained more clearly in the second chapter.
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capability to meet the new requirements of the War, the Government
was reluctant to take any drastic measure. There was the "G-reat
p
Reservoir" as the income tax had been called since Gladstone, and
3
there was the total stock of wealth which would enable the people to
make a worthy sacrifice. For the first months of the bar no decisive
action had occurred on the fighting front,^ but expenditure was running
at a million pounds a day and this had to be financed by the peace
budget. In the middle of ITovember, Lloyd George intended to go to
parliament to ask for tax increases. Speculation was rife and the
"Scotsman" reported on the morning of the budget day that possibilities
of new taxes to be imposed immediately were being canvassed eagerly.-'
The focus was on Income Tax which everyone expected to get the
necessary money for war.^ Lloyd George himself reminded his listeners
that the tax supplied ample sums to finance the French, Crimean and
Boer Wars and emphasised that taxing and taxing heavily was the only
path in accordance with the honoured traditions set and hitherto main¬
tained by Britain in such an emergency."^ Outlay taxes are important
to exact a share from the non-earning group but still they are precarious.
Customs duties, for instance, however high their rates yield but only a
limited proportion of the total revenue owing to the physical and economic
1. Stamp, Sir J: Taxation During the War, p.1.
2. Ibid, p. 10.
3. Ibid, p.11.
4. Hirst, F.W. and Allen, J.E: British War Budgets, p.21.
5. The Scotsman. 17.11.1914.
6. Stamp, op. cit. p.17.
7. Hansard, Vol.68, 1914, p.350.
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restrictions occurring during the rnr. In the case of excise duties,
their yield is affected by demand and the products which are highly
demanded cannot easily be taxed without straining political and social
relations. On the other hand dependence on loans creates different
problems. Internal loans are limited by the distribution of the
national income and also upon the propensity of a section of the
community above the margin of subsistence, to consume and save.
Reliance on loans does not reduce the tax burden butt rather shifts it
to the future generation. External loans in their turn have a. reper¬
cussion on the balance of payments of the debtor country and influence
-Jthe shaping of its economic structure for a time.
In spite of all this evidence, the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer was not keen to exploit the occasion and increase the levy
p
on income. In his first War Budget he simply doubled the rate of
Income lax in respect of only the last four months of the year,-5 with
a similar addition to the super tax.
In his second budget his liberal attitude inclined him to leave the
rate of income tax the same. These feeble measures as Hirst called
them had a bearing on the high rate of taxation that followed and remained
for quite a good time after the War. It was not until a change-over took
%. Hirst, P.W: The Consequences of the War to Great Britain, p.
The British indebtedness for the first part of the War (to end on
March 31, 1915) was increased by £458m. See Mallet & George:
British Budgets, 1913-1921, p."49. 55"
3. The effective rate for 1914-15 was 1/8 in the £ and for 1915-16 was
3/- in the £
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place and a third War Budget was introduced in September 1 9*15 that real
steps were taken to finance the War largely "by taxation. It can he
said in defence of such policy that Lloyd George did not expect the
War to he of long duration, or on the scale which occurred.
In Prance conditions were worse. The War did not hasten the
execution of Income Tax reform; on the contrary it was postponed and
the call for doubling the rates of the existing taxes was refused under
1
the pretext of not frightening the people and lowering their morale.
It was only in the middle of 1^16, after two years of the "far, that
some serious measures were taken to let income play a role in war
finance.
Looking hack to the state of revenue and expenditure, in this
transitory hesitating period: Income Tax out-stripped its first
2
estimate by about 12$>, and the Super-tax by just less than 2Q%, The
total yield of Income Tax in the financial year was £69.4m or about 3Qo
of the whole revenue and over 3°j of the tax receipts. The realised
increase in Income Tax in the same year was only £22m. compared with
<5333m. being the budgetary deficit or less than ~Jp.
In Egypt the outbreak of the First World War called for an increase
1. Truchy, op. cit. p.188
2. Hirst & Allen, op. cit. p.41.
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in expenditure and as the revenue was rather inflexible a deficit
occurred in the 1914 Budget (the expenditure was £0221.3m and the
-j
revenue £3219.1m) and the Government had to draw on the reserve fund.
Fearing that this state of affairs might continue, the Government
increased the rates of customs duties by 1fa on certain articles after
consulting the Powers concerned, and only for the duration of the war.
The Government was also obliged to increase the rates of public services
instead of taxing the war profiteers. The Government was thus able to
balance the budget during the war and even to augment the reserve fund
by exploiting to the utmost the measures in their hand and by drastically
p
cutting the less urgent paft of the expenditure,
c. Pull Scale War Finance:
The long awaited budget to meet the direct cost of the War arrived
with McKenna. Expenditure was increasing rapidly to an average of £1.3m
x
a day in the four months interval"^ and private spending was by no means
checked and prices increased by August 1915 to over 34'^r those at the
beginning of hostilities. The Chancellor of the Exchequer raised Income
Tax rates by kcfo and broadened the tax basis by reducing the exemption
limit, cutting down the abatements and reselling the assessments under
different schedules. Super-tax was also increased. The new measures
1. The system of keeping a reserve fund for emergency was a dominant
factor in Egyptian finance which lacked the necessary flexibility.
2. The reserve fund reached £E4 m in 1915-16 and increased to £E12.4 el
in 1 91 8-19.
3. Hirst, op. cit.
4. Ibid, p.80.
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were expected to raise the revenue "by an amount equal to the total
receipts of Income Tax in the pre-War period. These measures were
accompanied "by a fiscal innovation namely the levying of a special duty
in i"espect of profits which had "been extraordinarily increased during
the war. The Excess Profits Duty (3.P.D.) had no success. It was
imposed for mere political reasons, and after much reluctance for fear
of its check on incentive. A considerable part of it was refunded to
the taxpayers after the War in spite of the inflating prices.
The flexibility of the British income tax system was quite apparent.
Every year brought increases in the rate or modification of its applic¬
ation which yielded more revenue. The marginal rate, which was 1/3
in the £ just before the War, reached 6/- in the in 1918-19, an
increase of about five fold, and the Super-tax which was only 6d in the
£ on incomes over £5000 became a progressive scale with an upper limit
of l,/6 in the £ when incomes exceeded ,310,000. These two increases
brought the highest rate of Income Tax to 10/6 in the £.
The E.P.D. was imposed on excess profits over and above either an
estimated standard figure or the pre-War average. The tax was justified
as being on the abnormal profits which could not be reached accurately
by the ordinary income tax. Another idea was that such profits arose
from people's sufferings, and that they were not the result of individual
enterprise. The rate of the duty was first charged at 5Qv increasing
1. Income Tax yield in 1913-14 was £47 m. and the expected increase
was £47 m.
to 6qfo in 1 916 and to 80/0 a year later.
The elasticity of these taxation measures can "be shown by the
following table which gives the estimated and the realised revenue from
Income Tax and E.P.D. and their relation to the aggregate tax revenue.
In £M
Year Income Tax S.P.D. Total Tax Revenue
Est. Real Est. Real Est. Real
1913-14 46.0 47.2 160.0 163.0
1914-15 61.5 69.4 — — 173.8 189.3
1915-16 116.4 128.3 6.0 0.1 265.7 290.1
1916-17 151.5 205.0 75.0 139.9 381.2 514.1
1917-18 224.0 239.5 180.0 220.2 543.6 613.0
191 8-19 290.5 291.2 300.0 285.0 782.2 784,2
1919-20 354.0 359.1 300.0 290.0 898.6 999.0
Source: Financial Statements from 1913-''4 to 1919-20.
From 1915-16 to 1917-18 the receipts of Income Tax exceeded the
estimates by over 1 8/0 and that of E.P.D. by 3$>» Incane Tax provided
in 1918-19, 3@/° of the tax yield and with the addition of E.P.D. the
percentage becomes 13/° canpared with 3Q'°, in 1913-14. The total
receipts of Income Tax and E.P.D. in 1918-19, was over twelve times the
pre-War figure, while the aggregate receipts of taxation generally was
only 4.8 times.
In France effective measures to offset part of war expenses
through income taxation were taken in the middle of 1916. A general
tax was imposed at 2$ on all incomes over 5000 frs.^ The progressive
1. Nogaro, B: Effects of the War upon French Finance, p. 82.
principle was adopted shortly after that and the maximum rate became
IQ? increased to 1^o, six months later, and to 2Q-q in 191 8. This
tax on general income based on the existing tax formula was rather
ineffective and produced not more than 51 frs or about ~J?o of the
a
1914 figure of "direct taxes". The logical procedure came in 19*17
when the imposition of the Schedular Taxes broadened the scope of that
tax. The Schedular Income Taxes replaced the old impersonal ones except
that on real estate. These were composed of a set of imposts on income
from different sources with variable rates from 3^0 on agricultural
profits to ksfo on those derived from industry and trade.
The attitude to taxation which arose in the middle of the War,
accompanied by the fierce criticism of war finance, forced the French
Government to impose a war profits tax similar to the British one.
2
It was justified rather from the social angle than from the economic..
Its rate was made 5Qb and raised six months afterwards (in December 1916)
to GQ/o on excess profits exceeding half a million francs. A year
later, the rate was graduated from 60o on the excess profits ranged from
100,000 to 250,000 frs. up to 8O/0 on profits exceeding half a million
francs. A similar measure was also taken, for political reasons, and
an "exceptional war tax" was levied on people of military age not joining
the Colours except in certain specified cases. It was a type of a poll
tax of 12 frs. in addition to 25;o extra on the general income tax.
1. To include taxes on Securities.
2, Of. Truchy, op, cit. p.202.
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Hie success of these steps was very clear since 19*17 as is seen
from the following table:-
In M. Prs.
Revenue from; 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Old Property and other "direct
taxes" 764 704 680 718 402 )
New Income Taxes - 51 254 547 )
War Profits Taxes - - - 209 578 672
Outlay and Similar Taxes 2157 2104 2798 3425 3467 5828
Tax Revenue 2921 2808 3529 4606 4994 7859
Total State Revenue 4549 4131 5252 6943 7621 13282
Source: Annuaire Statistique, Prance, 1939-
The yield of income taxes doubled themselves in 1918 ccnpared with
1917 but this was at the expense of the "old property taxes" which
shrunk by almost the same amount. The main reasons for the ineffective¬
ness of income taxes could be attributed to different factors. In the
first place an important part of French territory was occupied by the
enemy, causing an adverse effect on the national income and even when
it was reclaimed after the hostilities ended it was in a deteriorating
state. Secondly, the collection was lagging very much behind assessment.
For instance, in the 1919 Budget, 4^6 of the tax on schedular and general
incomes was delayed in delivery and only 466 of that part was recovered
a year later.8 in seme cases, the taxation department unlike its
1. The occupied area was estimated to have produced 70^ of France's
coal, 63/0 of her steel and 780 of her sugar. See Peel, C:
The Financial Crisis of France, p.111.
2. Annuaire Statistique, op. cit. p.212.
counterpart in Britain was apathetic in demanding payment and "by their
actions encouraged fraud and evasion.
It was estimated that out of 23 milliard francs of interest on
State and company dividend, only 3.7 milliards "brought in tax. The
most productive tax in the whole system was that on war profits which
yielded an amount nearly equal to that supplied "by the "new" income
taxes. Its amount increased "by about 177fi in 1 918 compared to the
i
preceding year and it was more than trebled in 1919. The proportionof
income and excess profits taxes in relation to the total tax revenue
was 1Qi in 1917 and 22?a in 1918 which indicates their inherent elasticity
and their possible success if they were well administered.
The increase of taxation and the imposition of new ones are not
sufficient to explain the full story of war finance. War expenditure
was very high and only a limited part was met by taxation. But this
part had a certain bearing on the price level and the future balance of
2
the budget. Britain defrayed about 24.?/o of her expenditure from the
beginning of the War up till March 31, 1919, through taxation, the main
part of it as we have seen came from the Income Tax and E.P.D. Fiance
in its turn defrayed only 15.4a "by the same means. ^ The loans contracted
were thus less in the foimer country compared with the latter, with the
result that debt service in Britain increased by about ten times at the
1. Peel, dp. cit. p.110, said that in Spring of 1919, the taxpayers
as a whole had not generally received the demand notes for income
tax relating to the incomes of 1917.
2. Excluding the loans given to the Allies and Dominions.
3. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.34, p.171.
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end of the War compared with 15 times in France.
Regarding its relation to national inccme, the debt charge reached
in Britain 12. 9;o compared with 32.2fo in France."' Such a heavy burden
kept the rate of taxation very high in the post War period especially
in France.
d. Tax Burden and its Distribution;
It is clear that Britain abandoned the idea of judging income tax
in isolation which was the common outlook in the French wars. The
whole tax structure was undermined whenever there was a proposal of
increasing certain tax or creating another. The balance between
"direct" taxes and those on outlay in Britain was changed between
1913-14 and 1918-19 in favour of the former. The proportion became
7SH> in 1918-19 compared with 54^ in 1913-14# Besides, some material
direct and indirect benefits were granted to the groups in the lower
strata through the increase of welfare expenditure (on education, old
age pensions, public health, etc.)
In the case of Finance, an opposite policy was pursued. The
proportion between income taxes and outlay "taxes changed in the jjeriod
against the former. Their proportion became 23?) in 1918 compared with
2£po of the tax revenue in 1 914. Following his apologia, Truchy
justified this proportion of outlay taxes in France as due to the com¬
paratively lower income in France than in Britain, the difference in
the income distribution, with income in France being more widely
1, For the figures see Stamp "Wealth and Income of the Chief Powers"
the Bconomist, 24.5*1 919#
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distributed and the long acclimatization of the public to the British
system. But these are insufficient to explain the exemption of State
securities in Prance, a principle which had long been rejected in
Britain and the under-valuation of certain incomes which he himself
mentioned as demoralizing the taxpayer and increasing the possibility
2
of evasion. She French accepted the payment of taxation by securities
at their par value while they were in fact depreciated, thus reducing
the effective amount paid. Moreover, the proportional increase in
prices tended to widen the gap between the different groups and would
thus call for a higher percentage of income taxes compared with outlay
taxes.
In Egypt the war finance disturbed the balance between the classes
and widened the gap between the rich and the poor. While cotton growers
and dealers, for instance, massed wealth through a sharp increase in
the price of their product, the poor classes were still struggling to
survive,^ The yield of the "direct taxes" which were paid by the
property section of the people, was stationary at £335.6 m, but the
revenue from "indirect taxes" and public services, which hit the poor
section harder than others, increased from £3211.8 m, in 1913 to £3322,7 m
in 1 918-1 9.
The burden of taxation in Britain increased more during the War
1. Truchy, op. cit. pp.222-24,
2. Ibid, pp.226-27.
3. Cotton prices increased from $12,01 per kantar in 1914-15 to $87.81 in
1919-20 and to $200 in 1920; in the meantime, it was estimated by Dr.
Wilson of the School of Medicine that the family expenses of the poor
classes increased by 179J by the end of the war while their earnings
Trent up by 8$> only. See Crouchley, A.E: The Economic Development
of Modern Egypt, p.192, Department of Overseas Trade, Deport onjfche
Economic and Financial Situation of li^gypt, 1919.
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than that in Prance as one can see from the following table:-
1913-1914 1923-1924
Tax in fo of Tax per Tax in fo of Tax per
IT. Income Capita IT.rlncome Capita
£ -
Britain 7-1 3.5 18 9.6
Prance 10 3.7 13g- 5.9
Source: Bowley, A.L: Some Economic Consequences of the
Great War, pp.116 and 120.
In addition to the economic effect of financing the War through
taxation, it had also the psychological effect of impressing on the
people the reality of the burden and the responsibility towards the
coming generation.
If one can use the effective rates of taxation, at the end of the
War in Britain and Prance, everything being equal, to assess the degree
of pressure on different income earning classes, it could be observed
that the burden on the higher incanes in Prance was comparatively more
than in Britain as shown in the following table:-
Rate in the £.
Income
All Earned All Unearned
£150 £600 £l0q000 £150 £600 £100,000
pennies
Britain Actual 5.4 30.0 1 23.45 7.2 37.5 1 23.45
Prance " 1.59 10.47 47.49 12.52 15.7 49.95
Corrected 5.4 35.56 161.29 7.2 9.0 28.62
Calculated from the Report of the Royal Commission on the
Income Tax, 1920, Appendices.
The pressure on incomes of middle size was slightly higher in France
than in Britain, In spite of this in the case of the unearned inccmes
4®.
the French tax was more severe on the lower and middle groups than in
Britain. Also, people with family responsibilities had to bear higher
burdens even if income was earned. On the whole owing to better war
finance in Britain, and the long experience of inccme taxation, the
country was in a batter position to maintain comparatively more stable
socio-economic conditions than France which had to face a high degree
of inflation and disturbing and unbalancing budgets.
Ill Income Taxation in World War II.
a. Expectations priofc to the War;
Hie outbreak of World War II did not take any one by surprise.
Since the middle of the 30's Fascism was beating its drum and a clash
seemed inevitable after Munich. A large part of economic relations
was defined in the inter-war period and the fiscal structure of the
Great Powers was consolidated. Liberal measures to meet a wo rid wide
conflict were insufficient and the planning of the whole economic
structure became a necessity. The orthodoxies of supply and demand in
contracting loans and of profit motive as influencing taxation limit in
a war, were ruled out. On the whole the sequence of economic phenomena
of war became very much clearer. The writings of Nicholson, Pigou,
Keynes, Jeze and Aftalion - their analysis and criticism of the economics
of World War I directed the war architects in Britain and France in the
second war unlike in the previous ones. In Egypt this was not exactly
1. In Britain for a family con-posed of three children no charge if
their inccme was £200, but paid in France £1. 4. 0.
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the case. Shortly before hostilities she had overcome political
obstacles and introduced income taxation of the modern type for the
first time in her history.
Comparative assessment of the different measures taken in this
period by Britain, Prance and Egypt would be rather difficult. While
Britain was in full scale war from 1939 till 1945, Prance surrendered
after Dunkirk and became non-combatant till the landing in Normandy.
Egypt was non-belligerent nearly all the time. These differences in
the part played in the hostilities had their bearing on the scale ahd
manner of fiscal policy, Still it is interesting to analyse these
different policies to find out how income taxation functioned during
this period.
Two stages can be found to relate the chronological events of
military actions to fiscal policy. In each case the country acted
either directly or was obliged to take measures in conformity with the
policy of the occupying power. The first period ended with Dunkirk or
the French surrender; then the second period opened to be closed by the
end of the War. In each stage a certain degree of State expenditure
was needed but the policies were not necessarily uniform. While
admitting that such division is rather arbitrary, it will be seen that
it will facilitate the discussion.
b. Taxation Measures in the First Stage;
Britain entered the War with a sound budget, after several years
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with realised surpluses. Made alert by the political unrest in Europe,
she started to move, and by the P.A. 1937 introduced a "National Defence
Contribution" (N.D.C.) which was applied, with certain exceptions to
trades or business including agricultural business and business consist¬
ing of the holding of investments or other property. It exempted from
the tax certain public utility undertakings such as water, gas, electric¬
ity, and railways, and other income realised from profession or employ-
A
ment. The Taxable profits were those exceeding £2,000 per annum
and the rate was $fo if the business was carried on by a company or other
2
body corporate and 4b if the business was carried on by a different way.
By the P.A.(1) 1939, most of the existing taxes were increased, and the
marginal rate of Income Tax became 5/6 in the £. An "Armament Profits
Duty" (A.P.D.) was also levied on profits arising from armament contracts.
The rate was three fifths of the part exceeding the standard profit which
3 4
was to be assessed in the same manner as the war profits taxes. No
time could possibly be wasted as it had been in World War I. On the
whole, according to Hancock, by 1939 "a broader and firmer conception
1. Profits ranged between £2000 and £12000 enjoyed an abatement of
one fifth. See P.A. 1937.
2. Building Societies were favoured and were subject to an over-riding
maximum of 1-^S of the total profits before deduction of interest
on loans from members of depositors.
3. No revenue had in fact been collected from the tax as it was merged
with E.P. T. in the first war budget some months later. Its real
importance was its use as the basip for E.P.T. See Hicks, J.R.
and others; The Taxation of War^ p.91."
4. Excess profits derived from other than the defined reason was not
taxed such as those from investment. No deductions were allowed
on account of liability to pay the Inccme Tax, N.D.C. or A.P.D.
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of the purposes and techniques of war finance had established itself".''
The declaration of war "brought in complete mobilisation of the
national resources. With established traditions of past history in
mind the theme of the war financiers was 'pay as you fight; in other
words financing the War by taxation and keeping down national debt.
The Government did not need any stimulation to increase taxation and
create new ones, neither did they wait to see the upward movement of
expenditure or expect a quick and decisive battle. A tremendous in¬
crease of expenditui-e was expected and planning v/as carried out on the
O
estimate of five years of war.
The Government planned to take back by taxation most of the increase
of income dud to war, but it became clear that finance by itself would
not do the intended job and win the War, so that side by side with
taxation measures, economic control had to be effective and inflation,
the paradise of profiteering, had to be checked. So, P.A. (2) 1939*
further increased the existing taxes and imposed the Excess Profits Tax
(3.P.T.) in place of A.P.D. It was modelled on the latter levy but
was to apply to all the field of trade and industry generally as there
was no further need to deal with armaments profits separately. The
IT.D.C. v/as left in operation but only as an alternative to E.P.T. and
the taxpayer had to pay which ever was the higher. Inccme Tax became 7/6
1. Hancock, W.K. and Gowing, M.M: British War Economy, p. 10. One can
justify all such precautions understanding that at that time
Germany was spending about 23.of her national income on re¬
armament compared with 6. tfo in Britain; Ibid, p.71.
2. Ibid, p.72.
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in the £ and the Surtax scale was stretched with a top rate of 9/6
in the £, making the maximum rate for income tax 8f/. The E.P.T.
was charged at 6cf0 of the profits exceeding the standard amount after
A
providing an overall allowance. To lessen the pressure of the tax on
production and incentive a relief could "be granted if the plant incurred
any loss in a subsequent year.
More drastic measures had to be taken in the following year to
cope with increasing difficulties and to impress upon the people the
gravity of the situation. The change of Government brought in Sir E.
Wood who announced the increase of the E.P.T. to 10Q<o, a step which was
2
taken for political rather than economic reasons. Yfhen this measure
was taken it was feared that it would increase temptations to spend
lavishly on wages, adrainistration or other unnecessary items and might
accelerate demand on consumers' goods. In addition to the increase
of the E.P.T. Income Tax was raised to 8/6 in the £.
The different tax measures realised in the first two years of the
War an incx-ease of £67 m and £284 m or 16/ and 6"// of the Income Tax
receipts in the pre-war period. These incx-eases equalled 5Jfo and 58fo
of the additions to the total revenue fx-om all sources. It was a
notable amount but not enough to deal with the widening budgetary gap.
Britain was faced with a dilemma after the defeat of Prance and it
1, This was £1000 for the joint stock companies and £750 for each working
proprietor in case of business carried.on by a partnership. If
the business was carried by a joint stock company, the rate would
be 6/0 of the paid up capital, but if carried by a body of corporate
members, the rate should be £/ and fox- other business 1Q&.
2. Pigou, A.C:/) Studies in Public Pinance, p. 158. ^
2
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"became clear according to Hancock that "the surrender of the liabilities
of economic classes in the interests of national war-making power was
1
never seriously challenged".
In the case of Prance, in the same period, one finds little
difference. The country was more aware of the explosive situation in
Europe than they were in World War I. A series of measures were intro¬
duced to provide for rearmament, and others to complete the reorganisation
of the taxation machine. War finance was approached even earlier than
in Britain. This was clear in 1 93& when an extraordinary budget was
drawn for war and by 1938 the extraordinary expendit ire reached about
3Q& of the ordinary.^ Between 1 935 and 1938 a scheduler sur-tax was
imposed at 1Q& and 3®> on the concerns deriving their profits from
3
trading with State departments, civilian or military. That tax was
made progressive shortly before the War (29 July, 1939) and based on
the turnover tax to be graduated from 2on the slice of benefit not
exceeding I$> of the turnover figure and 10Q5o on the profits exceeding
1(It was less harsh on traders and those working on commission.^
When the War began, three laws concerning this tax were passed in three
months. The enterprises were divided into two; those operated on
State contracts would be subject to a rate which ranged frcm 25'o to 10Qo
of the profit if it exceeded to 1 cfo of the turnover figure, the
1. Hancock, op. cit. p.86
2. Laufenburger, II: Les Finances ae 1939 a 1 945, La France, pp.25-6
3. Formery, op. cit. p.217. 4. Laufenburger, op, cit. p.81.
5. The maximum rate for the traders was to be reached #ien the profits
were 20a of the turnover, and for the others 4Qo. See Laufenburger,
H: Precis d'Economic et de Legislation Finaneieres, p.34.
46 •
4
second section embodied other concerns and were allowed a bigger margin,
ibis measure was in reality an attempt to limit profit margins rather
2
than to tax war profits.
Moreover, the Scheduler and the General Income Taxes wore increased
and their administration was largely improved. The tax on wages was
collected at the source from January, 1940, in a manner similar to the
British "Fay as you Barn" (p. A.Y.E.) practice. Hie general income tax
was freed from previous limitations and it became possible that the
rate of progression might exceed 32;a and the aggregate tax paid could
be more than 5Q-o •^
Whether these measures were enough to supply war needs could not
be easily judged because of the swift end of hostilities with the
Germans. In spite of that one can see how Prance followed her old
traditions of relying on loans and outlay taxes for financing the War.
The expenditure from 1st September 1939 till the end of August 1940 was
5
263.4 milliard francs, and only 56.8 milliards, or just less than 21.6fo
c
were supplied by taxation. The direct taxes and those on income
amounted to 2$ of that figure. This low percentage could be explained
in the light of administrative inefficiency, the loopholes in the laws
and the reluctance of the taxpayers to comply with their obligations,
unlike the case of Britain where the Chancellor of the Exchequer's
appeal for quick payment was heartily suppoi"ted by the public.^
1. Laufenburger, Les Finances de 1939 a 1945, pp.81-2. /
2. Hides, J.P.. and Others: The Taxation of War Wealth, pp.153-4 and
Laufenburger, Ibid, p.86.
3. Laufenburger, Ibid, p.81.
4. It should be remembered that the taxpayer, according to the French
system had to pay the tax on general income over those paid on
the different sheedules.
5. Ibid, p.63. 6. Ibid, p.106.
7. See Hansard, Vol.360, 1939-40, p.52.
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As to IJgypt in the same period, conditions were different.
Shortly before the War an Income Tax Reform was introduced after a
-t
long struggle against the Capitulation system. The Reform was a
copy of the French Schedular Taxes of 1917 with some modifications
taken from the British and Italian systems. It was not accompanied
by a general income tax as was the case in France and suffered from
most of the defects of its French original. The assessment of income
was carried out sometimes according to outward signs or estimated x-ental
charges, 'The rates were very modest, reaching l/o as the maximum. It
was expected from the Reform, in addition to redistributing the tax
burden, to supply the Government with ample sums to pay for the increas¬
ing civil expenses and those military expenses required by the Anglo-
2
Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
When the war broke out, it appeared that Egypt did not participate
but in reality She v/as the centre of Middle East operations. According
to the Treaty obligations all facilities of supplies, manpower and
finance had to be provided for the forces. Die new situation increased
State expenditure especially that of the army v/hich had to be expanded
from £E2.9m in 1937-38 to £E8.2m in 1939-40. In spite of all that, up .
till the entry of Italy into the War and the French collapse, the Middle
East seemed to be rather quiet. No drastic financial actions had to
be taken. Prices increased by 2lf0 in 1 940, compared with 33/° in Britain
1. See Chapter II of this thesis.
2. Expenditure to meet the Treaty obligations reached «£El.2m between
193Q-40 and 1942-43. Statistical Year Book of Egypt.
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and 32$ in France. The "budgetary deficit was £ES. 1m or 12|$ of the
revenue in 1 939-40 and was met "by drawing on the reserve fund. But
while that year was the first full year since the introduction of the
"new" taxes, their productivity was noticeable; they supplied £E2.7m
or kofo of the yield of the "old" property taxes. All the "direct"
taxes supplied 23/2 of State revenue compared with 1in the preceding
year.
c. Taxation Measures in the Second Stage:
The second phase of the War was very harsh for Britain in the
beginning, but was comparatively easier when Germany expanded her
campaign in the Bast and America joined the Allies in the battle for
democracy. State expenditure was rising high and the budgetary gap
was widening. But still there was no panic and confidence could be
felt from the steady fiscal actions taken and the determined measures
introduced, tapping every source of revenue. In addition to the 10C$
E.P.T., other drastic actions were taken to keep the net effective
income as low as possible. Income Tax standard rate became 10/- in
the £jallowances and reliefs for earned income were substantially
2
reduced, and the wage earners were asked to pull their weight. Farming
and market gardening up to a certain degree were categoried under
3
Schedule D and thus became subject to taxation on real profits.
"1. U.N.0. Statistical Year Book, 1948.
2. To appease married women and encourage them to participate in
production, their personal allowances were increased.
3. If annual value of the farm exceeded £300.
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Foreign capital assets were transferred to the Treasury on payment of
Treasury Bills. All these measures were accompanied "by a vast scheme
of price control and rationing.
To soften the psychological effect on those whose allowances were
reduced, it was stated that revenue from such reduction would "be
credited to the taxpayers and made available to them after the War, as
Parliament might determine. A similar procedure was taken in the
case of E.P. T. which was severely criticised for its disastrous effect
on production. The borrowed capital directed to develop and expand
production for war needs was i-egarded as working capital when cal-
■\
culating the standard profits. Moreover, part of the produce of the
10(fb rate was treated as reserve to be made available for industrial
reconstruction after the War.
Juggling between the sources of income to get more revenue,
different proposals were submitted to the Government but seme of them
had to be turned dowf|% For instance, a suggestion that an excess tax
could be levied on earned and unearned incomes was refused because
incomes could not possibly bear any more taxes. Also, a proposal of
a service tax on essential amenities had to be turned down for fear
of the reaction of individuals and prices.
It seems as if Britain had reached a state of full mobilisation
of fiscal resources and that no more taxes could be easily levied.
1. This concession did not apply to financial concerns which were
considered as being in a different position.
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This is clear from the yield of most of the taxes especially those
on high income groups. The Surtax reached a stationary state in 1940
and only a slight increase could be expected from E.P.T. after the
confiscatory rate. The slight increase in the yield -was mostly due
to the increase in prices. The increase in Inccme Tax yield could be
also attributed to the same factor. But on the whole, income and
profit taxes supplied in 1944-45,-21895 m. more than the amount supplied
in 1938 and about 1.8 times the whole revenue in that year as shown in
the following table:-
The Yield of Inccme and Profits Taxes
in £ m.
1938-39 - 40 ■- 41 ■- 42 - 43 - 44 - 45
Income Tax 336 392 531 775 1007 1183 1310
Surtax 63 69 77 75 75 76 74
3.P.T. & E.P.D. 1 1 74 248 348 468 475
TT.D.C. 22 27 24 22 30 34 34
Total 422 489 706 1120 1460 1761 1893
Total State Tev. 1006 1132 1495 2175 2708 3149 3355
Source; Statistical Abstract of U.K.
In spite of the fact that the finance "ceased to be sufficient
• 1
as the measure and motive power of economic mobilisation in war"
,2
net taxation (taxation less subsidies) paid about 40o of the Govern¬
ment expenses from 1940 to 1945 compared with about a quarter in the
World War I. The "direct" tax payment supplied about 5Q^ of the
former figure.
1. Hancock, op. cit. p.47.
2. Calculated from figures in Ibid, pp.200, 201, 348 and 349.
51.
As to France in this period, the occupation altered her fiscal
outlook in accordance with her new obligations. War expenditure was
largely replaced by occupation costs causing a slight reduction in the
aggregate expenditure. Between 1940 and 1944 the occupation expenses
- 1
were 45fS of the whole expenses in the period. In 1944 the total
expenditures reached about three times those in 1939 compared with about
five times in Britain which was in a complete state of war on more than
one front. To keep pace with the mounting expenditure the income tax
was radically changed. The "new" measures were not only adopted as
revenue getters but also in order to have an influence on prices and the
2
cost of living which were intended to be kept fairly stable.
A national agricultural fund was introduced to be financed from
the yield of some taxes on agricultural profits,"' and was intended to
improve the social welfare of the agricultural class and to attract
people to return to land. More direct measures to keep prices down
were taken; distributed dividends and other payments from profits either
to the shareholders or the Boards of Directors of Companies were not
allowed to exceed those distributed in one of the three years before
January, 1940, with an increase of of every increase in Capital.
Moreover, the undistributed profits were blocked and could only be
1. See figures in Lauferiburger, Les Finances de 1939 a 1945, p. 67.
2. London and Cambridge Economic Service Vol.24, 1946, p.218. ?
3. To finance the"Fond Rationale de Solidarite Agricttle" several
taxes were imposed; for instance a tax of 3;o on the basic prices
of the wheat production, 8 frs. on each hectolitre of wine produced,
on the selling prices of wood from forest, etc. See Lauferiburger,
Precis, op. cit. pp.19-20.
1
used by the Treasury at interest. By the Act of January 1944, the
^ 2
maximum dividend and profits distributed were limited to 2($&. The
scheduler tax on interest was made uniform at a rate of 2^, except in
the case of interest on post office personal deposits which was favoured
(rate 1Q!o) . A Sur-tax of 5a v/as also imposed on most of the existing
taxes.^ Another measure taken was the replacement of the Armament
Duties by a tax on excess profits in 1941, which exceeded either the
basic profits of the pre-Y/ar figure or 6f0 of the working capital. The
. _ 4
rate was progressive and varied between 2yo and 8Q-o. The real
agricultural profits of collective organisations became subject to
scheduler taxes in 1942, and the indirect system of assessment, "forfait"
through which professional profits were estimated was changed in the
5
same way. The most significant of all alterations was the ending of
the practice of deducting the schedular taxes when assessing the revenue
for taxation.^ Certain reserves were allowed as in the case of
Britain for the renewal of machines and plants. Such reserves were to
be multiplied by 1.25 for 1940, and gradually till it reached 2.20 in
1944 (1939 = 1). In addition allowances were given for technical
development and scientific laboratories, these to be countered by an
extra tax on those subject to commercial and industrial profits tax."''
1. Ibid, p.235
2. Laufenburger, H: Finances Compares, p.235
3. Ibid, p.14 N
4. Laufenburger, Les Finances de 1939 a 1945, p.86
5. Ibid, p.83.
6. Ibid, p.84
7. This tax was part of the turnover tax from which were exempted those
with selling turnover less than 10,000 frs. See Laufenburger,
Precis, op. cit. pp.33 and 34.
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The high tax rates were accompanied by a large degree of evasion
which was encouraged by the resistance movement as a sabotaging method
against the Germans. This limited the effects of direct taxation.
From 1st September 1939 till 31st December 1944, only 29.3^ of the State
expenditure was met by budgetary receipts. Out of the 1931.1 milliard
2francs expenditure, between 1940 and 1944,taxation supplied only about
2% f of which the "direct" taxes alone subscribed 3^S. In comparison
with the conditions of the World War I as shown in the following table,
it seems that income taxation was still excellent as a flexible financ¬
ing measure for emergency.
In Milliard Frs.
Period 12 3 4
Total llormal 2 in f Tax- 3 in fa Income 4 in fa
Bxpen- receipts of 1 ation of 2 & other of 2
ses direct
taxes
1.8.1914-31,12.1918 140 25 18 16 64 5 20
1940-1944 1931 550 28 489 89 175 32
Sources; Lauferiburger, Les Finances de 1939 a 1945.
L'Anpaire Statistique, Prance, 1939.
Quarterly Journal, Vol.34, p.174.
Dunkirk opened a new chapter in the War, and the Axis, repeating
the traditional method of attack against Britain drove to the back door
in the Middle Eastland Egypt had to strain her economy to cope with this
1. Lauferiburger, Les Finances de 1939 a 1945, p.77
2. Ibid, p.66
3. See figuressi Ibid, p.1 30
4. See figures, Ibid, p.114.
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development. Extraordinary expenditure increased and prices soared.
To deal with the new problem a rather liberal attitude was taken,
similar to that of financing World War I in Germany and France, i.e.
through opening credit in the Central Bank and other commercial banks.
The increase in State expenditure was met by increasing taxation very
moderately. Commercial and industrial profits tax was increased by
gradual portions reaching a maximum rate of 12f° in 1942. A sur-tax on
most of the existing taxes fluctuating between 1f° and 1Q:o was also
levied. Another peculiar tax was imposed on the profits derived from
dealings in cotton in 1942. It was meant to force the cotton dealers
out of the market in order to allow the Cotton Commission to buy the
material at the price fixed by the Government. The rate of the tax
was 50° of the profits above 12f° from the cotton trade and was applied
without interference to the other existing taxes.
The most important step taken was the imposition in 1941 of the
E.P.T. It was in the Belgian model, and charged on profits exceeding
a standard amount of the pre-War level or equal to 1 of the income
actually invested. The principle of progression was applied and the
rate ranged between 2Q'j on the excess profits not exceeding a quarter
of the basic figure, and 50° on the excess profits exceeding one half
of the basic figure. Two years later the rates were increased reaching
70° of the part of the excess profits over three quarters of the basic
amount."'
___
1. For Egyptian Income Tax Acts see collection published in Arabic
by the Egyptian Ministry of Finance.
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The Egyptian Government had no difficulty in meeting their
expenditure and through their economy drive they realised a surplus
nearly every year "between 1 940 and 1945. Taxation supplied about two
thirds of the revenue and income and other property taxes provided an
average equal to 2yi> as seen in the following table:-
InJEEM.
123 4
Year Expend- P.evenue Taxation 3 info Income and 4 in f>
iture of % Profits Taxes of %
1940-41 42.7 43.3 26.3 61 9.0 21
-42 46.1 56.1 33.4 60 10.4 19
-43 56.6 66.8 42.5 64 18.0 27
-44 71.9 77.8 48.1 62 20.1 26
-45 82.1 87.7 56.5 64 19.9 23
Source; Pocket Year Book of Statistics.
The flexibility of income taxation is very clear. Its yield
increased from £32 m. in 1940-41 to about £E8 m. in 1 94-4—45. Also the
E.P. T. supplied an amount equal to 75& of the Schedular Income Taxes
in the latter year.
d. The Burden of Taxation and its Distribution;
Prom the previous analysis one can see that the British system
distributed fairly the burden of War expenses between Yfar time and the
future much better than Prance did. The obvious burden on the British
people was the continuous dissaving, through the consumption of part of
1
the capital assets equal to £1686 m. from 1940 to 1944. In addition
1. See National Income and Expenditure, Cmd. 7371.
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industry was unable during the War to accumulate reserves for post¬
war reconstruction due to the confiscating rate of S.P.T. In the case
of Egypt her direct "burden was the accumulation of sterling "balances
which were the outcome of Allied expenses. The increase of these
expenses from EE25 m. in 1959 to £S76.8 m. in 1945' without sufficient
increase in production resulted in the increase of cost of living index
"by over three times its pre-War level.
The proportion of national income absorbed by taxation in the
three countries can be seen in the following table
N.Income Net- * Per Capita in Year
Taxation 1958 prices
Britain ; Em. 4707 1014 22 £21.5 1958
8555 2504 50 59.1 1945
France : l,frd.Frs. 576 65 17 Frs.5o75 1938
1500 275 21 5150 1945
Egypt : ES m. 166 26 16 EE 1.6 1958
502 54 11 1.0 1945
Sources: National Income and Expenditure of U.K.
Laufenburger: Finances Compares Annexes
: Les Finances de 1959 a 1945, p. 128
International Financial Statistics Vol.IV, No.9
U.N. 0. Statistical Year Book, 1948.
From the former table one can notice that the rate of taxation in
relation to national income increased in Britain and in France but toa
I
less degree; in Egypt it decreased. In Britain, it seems that the
safety maximum rate of taxation was reached according to the Physiocratic
2
policy and was much exceeded according to Clark's estimations. Per
2„ Clark, C: The Economic Journal, December 1945, pp.571 and 589.
See also Chapter VI of this thesis.
1. Prest, A.R: War Economics of Primary Producing Countries, p.128
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Capita, the net tax "burden in Britain increased in 1945 (in 1938
prices) "by about 37*° compared with 33*° in Prance. While the average
burden in Rgypt was getting lower, the low income groups in fact bore
an increasing burden. Their income increased by less than 5Qt com¬
pared with a 191?° rise in the cost of living. The higher income groups
whose incomes were highly inflated bore a much lesser burden due to
the limited increase of taxation on them.
The following tables give the tax incidence on different incane
groups in Britain and Prance before and after the Warj-
1938-39
Britain Prance
Total Income Total Income
Range of Before After Rate Range of Before After Rate
Income Tax Tax 7° Income Tax Tax
£ at Frs. Frs. l£Lrd.
Under 250 2681 2676 0.2 100-50,000 86.1 80.4 6.6
(£287) \
500 -
1,000 350 311 11.1 100,000 - 5.5 3.6 33.7
200,000
(£575-1150)
1000 and 170 84 51.2 Over 1 m. Frs. 7.1 5.3 25.9
over (Over 5750)
Total 5107 4704 7.9 115.2 101.5 12.3
1945-46
Under 250 3565 3449 3.3 Under 100,000 561.8 538.3 4.2
(£208)
500 - 300,000 -
1,000 1140 833 27.0 500,000 70.9 50.6 15.8
(£625-1042)
2,000 and 1 M and over
34.6and over 600 24S 59.0 (£2084 & over) 21.4 14.0
Total 9215 7358 20.0 880.7 801.1 9.1
Sources: Annual Abstract of Statistics No.84, p.232._
Brochier, H: Finances Publiques et Redistribution des
Revenues, p.44
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The tables show that the lower inccme groups were still hardly
hit in Prance compared with Britain. The part of income absorbed by
direct taxation while it was reduced in Prance by about 2.~p/o between
1938-39 and 1945-46, was increased by over 153^ in Britain. There
are no figures available in Bgypt related to the distribution of
income that could be compared with the former ones.
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CHAPTER II
r:cc?z taxation dt peace ifutapce
Income taxation in Britain has gone througfj thx-ee stages. In
the first place, it was imposed as an emergency measure to Balance the
Budget; in the second it Became a permanent feature of special
importance in the fiscal structure; and in the third, it was used to
implement certain socio-economic purposes. In Egypt and France the
tax was levied from the Beginning to reform the existing systems and
so it did not pass the first stage.
I. Income Tax as a Temporary Measure to Balance the Budget.
After the abolition of income taxation in 1816, the British
Chancellors of the Exchequer returned to the traditional measures of
financing their Budgets. Customs and excise duties were used to the
utmost and land and houses supplied a limited and static amount.
Bicardianism and "laissez-faire" ideology were dominating socio-economic
thought. Hie current opinion was that State activity should Be restrain¬
ed and that the State should refrain from interfering with peoples'
activities directly or indirectly, In order to achieve a maximum of
welfare for the whole. This was justified under the assumption that
State expenditure was unproductive and, therefore, that any increase of
taxation would hamper pi"oduction and curtail capital accumulation.
Taxation was looked at as a choice of evils under every form.
1. Bicardo, B: op. cit. j»
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It could not be expected then that the purpose of taxation would
be more than a fiscal one. Ideas of graduation and differentiation
were unacceptable from both the economic and the moral point of view.^
In the former it would mean an intervention leading to a disturbance in
2the price mechanism, a circumstance which it was feared would paralyse
industry. In the latter, such a policy "would be unjust, violating the
natural order in society.
Guided by these principles, the Chancellors of the Exchequer
managed to reduce expenditure by about 4Qo between 181? and 1836."* But
this policy could not be maintained any longer than that since the debt
charge was stationary at a high level and made up between 5Cfo and 6qS
of the whole expenditure. Ihe reliance on optional taxes limited
revenue and cumulative budgetary deficits could not be avoided.
Deficits occurred in twelve of the seventeen years prior- to that in which
income tax was reimposed, the total deficit for those twelve years amount¬
ed to El 9.7 m and the surpluses in the other five years amounted in toto
to only £3.3 m. Such a deficit had to be met by creating new deadweight
loans, which, in their turn, aggravated the budgetary problem. In the
period between 1816 and 1842, there were violent fluctuations of demand
and employment, accompanied by bad harvests. The distress was felt
by every section of the community and each attributed it to a defect in
1. McCulloch, J.R: A Treatise on the Principles and practical Influence
of Taxation and the Funding System, pp.1 22-4.
2. Ibid, p.141 and Ricardo, op. cit. p.184
3. See Pees, J.F; A Short Fiscal and Financial History of England,
1815-1918, pp.28 and 54.
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one part or other of the fiscal structure. The agriculturalists
"blamed high rates and export duties for aggravating their conditions;
the industrialists laid the "blame on high tariffs for preventing the
recovery of industry; and the working classes were discontented with
the extensive pressure of indirect taxes. Different propositions were
offered from time to time to end the financial weaknesses "but most of
them evaded any reference to "direct taxation" of income. A general
tax on houses, a property tax limited to capital and a lev;'' on created
A
wealth were some of these suggested imposts.
The most urgent problem facing the Chancellor of the Exchequer
was the chronic "budgetary deficit which could not "be cured by economies
in expenditure. Balancing the budget was the main aim of sound policy
at that time and one which was hailed from the economic and moral points
of view. It was a sign of economic stability analogous to the behaviour
of individuals. So Peel went to Parliament reminding it of its assur¬
ance to approve direct measures "for the purpose of equalizing revenue
2
and expenditure". The experiment of loans proved to be insufficient,
3
wretched and inexpedient. As to increasing outlay taxes, it seemed
that such a policy was tried and failed to supply what was estimated,
thus giving an impression that the.rates had reached the maximum limit.
Moreover, any increase of duties on articles of wide consumption would
inflict excessive damage on the labouring classes and the duties on
1. Seligman, E.E.A; The Income Tax, pp.118-121 ^
2. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.61, 1842, p.431
3. Ibid, p.430
luxury goods would not yield an impressive amount. Besides, such
levies would depress industry and trade. Great initiative was needed
to deal with the problem, and in spite of the resentment against direct
income taxation, Peel proposed that "for a time to he limited, the
income of (Britain) should he called on to contribute a certain sum
for the purpose of remedying this mighty and growing evil". And so
Income Tax was imposed for three years, hearing a rate of 7d in the £
on incomes ahd over £150 which was the exemption limit.
Foreigners, as well as nationals, were subject to the Income Tax,
hut Ireland for the time being, was not subject to it for no reason
-1
other than the absence of suitable machinery for the job. One of the
advantages of the tax, declai-ed Peel, was the small cost of its
p
collection. The tax was criticised in parliament for being the most
unpopular levy ever introduced in Britain, inquisitorial and unjust.
The opponents pressed the Chancellor to give an assurance that the tax
would be temporary, that during this period of its temporary imposition
its pressure should be light and that there should be no invidious
3
exemptions, discrimination or graduation.
The tax turned out to be more productive than had been anticipated
and it yielded over £5 m. which was one-third above the estimated amount.
1. According to the Irish, the Act of the Union which was passed in 1800
regarded them as a separate unit for purposes of taxation and thus
were not obliged to subscribe in the U.K. budget of. The Report of
the Royal Commission on the Financial Relations between Great Britain
and Irelandc-8262.
2. Hansard, op. cit. p.445.
5. Ibid, pp.508-9.
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In 1844, a budgetary surplus was realised for the first time in six
1
years. Shis budget continued to show a surplus until 1854, with the
exception of two years.
a. The H&le of Income Tax to Reform the Fiscal Structure;
In addition to meeting the budgetary deficit, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer intended to use the temporary tax to reform the fiscal
structure. The Chartist movement was strong and the Anti-Corn League
was very active. A Committee on Import Duties presented a report in
1840 in which they advised the removal of some prohibitive duties amd
2
the relaxation of others. Peel and his followers did not doubt the
social and economic advantages of implementing free-trade policy. The
reduction of outlay duties would reduce the prices of articles of con¬
sumption and so the cost of living. Thus, the imposition of Income Tax,
Peel asserted, would not mean an incroise of the taxation burden because,
frcm the pecuniary point of view, it would be ccmpensated by a reduction
3
in outlay taxes.
The success of the income tax facilitated the continuation of such
a policy, and thus its renewal became necessary at every date of the
expiration of the temporary legislation. In 1842 export duties on home
manufactures were removed except those on raw materials needed by
industry such as coal and wool; other duties on no less than 750
articles were reduced.^" By 1845, being in a strong financial and
1. Cf. Pees, op. cit. pp.54 and 82.
3. Hansard, op. cit. p.439
2. Buxton, S: Finance and Politics, Vol.1, pp.48-50, The Committee
showed that ten-elevenths of the whole customs receipts were produced
by 82 articles; and over six-sevenths from only 9 articles.
4. Hansard, Vol.126, 1852, p.1359.
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political position, Peel was able to sweep away by one action about 520
customs duties, most of them unremunerative, and so gave a great impetus
to commercial enterprise. A year later, the Corn Laws came to an end
and the champions of free-trade were greatly strengthened. In 1853,
Gladstone stated bluntly that Parliament could dispose of the income tax,
but they had to find an alternative in a tax upon land, houses, and other
visible property or in a system of licences upon trade, or by changing
the legacy duties, none of which proposals could be as effective as the
income tax:, which was still needed to stabilise the budget and assure
commercial and fiscal reforms.
The renewal of income tax this time, in spite of its unpopularity,
was so important to finish the work which was already s tarted that,
according to Giffen, "Had no decisive remissions been made in 1853, had
not the way to do so been discovered notwithstanding every obstacle, it
is altogether doubtful when they would have been made. It was in 1861
that Gladstone showed that a balance between "direct" and "indirect"
taxation should be attained without any kind of partiality. In his
financial statement he compared the two kinds of taxes as two sisters
"one living more free and open, and the other somewhat more shy, retiring,
and insinuating".^ There was no need for unfriendly rivalry in the
admirers of the two.
The tariff reform measures proved to be successful. While facilitating
1. Giffen, Sir R; Economic Inquiries and Studies, Vol.I, pp.238-9
2. Ibid, pp.238-9
3. Quoted by Seligman, op. cit. p.165
'
I
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trade and encouraging industry, they did not seem to have reduced the
yield of customs and excise duties on the average. On the other
hand, the flexibility of income tax showed its merits as an engine of
p
fiscal reform and long experience strengthened its permanency. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer in a short time became accurate in estimating
the revenue from the income tax within a margin of error of 2,1°/0 over
17 years, as one can see from the following table. This countered the
criticism that the tax could not comply with the maxim of certainty.
Estimated and Realised Eevenue from Income Tax
in £ M.
Year Estimated Realised Year Estimated Realised
1858-59 6.1 6.7 1867-68 6.8 6.2
1859-^0 9.9 9.6 1868-69 8.7 8.6
1 86o-1861 10.9 10.9 1869-1870 9.4 10.0
1861 -1862 10.4 10.4 1870-T871 6.4 6.4
1862-1863 10.1 10.6 1871 -1872 8.8 9.1
1863-1864 8.7 9.1 1872-1873 6.9 7.5
1864-1865 7.8 8.0 1873-1874 5.6 5.7
1865-1866 6.2 6.4 1874-1875 4.0 4.3
1866-1867 5.7 5.7 1 132.4 135.2
Source: Buxton, Finance and Politics, Vol.11, App.C.
In spite of that, with an adequate surplus in hand, Gladstone
thought that time had come to abrogate the tax, and made this the main
plank in his election platform in 1874 but his defeat put an end to all
hesitation and the tax became a permanent part of the fiscal structure
of Britain. The reduction of the rate after the election to 2d in the £
was merely a political manoeuvre but no Chancellor of the Exchequer
ever promised again to abolish income tax.
1. Cf. Rees, op. cit. pp.232-3.
2. Giffen, op. cit. p.245»
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b? The Distribution of the Income Tax Burden during the period;
The imposition of income taxation changed the "balance hetween
"direct" and "indirect" levies. In 1842, customs and excise duties
yielded 74J of the whole State revenue; in 1875 when the income tax
was at its lowest the percentage was oZfo. In 1857, when the income
tax revenue reached its highest figure of cS15 m, the percentage was
only 51/o,
When the tax was introduced in 1842, the rate was 7d in the «£j
incomes under £150 were exempt, as were also savings hanks and charitable
institutions. Scotland enjoyed a reduced rate and the Irish were un-
A
taxed. The outcry against the inequality of the tax resulted in an
attempt at successive reduction of the rates after 1855, on diminution
of the marginal untaxed income to £100 and the application of the tax
to Ireland in the same manner as in Scotland. The Crimean War in 1854-5
pushed the rate up to 1/2 in the £, hut then it was reduced again and
fluctuated according to the need of the Exchequer and reached,its lowest
rate in 1874 when it became 2d in the <£, a rate which could not he
maintained without sacrificing the reputation of the tax that it cost,?
least to administer. Sometimes, the low rate was accepted as a measure
to lessen the inequality attributed to the tax.
The continuous criticism of inequality in the income tax resulted
in the setting up of two Select Committees in 1851 una 1861 known as
1. Seligman, op. cit. p.132. i/ According to the Commission of the
Financial Relations, op. cit. incaae tax was imposed on Ireland
in compensation for a loan supplied to relieve the Irish poor
during the Irish famine.
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the Hume and Hubbard Committees, to enquire into the existing mode of
assessing and collecting the tax and rendering it more equitable. The
reports of the Committees threw much light on the awareness of the
witnesses of the problems concerning income taxation at that early time
of its trial. The actuarially minded witnesses favoured the capital-
ization of income by which method the tax could be assessed accordingly.
This seemed perfect from the theoretical point of view but presented
sutfh serious practical difficulties that Hume's Committee refused it,
and it was also criticised by Gladstone in 1853.
The main problem, on which the two Committees virtually agreed,
was the differentiation of the rate according to the kind, or the source
of income; whether it was professional, or industrial, or variable,
or ephemeral on the one hand, or what could be called perpetual, or
?
certain, or property income on the other. But neither was able to
present a practical scheme to implement such a rule. The most object¬
ionable principle was the graduation of the tax. In 1842, Lord
Brougham objected to its application, arguing that it would destroy the
basis of jgstice on which the tax was supposed to rest."' If one
accepted the principle of graduation, the logical consequence would be
a rate of 1OQv which could not be approved. McCulloch called such a
proposal "seductive, unjust and dangerous".^1" If the State agreed to it,
1. McCull ch adhered to this view. He said that in order to lay the
same burden on two parties, we should calculate the present value
of the income enjoyed by each. op. cit. pp.128-9.
2. Seligman, op. cit. pp. 145 "dnd 161 -2/
3. Hansard, Vol.61, 1842, p.735.
4. McCulloch, op. cit. p.141.
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he said, it had stepped out of its proper province, security would
come to an end, and we would find ourselves "at sea without rudder or
1
compass". The two Committees failed to submit an approved report
to reform the income tax as it was felt that the tax was of a temporary
character and any agreed plan might result in making it permanent.
Thus the absence of discrimination according to the source and graduation
of the rate of the tax resulted in the burden being inequally distributed.
In spite of the failure of the two Committees, they clarified some
points concerning the income tax such as the exemption of savings which
was advocated by J.S. Mill; the need for a clear definition of taxable
income, the distinction between income and capital gain and the emphasis
that net income and not the gross, should be the basis for the imposiV
tion of the tax.
The application of the income tax on Ireland, and the comparatively
low rate enjoyed by Scotland raised the problem of distributing the
Imperial tax among the different communities within the country. In
less prosperous sections, the productivity of.capital is smaller than in
the prosperous ones in the same way as small incomes and high incomes
2
are. Accordingly, as we should graduate the tax rate to ensure equality
of the distribution of the burden, the incanes of persons in less pros¬
perous areas should enjoy a reduced rate. Such action would retain
■within the boundaries of the latter areas the capital necessary for its
development. To what extent the distribution of the tax burden in the
1. Ibid, pp.142-3
2. Royal Commission on the Financial Relations, op. cit.
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period conformed with that principle is very difficult to assess. The
0'Conor Don Committee which reported on its inquiry into the financial
relations and the relative taxable capacity between Great Britain and
Ireland in 1896 came to the conclusion that "whilst the actual tax
revenue of Ireland is about one-eleventh of that of Great Britain, the
relative capacity of Ireland is very much smaller and is not estimated
....as exceeding one-twentieth". The Report went on to quote IT. Senior
that "the pressure of taxation will be felt most by the weakest part
1
of the community" and that the capacity of a rich country for bearing
taxation, relatively to that of a poor one, exceeds the ratio given by
their respective annual wealth. In other words, the proportional rate
of income taxation between rich and poor communities is bound to inflict
excessive burdens on the latter compared with the forcer.^ No
similar enquiry was made about Scotland, but most probably, what is
applied to Ireland can be applied to Scotland too.
Giffen, in an article written in 1876, looked at the problem from
the angle of Parliamentary representation. He assessed that there
"ought clearly to be some proportion between the representation of
different communities in a common Parliament and the wealth and popul¬
ation of these communities".^ Following his argument one would be led
to accept a principle that proportional representation ought to be in
accordance with taxation, to assure political stability. This is
1. ' Ibid, p.l6. ~~
2. According to the Report the average income of the inhabitant of
Great Britain was £h0 and of Ireland £16 and after providing for
subsistence, the proportional taxation would then take from the
Irishman nearly three times as much comparatively as from an
inhabitant of Great Britain. Ibid, pp.20 et sep.
3. Giffen, op. cit. p.277.
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"because, when disproportionality existed, the weaker communities
share in voting the burdens which their richer and stronger associates
have to bear. It is rather difficult to accept such a view as it would
lead to the deterioration of the conditions of weaker communities. As
in the case of individuals, communities should bear the burden according
to their ability, assuming that the good of the whole as such is the end.
The per capita figures would show that they were lower in Scotland and
Ireland than in England, but this would not be sufficient indication as
to the real burden in each section under the former assumption.
II. Income Taxation as a Permanent feature in the Fiscal Structure -
A Heutral Stage "(1874-1 90^):
The success of income tax: as an emergency measure gave the Exchequer
in Britain an accurate factor with which to construct a stable fiscal
structure. He benefited from the theoretical discussions, the parliam¬
entary controversy as well as from the different select committees which
co-operated to clarify the nature of the tax. In Egypt and Prance,
the task of the Ministers of Finance was different and rather difficult.
They had to deal with a rigid structure, fortified by strong political
power groups. Odd taxes on certain types of income were introduced
and it was only after a hard and ceaseless struggle that complete systems
of income taxation were adopted. Even then, these countries' reaction
towards the "new" schemes was uncertain, making the estimated of the
Ministers more or less, uncertain and hazardous.
a» Gradual Increase of Expenditure:
Several factors contributed to the gradual increase of expenditure
in the three countries, in spite of the economic tremors from time to
time. Population was graving steadily and their needs were increasing
sharply. The international instability necessitated the maintenance
of a large standing army arid a high rate of rearmament. There were
also war commitments which contributed excessively to the charge.
Moreover, expenditure on social welfare was augmented, an outcome of
a revaluation in public sentiment and political thought. In Britain,
State expenditure increased by £33.9 m. or 45.6/0 in the 25 years between
1875 and 1899. The Boer War pushed expenditure further up and the
return of peace did not return it to its pre-war level. In Parliament,
members disputed the wisdom of such a course of affairs and argued
whether such an increase was proportional or "out of all proportion to
-1
the national enrichment". The same steps, but on a smaller scale,
were followed in Egypt and Prance.
The increase of expenditure in Britain did not ccme about without
resistance. In 1904, an amendment tabled to the Finance Bill condemned
its continuous growth and all aspects that led to such an increase were
attacked. Administrative expenditure were considered as of a wasteful
nature. Expenditure on social services was not favoured by one section
and those on army and navy were condemned by another. Even the dis¬
charging of the public debt through a "sinking" fund was painful. Its
maintenance meant a high rate of taxation and its suspension meant a
large debt service. It was feared that an unchecked increase in public
1. Gf. The discussion in the 1902-3 budget and controversy of ¥. Churchill
and Sir S. Giffen in Mallet: British Budgets, pp.1 93-4.
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expenditure would "broaden largely the basis of taxation (and) -would
therefore l-aise ...something much more formidable than a political
issue; it would raise an issue directly social". Ibis fear was
justified shortly afterwards when the socio-economic aspect was domin¬
ating the taxation policies - an expenditure which started in Britain
and spread to other countries. Harcourt declared in 1895 that this
trend would be permanent. He frankly said that "economy,..has become
a lost art at the close of the century. It is a despised and unfashion¬
able idea and I do not know whether, under any circumstances, it will
2
ever come into fashion again".
Till the social ana fiscal reforms introduced by the Liberals in
the last decade of the 19th century, the increase of State expenditure
was parallel to that of the national income as seen in the following
table:-
Year national Income State %
(at market price) Expenditure
1870-6 1177 72.6 6.1
1904-10 2241 147.3 6.6
Sources: Clark, C: Bconomics of Progress, 195<|, 33-.
p.63 and The Statistical Abstract of U.K.
b. The theoretical development:
It might be true that the increase in State expenditure went
parallel with that of national income, but there was not enough reason
for taxation to be incx-eased proportionally, simply because income
1. W. Churchill in the Budgetary Discussion in 1902, Ibid p.195.
2. Ibid, pp.99-100
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distribution did not stay static. - Thus politicians had to find
guidance from contemporary theories.
J. S. Mill, who was quoted several times in Parliamentary debates
and had given evidence in every Select Committee dealing with taxation
during his time, was against any tar: that might hinder the accumulation
of capital or impede the fostering of the national income. This was
the reason for his objection to any tax that might touch saving. He
advocated the principle of equality in taxation purposes which was
■\
interpreted as "Equality of Sacrifice", If one assumes that everyone
gets his reward from work, then, it would be just that taxation exacted
from each should be proportional, simply because everyone's income is
equal to the pain undergone by the work. But before exacting the tax
"a certain minimum of income, sufficient to provide the necessaries of
y 2
life" should be exempted, J In no way is the Government justified,
according to Mill, in interfering through graduating the tax, as this
might affect industry and economy and penalise the people "for having
worked harder and saved more than their neighbours". If there was any
difference between people, not in merits, but in opportunities, "it
would, be in the power of good Government to abolish such inequality"
by instruction and by legislation, and not by discrimination in the rate
of the tax",^ In other words, State interference should not go further
than redressing inequality due to unnatural conditions. This line of
reasoning matched the classical concept that individual freedom 'would
1. Mill, J.S: Principles of Political Economy, p.805
2. Ibid, p.8o£
3. Ibid, p.808
4. Ibid, p. 311
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assure economic equilibrium and produce maximum welfare.
The insistance on the reduction of taxation was thus important
as Wicksteed afterwards asserted, because taxation is in itself a kind
of interference through which some resources of members of society are
transferred "from purposes which they would have selected for themselves
to purposes which are selected for than" and which could only be justde¬
fied if there is proof that the purposes to which these resources are
directed are collectively more important than those from which they are
-j
deflected." Thus, any process of relieving the poor at the expense
of the rich might probably check the production energies of the community
unless the contrary could be fully proved. The safest way is to be
neutral in dealing with taxation and to impose an equal percentage rate,
after allowing a minimum for necessities, which would tend to reduce all
incomes to the same relative position and thus would not interferewith
2
the exchange rates which are the result of economic forces.
In Prance, "the prevalence of small farms and industrial enterprises"
contributed to the domination of individualism which was accepted as
"a priori rather than a posteriori"-5 by L. Say and Leroy-Beaulieu.
L. Say was very optimistic and a keen believer in the beneficience of
"natural law". Por a long time he was the autocratic ruler of French
finance and his main policy was to ameliorate the incidence of taxation.
Like Peel he did his best to remove trade restriction but unlike him
1. Wicksteed, P.H: The Common Sense of Political Economy, p*66o
2. Jevens, W.§: Political Economy, p.129
3. Haney, L.H: History of Economic Thought, p.601
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he was very hostile to the imposition of income taxation which he
feared would discourage individual effort and thrift. The two French
writers tirelessly and vigorously opposed income tax. Say, in his
eighties, and early nineties, was reported as having devoted a course
1
of lectures "to show the dangers and iniquities of the system".
This influential French school was in favour of the universality
of taxation which could be effected through proportional taxation.
This proportionality had been employed since the Revolution to rule
out the injustice of the old system and was afterwards turned into a
2
weapon against the rising Radical socialism. The difference in
approach to the tax by fiscal reformers on the one hand, and radical
opponents of wealth in general on the other, made it difficult for
both to bring the tax into being. It seems that the "academic"
emphasis, that the income tax should be graduated from the start,
frightened the middle-classes whose support was needed to pass such a
reform.
In the case of Egypt, the financial pressure and the political
difficulties of the 1870's shook the country's social framework. The
failure of the Khedive to meet his obligations to the bondholders
brought in a foreign dual control, Anglo-French ^ of the revenue and ex¬
penditure, The "open door" policy was adopted and Egypt became a
lucrative place for foreign investment. British occupation in the
early 'eighties completed the destruction of protectionism and turned
1. Seligman, op. cit. p.293
2. Bastable, C.F; Public Finance, p. 288.
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the country sharply towards liberalism. The Financial Advisers were
very much interested in free-trade and interpreted the Commercial
Treaties in which the country ms involved, sis giving equal treat¬
ment to foreign and domestic products. Accordingly, if the Govern¬
ment imposed a duty on an imported material, it should levy an
equivalent excise duty on similar material produced internally.
The same ideology supplied the background to the resistance of
any kind of incane taxation which might curtail the profits of traders
and reduce the rate of interest of the bondholders, who were largely
foreigners. Certain conventions, formally agreed to for a long period
of years, provided "Foreigners" with extra-territorial juridical treat¬
ment, These conventions were known as "Capitulations" through which
the privileged nationals of friendly nations enjoyed liberty of
residence, inviolability of domicile, freedom of travel and trade,
freedom of religious practice, exemption from local jurisdiction and
immunity from any extra taxes and obligations which might be imposed
on any subject because of his religious belief.
The study of the Capitulation treaties shows that they were intended
to exempt the nationals of the Privileged Powers from certain categories
of taxes and obligations, such as the poll-tax on non-Moslems, the
obligation of local citizens to feed the army en route, forced labour
1
for emergency needs and so on. But, when the country fell under the
11 Art.13 of the Prance-Turkish Treaty of 1604 reads as follows:-
"Que les~*dits Prancais soient exempts de I'impot de Cassabie autre-
ment nomme 1'Ayde de Cuirs,.. corame aussi de celui des cuirs nomme
Reft. Qu'ils ne soient non plus recherches de payer celui des buffles,
nomme Badj. Qu'ils soient aussi exempts de payer aucune chose aux
Gardes de nos portes et peoges.." See RecefitL des Traites dsaruTraxies
de Commerce But le Chev er $r.D. de Cussy, 1e Bartie II, Paris 1835
pp.456 et seq.
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strong influence of the West, the Capitulations were fully exploited
to the extent of immuring "the foreigners" from income taxation. Lord
Lloyd, at one time a High Commissioner in Egypt, looked on the
Capitulations as "the price which a backward Government, incapable of
maintaining order in its own territories, has to pay in order to secure
the influx of foreign trade and capital",
c. Inccme Tax at Work:
She theoretical ideas previously mentioned impressed on those
responsible for British public finance the need for a policy of
equilibrium through budgetary balance. Shis-policy was observed from
1874 to 1899 when deficits in some years were met by surpluses in others.
She absence of Income Sax in that period would have meant an over-all
2
deficit of £298.9 m. instead of a surplus of £9.7 m. She existence
of the tax made possible a reduction in the national debt in the period
3
of £130 m. With a fluctuating fate between 2d and 8d in the £ income
tax was degenerating into a Chancellor's umbrella to be put up or down
>r Zj.
according to the signs of the financial skies. But it was still con¬
sidered as a bad, though useful, tax.
She yearly debates in Parliament and the way in which the
Chancellors conducted their financial policies show the manner in which
income tax was framed. A scientific study of the real incidence of
1. Lloyd, Lord G: Egypt Since Cramer, Vol.1, p.21.
2. See figures in Pees, op. cit. a
3. figures in Buxton, Vol.11, op. cit. p.3^3 aad Mallet, op. cit. p.495
4. Clapham, J.H: An Economic History of Modern Britain, 1850-1886, p.152
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taxation was absent but every endeavour was made to apportion properly
the burden of taxation between individuals and among the various sections
of the community. At that time of growing State liability, it is
interesting to notice the insistence of the Chancellors of the Exchequer
on the division of the burden between direct and indirect taxes arising
from the crude idea that the former are mainly paid by the rich while
the latter are borne mainly by the poor. In addition to that policy,
there was the continuous call for equal division of the tax burden
between income and property earning groups. Such a constant preoccupy_
'4tion with the problem of equity made it possible for Britain to face
the tremendous growth of expenditure without feeling much financial
strain or politico-economic disturbance. It seems to have become a
traditional rule during the period that equal numerical proportion
between direct and indirect taxation should be maintained. If any
relief was to be given in one direction, it had to be balanced by similar
2
relief in the other. Eitchie seemed to be very pleased in 1903 when
estimates for revenue were 49.1/ for "direct" compared with 50.5$ for
"indirect" taxation.^ The increase of the rate of income tax from 8d
to 1/3 in the £ during the Boer Far was accompanied by the imposition of
1. The outlook on the incidence of taxation was expressed by Buxton,
who said "Ihe poor man in every purchase he mates pays for his very
poverty", and indirect taxes are "levied more or less at the same
rate on the different qualities of the same article". He added,
"the inevitable result is that the duty is far more burdensome on
the poor, the consumer of these goods. "To remedy this inequality
if for no other purpose, and to redress the balance between the
richer classes and the poor classes, it is essential to levy heavy
direct taxation". Buxton, Vol.11, pp.381-2.
2. This could also be noticed in the allocation of the increase in ex¬
penditure between 1875-6 to 1894-5» £12 m. weht to the Navy and Army
compared with £12.7 m. allocated for education and local authorities.
See Mallet, op. cit. p.78.
3. Ibid, p.217.
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duties on sugar, corn and the export of coal. The interrelation
between income tax and death duties was also observed and any criticism
of the low rate of the former was countered by the argument that it was
compensated for by increase in the latter.
When income tax became permanent, it was imperative that it should
be cleared of all ambiguity and misconception. Different steps were
taken to impose the tax on the true net income as far as possible.
Allowances for depreciation were given in Schedule D and even repairs
•i
for real estate became deductable. Persons occupying land for
purposes of husbandry were given the option to pay on their actual profit
in the same manner as in mines. The attitude towards benevolent fund
exemption became more accurate. Dxenptions for friendly societies were
extended and a limited amount of income employed for the benefit of
Trade Unions was allowed free of tax. The universality of the tax
became more apparent and the differentiation in assessment between
Dngland, Scotland and Ireland was terminated. The control over income
for foreign sources became more effective. To eliminate the suspicion
against tax administration, the system of poundage for civil servants
2
was abolished. Gradually, different measures were adopted to curtail
evasion and by the end of the century about two-thirds of the tax was
assessed at the source,'' This made possible the widening of the scope
1. Allowances for wear and tear increased from about £4 m. in 1893-4
to £11.8 m. in 1902-3
2. Seligman, op. cit. p. (s
3. The spread of joint stock companies facilitated such a course.
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of personal allowances and abatements. In 1874, only incomes between
£100 and £300 enjoyed abatements, the figure being £80. By 1 900
abatements were given on incomes between £16o and £700 and these ranged
between £160 and £70,
She rate of income tax between 1878 and 1900 ranged between 5d
and 8d in the £, As proportionality was thought to be a symptom of
equality, as we have noticed, and differentiation of the rate according
to the source was considered impracticable, it became rather difficult
to raise the rate without meeting stubborn resistance from the taxpayers.
Thus it was realised by Goschen in 1887 that what seemed to be an
elastic revenue system turned out no longer to possess that elasticity,
and he had to recommend two years later that the State should increase
p
the number of sources of revenue.
The State had pushed simplicity of taxation up to a point beyond
which it could not carry out its policy without danger. Goschen's
view was not shared by Sir E. Vincent, who thought that "high duties on
a small number of articles impede commerce less, cost less to collect,
and are probably .... less liable to evasion and fraud".^ At this stage
of development, and in its crude form, income tax could not be expected
to play a greater role in the fiscal structure. It was important that
it should, first of all, rally everyone round it, as the best neutral
factor of finance which did not hinder the creation of wealth or interfere
1. See Buxton, op. cit. Vol.11, p,378 and Mallet, op. cit. p.484
2. Mallet, op. cit. pp. 2 and 29.
3. Ibid, p. 158.
with the expansion of trade or hamper the growth of industry. iy
the end of the century, income tax was well established and was at
the point of reformation which would enable it to play a larger part
in the increasing socio-economic complexities.
The Boer War brought with it a notable increase in State expend¬
iture and fiscal revolution. In 1907, Asquith made it clear that,
recognizing income tax as a permanent part of British fiscal system,
something should be done "to remove anomaly and arrive at some scheme,
without destroying the essential features or the productive character
of the tax." He intended to introduce a system of financial planning
to cover several years in order to meet the needs of social reform, and
to satisfy meanwhile, the principle of ability. Asquith's policy and
that of Harcourt before him, were symptoms of the unqualified adoption
of the socio-economic theory, in other words that taxation should be
used fox- the purpose of social and economic regeneration. This was a
revolutionary divergence from the neutral outlook which was emphasized
by goschen in 1894 that "the Chancellor of the Bxehequer ought to
2
finance for the Exchequer and not for social reform". Following
the "new" idealism did not mean that income taxation ceased to be the
main factor for financial purposes as it continued to be so in addition
to its social function.
In the case of Egypt and France, income taxation was imposed mainly
1. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, ¥ol.172, 1907, p.1202
2. Quoted by Mallet, op. cit. p.92.
from the "beginning to finance the growing "budgetary expenditure "but
not to correct the maldistribution of wealth and income. The role of
the tax in the two countries will be discussed in the next section from
the latter point of view. But before leaving this point, one has to
note that the criticism of the French taxes in their failure to
distribute the public burdens equally, resulted in 1872 in the imposit¬
ion of a tax on "movable propei-ty", that is, on the interest, dividend
and other income of corporations. The tax was deducted at the source
and bore a proportional rate of . It was not considered as a tax on
inccrne, since that would lead to a hostile attitude, but it was con¬
sidered as an "indirect" impost and not assessed on specific individuals.
It is estimated that over 200 projects were submitted to the French
Assembly between 1871 and 1909 but all were stubbornly rejected.
In the case of Egypt, the only direct taxes existing up to 1884
were those on land and palm trees. The former was based on the rental
value of the land at a rate of 28.64') with a maximum of 164 P. T.
(£1. "13. 9) and minimum 18 P.T. (3/9) per acre. The rental estimates
on which the tax was based were to be valid for thirty years. The
latter was a tax on the palm trees at a rate of 10/ of the presumed
yearly output. These two taxes supplied about 70/3 of the State revenue
at that time. The "foreigners" did not raise any objection about paying
these taxes because the ownership of land by a "foreigner" was considered
a privilege in itself. 'Then "foreigners" were allowed to hold land by
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an Ottman Firman in June 10th, 1867, (Safar 7, 1284 Higry) it was
-j
stipulated that they would he subject to any tax levied on it.
The Government was prevented from imposing any other kind of
direct taxation on the Capitulary citizens without the consent of their
Governments. Article 9 of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1861 states,
"No duties of tonnage, harbour, pilotage...or other similar or correspond¬
ing duties, of whatever nature, or under whatever denomination, levied
in the name or for the pfofit of government, public functions, private
individuals, corporations or establishment of any kind, shall be
2
imposed". When, in 1884, the Egyptian Government imposed a house tax,
the "foreigners" refused to pay, and in 1885 an International Conference
had to be called by Britain to secure the approval of the Powers con¬
cerned for that tax, and in the meantime to discuss the ways and means
by which the pressure on Egyptian finance could be alleviated. The
Conference agreed on the justice of imposition by the Egyptian Government
on their subjects of a house tax, stamp duty and a "licence tax"
(a sort of patent).
The house tax was one-twelfth of the rental value after deducting
the necessary expenses for maintaining the premises and keeping them
intact. The'foreigners1paid it like other citizens in 1886 and have
raised no objection to it since. In a minor incident the Mixed Courts
ruled out an attempt by a land company not to pay the excess rate of 1-^a
which was imposed in Cairo in 1909 to defray the expenses and maintenance
1. Al-Eifaei, A: Direct Taxes, p.131
2. State Papers, 186o-1,p.l8
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of the sewage system, which was constructed at that time.
The "licence tax" to the imposition of which the Conference also
agreed, was fully implemented only in 1891 after tedious discussion
with the representative of the powers. The law imposed a duty on all
persons exercising a trade or profession in Egypt equivalent to 5f° of
the rental value of the premises used for trade or industry, and on
specified trades and professions certain additional dues were charged,
sometimes fixed, sometimes calculated according to the capital employed
or to the profit realised, and sanetimes varied according to the
2
locality. The tax contained certain provisions, inserted by the
Powers, in assessment, collection, revision and inspection. Ten months
later, Prance insisted on the abolition of the tax, in order to approve
3
a needed expansion of public expenditure.
Paced with the 'foreigners' stubborn resistance, the Egyptian
Government refrained from imposing any kind of incane taxation which
would be paid only by the Egyptians.
The Land fax which raised quite a good revenue was reserved as a
guarantee for the payment of the international debt service, and the
house tax raised but a very little sum, far from enough to pay for the
increasing needs of the State. In fact, instead of any expansion in
public expenditure, a deflationary policy was pursued in order to comply
1. Al-Eifaei, op. cit. p.Hi
2. Patent Tax, Ministry of Pinance. Archive, Egypt,
3. When the corvee was abolished, an increase in public expenditure
' followed. [[he Government could not easily impose any other tax
to meet this new demand and had to rely on the economics resulting
from the conversion of the debt which the Prench could not accept
except on condition that the patent tax was to stop.
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with the obligations which necessitated keeping any budgetary surplus
in the Reserve bund to guarantee the future payment of the debt charge.
In 1909, revenue ms RE 13.7 m. and expenditure £E 10.6 m. Land
tax supplied 45$> of the revenue receipts, other direct taxes on houses
and palm trees supplied ^0 and the rest was got from customs duties,
■]
octroi, salt and stamp duties. The need Both for the redistribution
of the tax burden so as to prevent injustice and for an elastic system
was greatly felt during World War I and in the post-war period,
d. The Degree of Effectiveness of Inccme Tax at this Stage:
The importance of income taxation was significant in this transitory
phase in British fiscal history. Before the introduction of the system
of progression through the Super tax, and in spite of the broadening
of the system of exemption and abatements, every penny rise in the rate
of the tax yielded an average of over <£2 m, an amount which was increased
by another half-a-million during the Boer War and its aftermath, due
largely to an increase in prices. The yield of income tax increased
from ;S4 m. in 1875-6 when the rate was the lowest ever reached (2d in
the £) being 8.6 of the aggregate from customs and excise duties, until
in the first decade of the present century, the yield reached £32.9
2
million or 514 of the amount collected from customs and excise duties.
>
The increase of income tax burden per head as compared with consumption
1. Annuaire Statistique, Egypt.
2. See figures in Hallet, op. cit. p.484
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duties was as follows:-
Year Total Income Per Tax on Per
Population Tax Capita Cons umpt ion Capita
m Sm. r>cO Sta S
1 875-1 876 32.2 4.1 0:2.6 47.6 1-9.0
1899-1900 41.1 18.8 0-9.6 55.9 1-7.2
Rate of
Increase 27.6 358.5 254.0 17.4 -6.3
Source: Statistical Abstract of U.K.
It thus appears that the "burden of taxation on income was increas¬
ing rapidly, and that on consumption grew in a lesser degree than on
population, causing a reduction of the burden per capita. This is not
enough to reveal the real burden or the degree of compensation between
different groups of taxes or the real burden on population whose
productivity was changed during the period together with the proportion
of people of working age. The following table gives an attempt at
a more concise idea-of the burden:-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tear Population Weight 1x2 Taxes on Taxes on 4x5 6 4- 3
15-70 age Real Income, Consump-
Eroduct property tion
per Man & Death
Hour
1875-
1876
1899-
1900
20.2
26.5
.229 2^6258 12.6 52.6
.301 79765 35.4 64.4
65.2
99.8
141
125
Rate of
Increase 31.1 31.4 181.0 22.4 53.1
Sources: Statistical Abstract and Clark, C: The
of Economic Progress, p.63.
Condition
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From the table we can observe that, weighting per man-hours, we
find that the overall burden of taxation 'direct' and 'indirect'
decreased from 1876-6 to 1899-1900. However, this is not sufficient
indication of the real burden as one has to consider the growth of
the national income and its distribution amongst the earning groups
and the different amount of tax borne by each group.
On the whole, the most striking feature of the finance of the
period was the increasing reliance on income tax as revenue supplier to
keep pace with increasing expenditure. Also, it seems that income
taxation had not any detrimental effect on the capacity of the people
and their desire to accumulate, and the floating of a loan in 1900 is
a good example of that. When the list of contributions to that loan
closed, it was found that the amount applied for was ten times that
needed."'
The change of policy on income tax since 1906 with the adoption
of the principles of differentiation and pi-ogression was an unavoidable
consequence after the proportional system, had reached a stage which,
if exceeded, might have injured the lower and middle income groups in
addition to destroying the elasticity which was a feature of income tax
on the whole,
III. Income Taxation as a Socio-Hconomic Measure:
a« Socio-economic development:
To change the common outlook on taxation from one of neutrality to
1. Ibid, p.1p6
one concerned with the implementation of socio-economic ends was not an
easy task for any Minister of Finance. She framework of society must
be of a suitable formation with its classes well balanced, that the
execution of such a policy will follow of necessity and in response to
a demand from within. Little wonder then, that the success of taxation
in this stage is different in Britain as compared with 'Egypt and France.
In Britain socio-economic changes had been occurring rapidly since
the last quarter of the 19th century. The free-trade idea gave more
understanding of business problems and the interrelation of factors of
production. The development of joint-stock companies side by side with
the Trade Unions made integration between the social classes more
necessary and urgent. Profits and wages were increasing but, at the
same time, risk-taking became more acute. Cyclical crises became more
violent, hitting hard both business and labour and provoking calls on
Government, as representative of the people,rato alleviate the burden
of the depressed sections. Liberal ideals led to social reformers to
demand an amelioration of the wretched conditions of the poor and call
for more just distribution to wealth and income. Their endeavour was
realised in social and economic acts giving pensions to disabled and
old persons, insuring labour against ill-health and against unemployment,
opening wide the field of competition by granting free education and
even supplying food at reasonable prices. All these actions were part
of constructive policies in nearly every aspect of the British life.
Everyone, man or woman, was given a chance to direct the policy of the
community without obstruction from any particular section. It is thus
89,
that taxation "became a flexible tool in the hands of the State to
attain a specific social or economic end.
In Ngypt, conditions were somewhat different. There was a hard
/
fight against the Capitulary regime which went on side by side with the
National political question. The latter was partly settled in 1Sj6 and
was followed by the termination of the former in 1937. This success
gave an impetus to social clamours to better the conditions of the
people and called upon the economic architects to seek a more construct¬
ive policy. Society was largely disintegrated, with landlords and
business magnates dominating the political scene and with the lower
strata in an appalling condition, depressed and disorganised. Wealth
was badly distributed ana the income gap between classes was very wide,
a condition which explained the political outbursts and the social unrest.
It was a state of two. distinct worlds, with a vacuum in between, and it
was not easy for either to move down and up in order to meet and to
work for the benefit of the two together, as a whole. When Capitulation
came to an end, the rich class did not of course, reveal their intentions
or things would have been different. They verbally showed their approval
of the principle of socio-economic equilibrium in theory, but when it
came to constructive policy the taxation measures taken looked inferior
in standard and ineffective. In spite of that, it is necessary to
analyse the taxation measures which were claimed to be for a socio¬
economic end, to find out whether they worked properly towards such an
end.
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The state of Prance lies somewhere between that of Britain and
that of Egypt. Its industry ms less progressive than that of
Britain. Its national income and the productivity per man was also
less than in Britain. According to Golin Clark's calculations national
income per head of working population in international, units was 641
1
in Prance compared with 1,093 in Britain in 1934. Product per man-
O
hour was 3°2, compared with 588 respectively in 1938, and even in
manufacturing industry Prance lagged behind by about 8.^0.^ The
country is mainly divided into two groups highly sensitive to their
interest, i.e., agriculturalists with medium-sized holdings and indus¬
trial labourers. In making his policy, the Minister of Finance had
to be impartial between the two sections. The disharmony is clear
from the repeated incidents when the Cabinet had to resign over simple
fiscal measures, such as subsidising religious schools or fixing a
bonus for increasing prices or imposing an extra duty. Such a stage
has long been passed by Britain and since the People's Budget the
Chancellor of the Exchequer has become the dominating figure in the
implementation of the Government policy in the fiscal sphere.
"8. Theoret ical development;
The change in the composition of modern society and in outlook
on the state gave a fillip to socio-economic and socio-political theories
of taxation. In his theory, Wagner stated that "the State should so
1. Clark, C: The Conditions of Economic Progress, p.148
2. Ibid, 1951 Ed. pp. 63 and 80
3. Ibid, pp.369 and 271
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order its expenditure, tax system and loans as to remove certain economic
and social evils", and that "taxation, in addition to serving the purely
financial purpose of providing sufficient revenue, should be employed
for the purpose of bringing about a different distribution of wealth
from that which would result from the working of free competition upon
the basis of the present social order". While British and French
writers were cautious in adopting such view, the application of their
theories to the existing conditions resulted in the same end. The
graduation of taxation is in accord with the Marginalist analysis and
the theories of sacrifice. Edgeworth's 'least aggregate sacrifice'
may even result in increasing the rate of taxation to a confiscatory
limit. Some writers took a moderate standpoint and approved graduation
according to the size of income and differentiation according to the
nature of the source and the duration of its yield, but to a limit that
2
would not impair the degree of productiveness of the taxpayers.- The
Marshallians discarded the 'benefit theory' of taxation and stressed
the non-compensatory nature of federal taxation. Their interest
lay in optimum production and welfare. Through a certain determinate
scheme of imposing a tax on industry operating under conditions of
decreasing return or increasing costs, and granting bounties to those
showing increasing return an optimum production would most probably
occur. Such a scheme, it was asserted would lead to the equalisation
Comstock, A: quoting Wagner: Taxation in the Modern State, pp.38-9
2. Nicholson, J.S: Principles of Political Economy, Vol,III, p.274
3. Pigou, A.C: J Studies in Public Finance, p.99 v
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of the marginal private and social net product and so establishes real
harmony in the socio-economic framework. To carry out its obligation
to execute the policy of the maximum aggregate welfare, the State should
direct taxation to yield the maximum revenue and have minimum effect
1
on consumers' surplus. This would lead to favouring income taxation
rather than consumption taxes, because the latter by altering relative
prices becomes partial and would result in the taxpayer carrying an
excess burden by reducing him to a lower indifference curve without
p
due gain to the treasury.
World War I and its after-effects of inflation and dislocation
of international trade and the great depression of the inter-war period,
which curtailed profits and deprived millions of employment were enough
justification for the Keynesians to advocate the employment of taxation
to deal with the rising problems. Reducing inequality in the distrib¬
ution of wealth and income was even looked at as a factor which kept
high the propensity to consume and thus remedy unemployment and help the
growth of the aggregate of wealth. Progressive taxation was then
approved to play such a role but to a stage not great enough to depress
business confidence or inhibit spontaneous optimism.
The significant factor in these different theories is their firm
adherence to the system of progressive income taxation as part of fiscal
structure to achieve socio-economic ends.
1, Ibid, p. 74
2. Joseph, M.P.W: The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.VI, pp.226 et seq.
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The same thesis v/as reflected in the Dilke and Colwyn Committees
of 1906 and 1927 in Britain, in Caillaux's Income Tax Bill of 1907 in
Prance, and in the Report of Taxation Committee of 1938 in Egypt. The
report of the Dilke Committee favoured the system of graduation and
differentiation hut for practical reasons they advised caution. Because
full graduation would mean the abandonment of the principle of stoppage
at the source and its substitution by the impractical system of personal
assessment, they desired the imposition of a super-tax after a certain
limit. The lower incomes would receive abatements similar to those
which existed at that time. The principle of differentiation v/as
desired by the Committee and it wished that "earned" and "unearned"
incomes should be clearly defined; but that did not require that incomes
irrespective of their size should be so treated. It v/as of the opinion
2
that such differentiation should not be applicable over a certain amount.
The Colwyn Committee in its turn argued that progressive taxation of
income was justified, in the main, by the general rule of decreasing
marginal utility of income as the income grows. In spite of the
difficulty of measuring the degree of depreciation in the marginal
utility in each individual case, however, "the State is bound to take
a more or less objective standard". To complete their view by
dealing with the other part of the formula, they examined "Social
expenditure which brings claims of production and distribution into
sharp contrasts",^" and came to the conclusion that "social expenditure
1. Seligman, op. cit. pp.197-8
2. Ibid, p.200
3. Colwyn Committee Report, pp.122-3
h. Ibid, p. 105
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is not only highly necessary as a matter of humanity and social
justice, hut is also, up to a point, essential to the promotion of
A
industrial efficiency".
In Prance, the Caillaux project was composed of two taxesj one
on the schedular incomes and the other on income in general. The
former qbodied differentiation according to the source of income and
the latter meant graduation according to the size of income. This was
2
thought to he in accord with the "faculty" principle. To justify his
project, Caillaux declared in 1908 that it was necessary to supply an
adequate sum to cope with increasing expenditure and especially that
for social reform. Moreover, it would help to enhance economic and
industrial development hy alleviating their "burden.The same argument
could he found in the Keport of the Taxation Committee in Sgypt which
was influenced hy the French taxation system. An additional factor
was included to justify the imposition of income taxation and that was
the necessity of distributing the tax hurden equally "between all citizens
without reference to their nationality.
c. The development of income taxation practice to fulfil
socio-economic ends;
In 1907, Asquith introduced the long awaited Liberal social reform.
He considered the case of the child, "the raw material upon the fashion¬
ing of which depends whether it shall add to the common stock of wealth...
or whether it shall he cast aside as a waste product"; and considered
1. Ibid, p.105
2. Selignan, op. cit. pp.310-2
3. Ibid, p.319
95,
also aid to all those who were "nearer the other end of the journey
1
of life..." To pay for this bill he did not specify a certain
section but made it the liability of "the whole nation - the working
and consuming classes as well as the wealthier class of direct-tax
2
payers". But when he adjusted his formula, he laid stress on
income tax and followed the recommendations of the Dilke Committee in
differentiating between the rates of "earned" and "unearned" incomes.
Shis step was followed up in 1909 when Lloyd George introduced a bill
which dealt not only with old-age pensions but also with the relief of
unemployment and the development of the deserted and impoverished parts
of Britain. ^ To justify the imposition of a super-tax on incomes
over £5,000, he stated that "the time, however, has gone by when a
simple addition of pence to the poundage of the tax....can be regarded
as a satisfactory solution of a financial difficulty".^ This Bill
started the well-known controversy which was ended by the termination
of the veto power of the Lords over finance Bills (Parliament Act, 1911)•
By 19*13, the British income tax structure embodied graduation by
exemption and abatements of all incomes not exceeding £700, graduation
by rate in the case of "earned" incomes only up to £3,000 and graduation
by super-tax on incomes above £5,000. The socio-economic taxation
ideal was followed after that time and was not interfered with even
during hostilities.
After 1909, expenditure on welfare increased swiftly and greatly.
1. Hansard, 2he Parliamentary Debates, Vol.172, 1907, pp.1198-9
2. Ibid, p.1192
3. Hansard, Vol.IV, 1909, pp.474 et seq.
4. Ibid, p. 506
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In the inter-wax period, expenditure on welfare exceeded 2% of
total. State expenditure and the aggregate figure was in 1938 more than
eight times greater than the figure in 1911, and "by 1950 it was about
five times more than the pre-war level. Welfare expenditure reached
£1,306 m in 1950, an amount equal to k(fo of the whole State expenditure.
Unemployment insurance which included the Exchequer transitional benefit
payments and unemployment allowances increased from £11.8 million in
1929 to £81.9 million in 1934, being ($> and 3(fo respectively of the
-I
total welfare expenditure. Expenditure for economic ends, in its
turn, has been quite remarkable since World War I; subsidies were given
to certain domestic industries to assure their continuity or to offset
their deficits as in the case of sugar and coal. An important achieve¬
ment in this respect has been the Labour Government's policy in the
post-war period of nationalisation, economic control, bulk buying and
the construction of certain economic schemes of a risky type. Without
discussing the wisdom of such measures we can say that their main aim
was the planning of the economic structure of Britain in a way which
would ensure full employment and readjust the distribution of national
income in a manner favourable to the working class section of the
community.
In order that the Government could fulfil this socio-econcmic
pledge, income taxation had to play a prominent part. The graduation
system had been broadened after World War I and its success encouraged
the Chancellor of the Exchequer to raise the rate on the upper reaches
1. Statistical Abstract of U.K.
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of inccsne to 94^ in 1950. Private enterprises are "burdened by a
peculiar levy, that is the "Profit? Tax" which replaced the IT.D. C. in
1946, and seems to have become a permanent feature of the British fiscal
structure. While the high income groups were highly squeezed, the
lower strata came to have a comparatively better position, enjoying
family allowances and being assured of a minimum standard of living.
Even during the Depression and the post-war difficulties the socio¬
economic principle of taxation was observed. The following table gives
the effective rate of the tax paid by various income earning groups.
Amount of Income and Effective Rate of Tax Payable.
(Single Person")
Income Income all earned Income all invested
Year Year
£ 1929 1939 1950 1929 1939 1950
150 _ 1 1 1 3 3
500 7 11 17 10 17 26
1,000 12 17 27 15 22 27
5,000 23 32 49 24 33 53
10,000 30 42 64 31 43 74
100,000 47 67 94 47 67 94
Sources: Inland Revenue Reports.
In Prance, the main concern of the Minister of Finance after
World War I was to secure the equilibrium of the budget. The socio¬
economic call for the extension of expenditure on welfare and public
works was of secondary importance. This was a sound principle, since
the depreciation of the currency, if not checked would have resulted in
the reduction of the real incomes of that section of the community which
was more in need of welfare. To achieve such an end, an increase in
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State revenue and economies in expenditure were necessary. In 1924,
A
following a sharp fall of the franc an over all increase of 2Qfo on
the taxes was introduced, and was followed by a capital levy of 1Q& in
1925. But all these actions, drastic though they were, were ineffective
and there was no escape from the dilemma except by reducing the exchange
rate of the franc in terms of gold which was due in 1926. Then balancing
2
the budget became a possibility, until the great depression of the 30*s.
An expansion of welfare expenditure took place after the social legis¬
lation of 1926. Welfare expenditure, which includes allowances for
education, social services and pensions increased by far more than the
proportional increase in the State aggregate expenditure. Between
1927 and 1933, the increase was 6(fS compared with less than 1 increase
3in the aggregate. Housing subsidies were extended, assistance to
large families was given and social insurance benefits have been increased.
The continuous budgetary deficit after 1933, did not give the people
much chance to press forward any significant increase in the proportion
spent on welfare, or it might be their desire to limit State intervention,
that kept expenditure on this item within reasonable bounds. Welfare
expenditure reached 1§& of the aggregate State expenditure in 1938,
compared with less than 20i in 1 946.^"
The financial difficulties and the social pressure contributed
to structural changes in other parts of the taxation system. To
facilitate the working of its mechanism, Prance went in December, 1948,
1. The exchange price of the franc depreciated from 75.7 frs. for the £
in 1923 to 120 frs. in Marfih, 1924.
2. Dalton, H: and Others. Unbalanced Budgets, p.277.
3. See figures, Ibid, pp.283 and 296. v
4. Brochier, op. cit. p.80 and Laufenburger, precis, p.164
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half way towards the British system. The schedular taxes were unified,
under what is now called "l'impot sur le revenu des personnes physiques",
being a tax on individuals and bearing a proportional rate of 1 $£ to
be accompanied by a super-tax on a progressive scale, and another levy
A
on profits of corporations known as "l'impot sur les benefices et
revenus des societes et autres personnes morales" bearing a standard
rate of
The attempt made to achieve socio-economic ends is reflected in
the exemption limits, the abatements and the degree of progression.
The average rate of the tax on general income in Prance reached 12
2
in 1938 and was only 9."1$ in 1946, compared with 7.1?S and 16.9&
respectively in Britain. Differentiation between the rates of the tax
according to the source was retained after the introduction of the
system of the schedular taxes. Even in the 1948 Reform, a certain
formula was found to assure the continuance of this principle. The
effective rate of the tax on income from "movable property" which could
be termed as "unearned" was relatively higher than if the income was
derived from work, as is seen in the following:
Rates on Income derived from:
Movable Property Property Com, and Ind. Agricul. Work,
1938 29.7 7.1 4.3 0.1 1.8
1946 28.8 - 3.6 0.6 3.5
Source: Brochier, op. cit. p.47
1. See Memento Fiscal, Paris, 1951
2. Brochier, op. cit. p.42
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According to the "new" reform in which a standard proportional
rate was levied, "earned income" which is realised from wages, pensions,
professional and artisan work, is assessed at half the tax rate if the
taxable income does not exceed 200,000 francs (£204). The progression
2
starts on incomes over 150,000 francs and ranges between 1($ and 6(J;o.
The margin of exemption and family allowances have fluctuated
mostly in accordance with the economic changes. In 1938, earnings of
10,000 francs were exempted from the general income tax and by 1946, an
exemption figure of 40,000 francs was reached while progressive rates
ranged between Mfo and 4($6 in the former case compared with 1 and 650
in the latter. For family allowances (quotient familial) taxable income
was divided in parts varying accordingly to the situation of the family
and every part was taxed separately. In addition to that, there were
other exemptions attached to the schedular income taxes. By later
changes, from 1 % to 10Cfo of the income could be deducted as family
allowance on condition that the deduction would not exceed 5,000 francs
for the first child and 15,000 francs for each other child.
The effective rate on different income groups in relation to
1. In the case of wages, from to % are first deducted from
the money income to reach the taxable income; this amount
is considered as necessary for insurance purposes, cf. Memento
Fiscal.
2. According to 1950 budgetary Act, Ibid, p.62
101.
schedular and general income taxes in 1946 was as follows:
Range of Income Income derived from:
Salaries Com. and Profession Agric. General
1,000 francs etc. Ind. Income
50-100 3.7 13.7 16.6 14.8 5.3
200-500 9.0 22.3 19.7 18.8 15.8 X
500-1000 - 24.0 23.5 12.9 28.2
over 1000 - - - - 36.5
x On income between 300.000 and 500.000 francs.
Source: Brochier, op. cit. pp.41 and 45
Prom the above one can observe that the highest rate paid from
income was 36.^5, a rate which was paid on incomes over £2,000, that is
equivalent to less than one million francs.
In Egypt, social legislation has gathered increasing momentum
since the 1919 Revolution. There has been great pressure to widen
the scope of education, improve the people's health and alleviate their
sufferings. Less than a million pounds was spent in 1913 on welfare
services out of a budget of £E16 m. or about in 1937, the welfare
expenditure was £E6 m. out of a total outlay of £E42 m. or over 14&.
The rapid increase in this sphere was clear after the last war when
£326 m. out of £3113 m. were destined for welfare or 2$; the welfare
expenditure went sharply up to £3351 m. in 1949-50 being 31/5 of the
whole.
This great increase was met before the last war from the "old"
■j
property taxes and a levy on the salaries of State personnel which was
first imposed in 1931. The land tax remained unchanged in its assess-
ment for 35 years and only in 1935 were the new valuations made and
1. The exact figure of welfare expenditure in 1937 was £36.2 m. and
the yield of the whole direct taxes was £336.4 m.
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the rates fixed with the same maximum charge per acre as "before. As
a matter of fact, the average rate was reduced so that the yield of the
tax would not become greater than it was before. No change occurred
in the house tax, but an excess levy over it helped to increase its
•j
yield. That levy is a quid pro quo tax, known as the Ghaffir and was
originally imposed to meet the expenses of police protection of property.
It took fiscal form in 1936 when it was fixed at 2(fo of the house tax
and collected from all proprietors liable for that tax.
Before the termination of the Capitulations, the Government made
tremendous efforts to impose a "patent® tax" on the 'foreigners'
without success and a project proposed in 1929 was rejected. The force
of the depression and the dire heed for revenue compelled the Government
to levy a tax on the earnings of its own personnel. It was put into
operation in September, 1931, at a rate of only, and supplied an
amount just short of one million pounds. In 1936, the lower ranks were
exempted and the yield of the tax sank to £E. 300,000 in 1939 when it
was abolished, giving way to the Schedular taxes, which were imposed
following the Montreux Conference.
The Schedular Inccme Taxes were much advertised and claimed by
the politicians as a big step towards equitable distribution of the
public burdens. Consideration of the post-war welfare expenditure
shows the inadequacy of this view. Only part of these expenses were
met by income taxation. In other words, the poor people who might
1. Ghaffir in Arabic means the watchman
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benefit from such expenditure had to pay a high price for it with a
great loss of consumers' surplus, a different state of affairs to that
in Britain, as can be seen in the following table;
1946-47 1949-50
in £ Mn.
Income and Welfare Income Welfare
Property Taxes Expenditure Taxes Expenditure
Britain 1,592 876 1,847 1,306
Egypt 19 26 23 51
Sources; Statistical Abstract of the U.K. and Pocket Book
of Statistics, Egypt.
Moreover, the rates of the schedular income taxes were almost
1
proportional and very minor exemptions were given which could not be
compared with the privileges conferred on certain section of taxpayers
as professionals, beneficiaries from State lands and earners of
agricultural profits. Even the E.P.T. which balanced the burden between
taxpayers and yielded about £E76 m. was abolished in 1950 in favour of
a general tax on income imposed in 1949. The latter tax is of a
graduated nature, starting at a rate of !$ on income between PE1001 and
£El 500 and reaching 5Cfo only on incomes over £E100,000. It contains
2
many loopholes and the expectation of its Jield is discouraging.
d. The effectiveness of income taxation as a socio-economic measure;
i/tv A
The effectiveness of income taxation && a socio-economic role
depends on the influence it exerts towards the redistribution of income
1. The tax on wages and salaries is the only progressive one, with
rates ranging between 2f0 and 7fo
2. It is expected that the fnew' general income tax would yield one
million pounds onlyj an amount less than the yield of the house tax.
The sliding scale was made sharper by the end of t951 with the
progression ranging between £fo and 7Qo
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and wealth. Progressive taxation tends to redistribute income in
favour of the poorer classes and if progression is very marked, the high
income earners might cease to accept work entailing great liability or
to invest in risky operations. Taxing reserves and operating excess
profits duties, would limit accumulation of capital and effect a
redistribution of wealth. On the whole, everything being equal,
national income would most probably be reallocated in favour of wage
and salary earners and against others.
In Britain, the socio-economic part which income taxation plays
is very clear. Total income before taxation was £4,322 m. in 1938,
and at that year's rates the income after tax was £4,015 m. and in
1949-50 rates it was calculated at £3,859 nu which means that the tax
absorption was 7.1$ and 10.1$ respectively. The important thing that
one has to consider is that most of the excess burden was borne by the
high income groups. The section whose incomes were £10,000 and over
paid 57.1$ cf their income in 1938 at that year's rates and would have
to pay 7S.Sfo at 1949-50 rates. Even if the rates were stationary,
the rise of prices which brings with it a relative increase in money
incomes would shift the taxpayers to a higher scale of tax.
In Prance, the available figures show a relative reduction in the
2
average rate of income taxation from 12. in 1938 to 9.1$ in 1946.
Most of the increase was borne in 1946 by the low and middle income
1. National Income and Expenditure of the U.K. 1946-50
2. Brochier, op. cit. pp.44-5
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groups; 79*5 Mid. francs were exacted from different classes of
income out of which 51?q was paid "by the section whose income did not
exceed 300,000 francs or £625, In Britain, in the same year, those
with incomes of up to £1,000 paid only 2&fo of the tax. There are no
figures showing the state of tax payment in Egypt hut it may he fairly
said that the "burden is progressive in indirect relation to the degree
of poverty and the increase of family responsibilities,
The taxable part of the gross amount of profits and property
assessed for income tax in Britain decreased gradually from 1875 till
the outbreak of the last war. The largest contribution in the various
schedules of income taxation now comes from Schedule E and this shows a
logical tendency as the wage portion of the national income rises.
Income from Schedule B( on the other hand, is gradually added to Schedule D.
thus making the assessment according to the real return of the tenants.
The following table gives a brief summary of this point.
Distribution of Gross Amount of Profits
and Property Assessed for Income Tax.
in £ M.
Tear A B c D E Total Taxable Part %
1875 162 67 43 267 33 572 498 87
1913 176 5 48 584 138 951 792 83
1925 363 49 132 1324 1083 1971 1349 68
1938 573 47 171 1415 1784 3990 1437 0 36
1950 396 1 214 2580 6175 9366 4271 46
Source; Statistical Abstract and Reports of Inland Revenue.
The similarity between Egyptian and French income taxation makes
possible a comparison of the yields according to the source of inccme.
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Hie proportion of property taxation and of "direct" taxation was iQfa
in 1939-40 in Egypt when the schedular income taxes were in full
operation for the first time. This balance was changed by 1946-7
and income taxation took 6^5 with the main burden being levelled on
commercial and industrial enterprises. In Prance, which is highly
industrialised and much more efficient than Egypt, commercial and
industrial concerns paid only 2% of the "direct" taxes in 1946 compared
with 21^a before the war. An insignificant amount was collected in
Egypt from professionals, the most privileged section in the community.
Hie following table gives the distribution of "direct" tax yield
according to the schedules of income:-
Source of Income
Movable Property
Com. and Ind.
Salaries etc.
Profession
Property and Agra
General
Total
\
EGYPT PRANCE
1939-40 1946-7 1938 1946
££M.► Mid. frs.
fo fo fo f
2.3 12 5.8 39 10.1 13
X 8.9 47 3.1 21 21.5 25
2.7 30 1.9 10 1.2 8 29.5 37
0.03 0 0.3 2 2.0 3
6.3 5.8 31 1.4 10 5.3 7
- - - 3.0 20 12.0 15
8.9 100 18.9 100 14.8 100 80.4 100
x Being ££3.6 m. the normal tax and ££5.3 m. E.P.T.
Sources; The Budgets of the Egyptian Government.
Brochier, op. cit. p.36.
Hie role of income taxation as a socio-economic measure cannot
be fulfilled unless the yield of the tax exceeds the welfare expenditure
by the amount of the administrative expense and unless all the privileges
are removed and progression is accurately operated. These reservations
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have been wholly observed in Britain, giving a situation which has
proved the success of its income taxation as a socio-economic
measure. Per contra, the Egyptian tax has failed to play that rble,
although it has succeeded in supplying the State with an ample sum to
pay for increasing expenditure. As for Prance, the continuous
budgetary deficits since 1933, show the difficult task which income
taxation must perfoim there. Even if welfare expenditure were
increased and income tax progressed, a problem arises due to the
counter-effect of budgetary deficit which seems likely to necessitate
devaluation from time to time.
PAST II
THE TECHNICAL MAKE-PP OF INCOME TAXES
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CHAPTER III
THE NOTION OF INCCME IN THE INCOME TAX FORMULA.
Definition of income for taxation "becomes especially essential
after the adoption of the progressive scheme and the excessive increase
in the tax rates. By means of the definition we can recognise the
taxpayer and trace the incidence of the tax on him, or on the other
hand, its effect upon capital formation and the incentive to work. A
proper definition is also of special importance in finding out to what
extent the universality principle in taxation is functioning and to
assure that taxation does not extend to sources not earmarked by the
legislature. Moreover, the State's need of revenue is continuous and
it has to base its estimates upon accurate figures of the regular flow
of revenue from its subjects or citizens. With regard to the community,
some clear definition might help in analysing the effect of incane
taxation on the national economy. Inability to arrive at a concrete
definition might have serious repercussions in the social and economic
structure of society.
a. Differences in theoretical definitions;
Income is still a controversial subject;. there is the periodicity
concept of Allix and Lecercle, the consumption concept of Malthus,
Hermann and Schmoller and the source concept of Struts and Puisting.
According to these concepts incane may denote a flow of wealth during
a definite period of time or it may mean the aggregate money receipts
minus that part appropriated for investment, or it may be the total
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services received from all sources including the individual's own
activity. The first definition excludes casual earnings and increment
of value frcci the scope of income; the second leads to the exemption
of savings; and the third is of a sweeping nature and confuses income
with capital, and embodies some elements which are almost impossible to
determine in tems of money.
The confusion in the definition arises from confusion between the
words 'income' and 'revenue' which have different meanings in various
languages. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun 'revenue'
means the return, the yield or the profit on any land, property or other
important source of income. The word 'income' means that which comes in
as the periodical produce of one's work, business, land, or investment
(commonly expressed in terms of money); or the annual or periodical
receipts accruing to a person or corporation. Sometimes the words
revenue and income are taken to mean the same. The Encyclopaedia
Britanica has defined income as the "satisfactions which are capable
of being parted with, or are usually parted with for money." It makes
periodicity an essential aspect of the word. Other definitions of
Haig, Seligman and Fisher, which give a different outlook, were also
given. In Arabic the word 'revenue' has a wider meaning compared with
the word 'income', with the former including the net accretion to the
individual in a period of time, while the latter includes only that which
comes in as a result of the individual's activity or the acquisition of
any right whether property or not. The French have only one word 'revenu'
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which means, according to La Grande Encyclopedic, the amount of wealth
which is employed for the satisfaction of needs without diminishing the
source. The word 'revenu' is interpreted sometimes to embody the
return or the periodicity of the receipt (retour d'une recette ou une
1
recette qui revient).
Several definitions of income are offered by economic and fiscal
writers from time to time. But they should not be interpreted as
suggesting that taxable income rests on any well framed academic formula.
The differences in the definitions applied "are due to different con¬
ceptions of the nature of income, constitutional limitations on the
legislature, political or economic considerations, and conventions with
o
other countries". That does not mean that academic concepts have had
no influence is determining any practical income formula. They help to;
clarify the confusion in legislation about income and make it easier to
distinguish between the product and its source in such a way as not to
hamper the working of the economic process.
Hie definition of income is largely affected by its relation to
capital. In a simple manner Adam Smith thought that income was a function
of capital during a period of time and thus income was the product of
3
capital. Such a definition is based on the existence of a physical
stock of instruments from which flows a stream of services through time.
It does not include any benefit which may arise from the acquisition of
certain rights such as goodwill. This definition makes it clear that
1. La jrcmme de biens que dans un temps determine un sujet peut employer
a*la satisfaction de ses besoins sans diminuer son fonds.
See also A1 Rifaei, A: Direct Taxation, p.42.
2. Spaulding, II.B: The Income Tax in Great Britain and the United
States, p.117.
3. Fisher, G: The Nature of Income and Capital, p.54.
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income is the result of capital "but it might equally well "be stated
that capital value is a result of income.
In some cases only capital has an intrinsic value which is equal to
the satisfaction which one enjoys in using it for consumption. She
adherents of the capitalisation norm consider capital value of any source
as the aggregate sum of the present worth of all anticipated successive
1
values. Their objection to the existence of a separate determinateness
of the value of the source and its product is a denial of the fact that
the market of the two elements is influenced "by more than one factor.
One might ignore the physical relation between source and product
and go a step beyond that as J.S, Mill did and look at the problem from
the point of view of individual. According to Mill, the distinction
between capital and non-capital depends on the Intention of the capitalist
or individual who directs his wealth either to consumption or to
2
investment. But this outlook cannot help us because, for taxation
purposes, the State cannot be left to the mercy of the individual's
decisions and tax only what he intends to dispose of for consumption.
It is necessary for taxation purposes that the definition should be
universal as far as possible and not left as a matter of individual
decision.
Seligman defined income as contrasted with capital as denoting
"that amount of wealth which flows in during a definite period and which
1. Seligman, R.A.E: Studies in Public Finance, p.103.
2. Fisher, op. cit. p.54
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1
is at the disposal of the owner for purposes of consumption". In
another instance he considered the characteristics of incane as a realised
inflow of satisfaction capable of "being transmuted into money terms.
It was something distinct and separate or could be separated from the
2
source. This definition is similar to that of Pigou, that income is
"the net inflow of goods and services, necessaries and conveniences of
life that accrue" during a period of time.-' Pigou emphasised that
"only that part of real income which has a money counterpart can be
brought into account" for taxation purposes.^ Such a definition assume#
the existence of a source or a fund from which a flow is derived.
Accordingly incane is that part which can be extracted or isolated without
impairing the effective reproduction of the source. This definition
looks realistic in the case of a fruit produced by the tree or the calf
by the cow. But it fails to explain the case of extractions from natural
deposits where exhaustion is a matter of time and no account of depreciation
could be substituted materially far what is already taken. Even in the
former case the production would have a certain physical or biological
effect on the source and sometimes the depreciation could not succeed in
restoring the source to its former position. The former definition of
income would also fail to give a concrete indication as to how we should
deal with transactions in the factors of production.
1. Seligman, R.A.S: Income Tax p.19
2. Seligman, Studies in Public Finance, pp.99-101
3. Pigou, A.C: Incane, p.2
4. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance.
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Plehn made an attempt to define income as the "recurrent, consumable
receipts". In his theory, Plehn, included revenue from labour, capital,
land, as well as annuities on pensions and savings out of income. He
excluded gifts and bequests as nonrecurrent items in the form of capital
gain from capital transaction. In reality, there is no clear cut
method according to which one can say that dividend is a recurrent receipt
and capital transactions are not, as the contrary might well be true.
Moreover, to consider income as consumable can mean almost nothing,
2
unless it means "consumable without Impairment of capital".
Almost identical to the Plehn definition is that held by Allix and
Lecercle in Prance, which is known as the theory of utilisation (these
d*exploitation), The theory defined income as the periodical product,
or as susceptible to periodicity of a durable source which consisted of
personal activity, work, or other material wealth.-^ This definition
interprets income by stressing its characteristics. It looks logical
and consistent but upon examination seems inoperable. If such a
definition were agreed to, it would curtail the scope of income for tax¬
ation and restrict it to the returns from durable factors of production.
The definition would also reduce the concept to the static state where
the returns could be freed from the admixture of capital ingredients.
The application of regularity would exclude occasional earnings and
1. Plehn, C: American Economic Review, Vol.14, 1924, pp.1-12
2. Simons, H.C: Personal Income Taxation, p.75 ,
3. "In their book "ImpSt sur le Revenu" Tom. Ie p.351 Allix and Lecercle
stated "Le revenu, avons-nous dit est le produit periodique ou
susceptible de periodicite d'un source durable, qui peut consister
dans l'activite personelle, ou travail, ou dans certains biend
materiels ou incorporals".
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•windfall profits from the taxable income while including the life-
annuities and pensions which could be considered as invested capital.
This theory cannot give a precise answer to such borderline questions
as whether the distribution of stock dividend should be included in the
taxable income or not. Seligman made it clear that "neither the
permanence of the source nor the regularity of the receipts any longer
forms a necessary part of the concept of taxable income".
Schanz, Haig and Simons gave a radical definition of income for
tax purposes. To them income is the money value of the net accretion
to one's economic power between two periods of time. This definition
ig4imilar to the Mercantilist notion that the difference in the balance
sheet at the opening and the close of the year determines the income of
the individual or the corporation in that period. The theory does not
p
refer to the origin of the revenue or the element of duration. It
includes any creation of value through human labour, or capital utilis¬
ation as well as all the increment of value of any factor. This theory
is known in Prance as the 'theorie de la plus-value' and sometimes the
•these du bilan'. Simons made it clear that personal inccme is an
acquisitive concept, it connotes, broadly, he declared the exercise of
control over the use of society's scarce resources and can be calculated
through the increase in "value of a person's store of property rights"
1. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Art. Incane Tax
2. According to Laufenburger "tout enrichissement ou tout accroissement
de valeur est un revenu, quelles qu'en soisnt l'origine^et la
duree" See. Traite D'economic et de Legislation Financieres, p.37.
3. Laufenburger, H: Finances Comparees, p.184
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if his consumption is nil, or "the value rights which he might have
exercised in consumption" while the value of his store of rights is
unaltered. This theory widens the scope of taxation and puts an end
to the dispute and confusion as to what is income ard what is not. It
might he an appropriate arithmetical answer^ to the difficulty of
determining the taxable income, but it is dangerous in application during
a time of violent change in prices* According to this theory, gratuitous
receipts in the shape of gifts and bequests are to be included as tax¬
able income because their exclusion "would be to introduce additional
3
arbitrary distinctions". All additions to capital even if they are
inchoate gains are to be taxable. This is justified because of the
acceptance of the idea of the impairment of capital as giving a reason
for a proper deduction from the taxable amount. To widen the scope
of taxable income to this extent, would threaten the existence of
capital and create a false impression of the meaning of income in the
minds of the people.^
■Whatever our theoretical definition of income, the applied
definition is more arbitrary. It is formulated according to admin¬
istrative factors, or to adjust specific public policy, or as a
reaction to the pressure of the different interested groups in society.
Income according to Simons "would be readily and accurately measurable
1. Simons, op. cit. p.49
2. Ibid, p. 51
3. Ibid, p.56
4. It was alleged that considering an augmentation of wealth and
income the increase in the value of stocks in the boom before
the crisis in 1 929 inflamed speculation and hastened the collapse.
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only in a world where goods and services fell nearly into a small
A
number of homogeneous classes" and where an accurate market for
capital valuation was existing. It is sufficient in practiee that
income taxation is not confined to a specific theory, but merely sets
up rules as to what is the gross incane, and what is to be deducted to
reach the net taxable income.
b. Income subject to taxation;
Income tax laws do not attempt to define income for tax purposes.
They simply provide a classification of all the various items which are
considered as taxable income. The classifications are modified from
time to time in accordance with administrative, political or economic
considerations. The Income Tax Codification Conmittee stated clearly
that British Financial Acts imposing income taxation nowhere contain
any clear definition of what was meant by 'total income' or how it was
to be calculated. The Committee in their turn did not attempt to
define it, but after providing a complete classification of all the
various kinds of income which were taxable they stated that "what is
meant by the total income of an individual is the net aggregate amount
of income of the various Classes in respect of which he is liable to
« 2
bear tax and is not able to pass on the liability to any other person .
The Income Tax is that by which the ultimate burden rests on the
beneficiary, but not the recipient. The Committee on the Taxation of
Trading Profits emphasised the view of the general scheme of British
1. Simons, op. cit. p.103
2. Report of the Income Tax Codification Committee Cmd.5131,
Vol. I. p.31
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Income Tax legislation as "being not to tax anything but income" and
-jthus "capital increment as such being outside its scope". But what
is capital is not defined and it seems that it is not easy to draw a
demarcation line between income and capital. The Egyptian and French
income taxes left the definition of taxable income more vague. In
both of them, the words 'revenue' and 'income' were often used to mean
the same thing and as a whole to cover the return of the factors of
production as well as any realised capital increment or any distribution
of corporation reserves.
The Conception of income prevalent in Britain, Egypt and France
could be studied through their classification of income.
In Britain, income is categoried for inccme tax purposes under five
schedules, the first, Sch. A., comprises income derived from the enjoy¬
ment of property, i.e. rent; the second, Sch. B., includes income from
the occupation of land, i.e. the return of the tenants; the third,
Sch. C., deals with income realised from funded property, in other words
from public revenue, dividends and shares; the fourth, Sch.D., covers
income arising or accruing from industry, trade and profession, in
addition to other gains not being specified under any other schedule;
and the last, Sch. B., refers to earnings from employment, annuities
and pensions. In 1949-50 farmers occupying land of a gross value not
exceeding £100, who hitherto had been assessed under Sch. B. were
1. ^eport of the Committee on the Taxation of Trading Profits
Cmd. 8189, p.7
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transferred to Sch. D. This meant an almost complete cancellation of
1
estimations under Sch. B.
This classification is not logically arranged, and brings together
matters having no intelligible connection. "On the one hand, it
invalues the distribution of income of the same nature among different
Schedules" and on the other includes income of a different nature in one
2
schedule. Per contra, the Egyptian and French Acts are clearly
drafted and logically arranged. In the two countries income is classi#»
fied according to the nature of the source. This facilitates the study
of the taxation system and easily gives one a fairly complete and accurate
grasp of their scope. There is a section for inccme derived from
movable capital, a second on income derived from commercial and industrial
profits, a third on profits from non-commercial professions, and the
fourth on earnings of the nature of salaries, wages, pensions and the
like. The French system includes profits from agricultural operations,
an item which is absent from its Egyptian counterpart. Income from
land and dwellings is dealt with through separate Acts. It is included
in Land and House taxes in Egypt and ' impots sur revenus fanciers des
proprietes baties et non baties which have been included with the
schedular taxes since January 1949 under the name of ' impot sur le
revenu des personnes physiques'.
Logical or illogical classification is not significant. The main
1. The provisional assessment of net true inccme under Sch. B. in
1949-50 reached only one million pounds see Inland Revenue
Report, 1950. Cmd. 8103, p. 37.
2. The Report of the Income Tax Codification Committee p.27.
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difference between the three systems is the elasticity which each gives
to the concept of income, and the manner of assessment. It is clear
from the British Tax that it is limited to income. Capital gains
except those from professional speculations are regarded as mere accrel*-
("ions of capital. In the case of business profits it is Stipulated
that "as near as practicable the taxable profits should be no more and
no less than the true "ones as computed on established accountancy
1
principles". Moreover, casual profits are also excluded from the tax.
The Egyptian and French systems interpreted income on a wider
scale. They considered as taxable income any distributed benefits from
p
reserved, as well as any increment received from the sale of any asset.
The State Council (le Conseil d'Etat) sanctioned in 1930, the theory of
utilisation, but the tax administration fought a battle against that
decision and the theory of 'balance sheet' was endorsed by Acts in 1932
3
and 1944. In addition to the tendency to tax capital increment,
casual profits and gains from whatever operation are also taxable. The
differences between restricting the concept of the taxable income in
Britain and stretching it in Egypt and France seems to be a result of
striking income as a unit in Britain and taxing separately the returns
of all income sources in Egypt and France,
c. Actual and estimated income:
The superiority of the British Income Tax is clear from its
1. Beport of the Committee on the Taxation of Trading Profits p.7
2. Bocquet, L: L'impot sur le revenu cedulaire et generale. Tom. II e,
p.139 Lauferiburger, Traite op. cit. pp.44 et seq.
3. Lauferiburger, Ibid, p.41
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fundamental reliance on the actual inccme rather than the estimated
one. This practice reduces evasion and accomplishes justice as between
the taxpayers. In the Egyptian Schedular Taxes people are charged on
their actual income. Before 1951, the liberal professionals were
taxed according to the rental value of professional premises which was
used as an indicator to their profits. It was alleged that this
privilege was given to appease this politically powerful section of the
\
taxpayers rather than for any administrative reason. Practical
difficulties and socio-political pressure seem to have influenced the
French legislator in relying upon income estimates in taxing artisans
and agricultural profits. This arbitrary system known in France as
•forfait' is far from just. It distributes the tax burden according
to fictitious assumptions.
The defect of depending on estimated income becomes serious with
every increase or progression of the tax rate, since a section of the
taxpayers are favoured at the expense of the others.
The criticism of the arbitrary assessment of income compelled the
planners of the General Income Tax in Egypt to avoid it when it was
administratively possible. The taxpayer is now assessed on the rental
value of his dwellings or land unless he can produce accurate accounts
of his actual profits frcm these sources.
d. The unity of income taxation;
The unity of income is the first step towards universality of
1. The taxable income of professionals was taken to equal 7.3'® or 1(^5
of the estimated rental value of the premises they occupy in
following their profession. The Law No.146 of 1950 imposes the
tax according to the real income realised from profession.
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distribution of the tax burden and towards the application of the
principle of ability. Once inccme is treated as a unit, then abate¬
ments and progression can be effectively carried out, and double tax¬
ation can be avoided. According to Stamp, "A prcper tax upon incomes
is hardly possible in a community that is not fairly advanced, both in
1
its people and its government". Personal declaration of income is
necessary and unless the people have a high civic sense, the burden of
the tax will swing against the honest. This was the reason far the
old fear that once the individual is trusted to make his declaration
of income, the treasury would be left to the mercy of his whim, and
would be in a position to judge for himself, what is the just share
to be contributed for public purposes. The absence of the character¬
istics of a well-balanced society, a highly advanced people and good
government would lead to a reliance upon presumptive taxes or conventional
expedients.
The British Income Tax is not a tax upon inccme but upon persons
according to their respective incomes. This is what makes it moire
progressive than the taxes in Egypt and Prance which treat income
objectively. The unity of the British Tax was achieved by the Finance
Act, 1927, which modified the method of calculating the tax in such a
way as to assist in assimilating the Income Tax and the Super Tax so as
to make a single duty. The French reformed their system and unified
their schedular inccme taxes under 'the tax on physical persons'. But
each source of income still has to pay a separate proportional tax and
1. Stamp, J; The Fundamental Principles of Taxation, p.22.
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then the total income is subject to a surtax following a progressive
scale.
The Sfeyptian system is following the old French system. It treats
the returns of each source as a separate entity. The objective outlook
is then the dominating feature of that system except in the case when
the return is derived wholly or partly from labour when it is looked
upon subjectively. The Ifeyptian Schedular Taxes have been supported
since July 1949 by a progressive tax which is imposed on the total net
income of the individual. This is a step towards unifying income
taxation.
Ideal income taxes impose equitable relative levies upon individuals.
This personal characteristic of the tax suggests two different lines of
approach; either to treat the cumulative family income as the taxable
income unit, or to consider the income of each physical individual as
the unit. If we adhere to the foxmer line, the exempted marginal income
should be comparatively high, and progression should be less steep than
if we approve the latter line.
The income taxation systems varied in this point because of
differences in the mode of life, in the constitution and in the status
given to the wife. The old rule in Christian World was to incorporate
the wealth of the husband and wife as a guarantee for commercial liability.
Contrary to that practice, in the Islamic World women rank pari passu
with men and their property is separate; marriage does not alter anyone's
position in this case. According to the British and French legislation,
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the rule is that "the husband and wife when living together are to be
•j
regarded as one unit for the purposes of taxation". if the wife
gained a profit, while living with her husband, such a profit would be
?
deemed as a profit of the husband, ©lis will lead to the assumption
that any loss sustained by the wife should be set off against the
husband's profits. On the other hand if a married woman were living
separate from her husband, or applied for separate treatment, she could
3
be assessed and charged as a 'feme sole'. This privilege is not
absolute because in Britain, for surtax purposes, the income of the people
is treated as one and the amount of the surtax payable in respect of
that is divided between the two in proportion to the amounts of their
respective incomes. Such a reservation is made to stop any evasion
of the high rate of surtax. The separation of the property of a
couple, by declaration or through divorce, in Prance gives each one the
right to separate treatment for the general income tax as well as the
progressive surtax (surtaxe progressive)."'
1. Report of the Income Tax Codification Committee, p. 81 and Formery L:
Les Irnpots en Prance, Tarn Ie, pp.276-7
2. Report, Ibid, p.8o
3. The British legislation stipulates that a woman is treated as living
with her husband unless they are separated under an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction or by deed of separation or they are in
fact separated in such circumstances that separation is likely to
be permanent. See Draft, Income Tax Consolidation Bill Ctad.8174
pp.270 & 276; The Report of the Codification Com.p.80 and Formery
op. cit. p.276
Income Tax Consolidation Bill, p.271
5. An attempt to impose the General Income Tax in Egypt on the joint
income of the family was refused by the Financial Committee of the
House of Deputies on religious basis. Cf. Collection of Taxation
Laws by Hasaballa, N: (in Arabic) pp.37-8.
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rJ3ne income tax legislation in Egypt follows the Moslem ruling and
treats the wife separately from her husband. In the meantime, she
cannot claim any family allowances if married, unless the husband is
incapacitated, or unless he is dead, or if she legally bears responsla¬
bility for them. This restricted rule is based on the principle of the
absolute legal responsibility of the man towards his family.
The practice of taxing the joint income of the family imposes the
greates injustice upon the majority of married people. Married couples
are penalised, by being taxed at a much higher rate than if they were
single, or if they were living together but unmarried. This arrangement
is also criticised because of its contraction to the spirit of 'The
Women's Property Act' which gives married and single wcsnen alike the
right to be independent and in control of their own finances. It seems
also to have a deterrent effect on married women who take part in
industry and trade.
Married couples could be relieved if they were given an exemption
equal to double that of a single individual, and allowing them a reduced
rate at any income level, "as the income goes up through graduated-rate
1
brackets". This solution would not rid the tax system from the in¬
justice borne by taxing the joint income and its practical inconsistency,
Shoup suggests that "the married couple's total net income must be
2
divided into two equal parts, each part being taxed separately". But
it would be more reasonable if each individual is required to file a
1. Groves, H.M: Viewpoints on Public Finance, p.203.
2. Ibid, p.207.
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separate return of his income and taxed accordingly, and in this case,
the exempted margin could "be curtailed in general,
e. The time element in income taxation:
The time element is important in determining taxable income. It is
almost an ordinance of nature to measure income "by year which, apart from
its appropriate reflection of relative ability, is in practice convenient
to the State. In Britain income in thought of as an annual amount, and
only the annual returns are subject to taxation. But the word 'annual'
is not a distinctive feature of the Schedular Income Taxes in Egypt and
Prance, Income from movable property is taxable when it is realised,
without any consideration of the period, and wages per day are subject
to the tax when they are earned in Egypt. Moreover, casual commissions
or brokerages are subject to the tax in Egypt. During the last war any
profit arising from any cotton operation was also liable to the tax,
without reference to the duration of profit. The Egyptian and French
practice is criticised as violating the principle of justice in dis¬
tributing the tax burden. When the tax is levied on any casual profit
or earning, it ignores the subjective element of the tax and does not
provide any reduction for subsistence or allow anything for family upkeep.
This practice is different from the P.A.Y.E. system of Britain,^
according to which taxation is deducted at the source from monthly or
weekly earnings of employees, and an exact balance is made at the end
1. Before 1914, it was considered that manual and weekly wage-earners
would be better able to contribute through outlay taxes because of
the difficulty of collection of direct taxes on their income.
Quarterly and half-yearly assessments were adopted from 1925 till
1943, when the P.A.Y.E. system was brought into operation. See
Pigou, A Study in public Finance, p.116.
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of the year, and the tax is adjusted by means of additional payment, or
a refund according to the real rate the employee is subject to. In
spite of the convenience realised from deducting the tax at the source,
the P.A.Y.E, system causes an enormous addition to the work of business
concerns and the Inland Revenue Department, A proposal for amalgamating
the P.A.Y.E. scheme with that of Social Security -will be discussed later
on.
Even if annual assessment is considered to be an acceptable basis,
there are different measures of annual income. Up to 1926-7 the normal
basis of assessment of business in Britain had been the average profits
A
of the three years preceding the year of assessment. Since then the
basis has been the actual income of the preceding year. In some cases
the tax is levied according to the actual income of the same year. There
is a wide dispute as to the preferability of basing the assessment on
the current year or of a return to the average system. The former seems
to be logical and in conformity with State's annual needs; the latter,
on the other hand, is favourable to the new and expanding business; it
also gains credit for being more equitable to those whose income fluctuates
widely from one year to another, in a country like Britain where high
p
progressive taxation exists. The average system is criticised for
causing lags in the yield when profits are increasing or declining and
3
making the tax excessive in relation to the actual profits.
1. Report of the Committee on the Taxation of Trading Profits, p.9
2. Ibid p.10 and Stamp, op. cit. pp.27-8
3. Spaulding, op. cit. p.222
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It destroys uniformity in assessment and makes the charge at a point of
time far from that at which the profits arise.
The preceding year basis is that applied in the Egyptian and French
1
Schedular Taxes. In some cases where income is taxed at the source,
the taxpayer is charged on the income received in the year of assessment.
This involves an assessment of taxation before the total income is known,
and is criticised as raising certain difficulties in meeting claims for
2
refund when the effective rate is less than the charged tax. In the
years when the value of money fluctuates, it is much better for the
State to impose and collect the tax at a time very near to that at which
income is received. "Where money values are falling, taxpayers under
3
the average system have a distinct advantage and vice versa".
The annual assessment, under whatever system, allows for continuous
change in the taxable income. It is still much better than the 'old*
system of fixing the taxable charge for more than one year and givin^io
weight to any change in income. In Egypt, up till the present time
taxable rental value of land is fixed for ten years, and in the case of
houses, the estimated taxable rent stands for eight years. In France
arbitrary estimates of the profits of artisans and from agriculture are
made every two years. The same practice was applied in Egypt up till
1944 in cases where the concern did not keep accurate accounts. Such a
system is based on fictitious profits, and sacrifices justice for
administrative ease.
1. It is stated in the French 'Surtaxe Progressive' that "II est du /
par toute personne..,et dont la part de revenu net total de l'annee
pre6e'dente..." See Memento Fiscal p.6o
2. Spaulding, op. cit. p.215
3. Ibid p.223
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f. Corporate income subject to taxation;
Corporations in Britain and Egypt pay income tax at a standard
rate like any other individual, Before any distribution of profits
takes place. In this manner, the corporations are not considered as
taxable entities, but merely agents for their shareholders. The con¬
tinuous increase of State*s need for revenue has caused a departure from
this theory in Britain, and corporations are now considered as potentially
taxable units and made subject to profits and excess profits taxes, in
the same way as they have long been treated in Prance. The French
justify the imposition of income taxation on corporations on a legal
view. A corporation has a separate legal identity quite apart from
its owners. It has a separate capital and its obligations are likewise
separate. D?hen corporations are made subject to taxation, the character¬
istics of personal taxes in the way of exemptions, individual allowances
and progression become out of the question.
For income tax purposes, each corporation in Britain is treated as
a unit, while for profits and excess profits taxes 'group treatment* is
allowed and is sometimes compulsory. For Profits Tax "where a parent
company,..owns directly or indirectly, not less than 75 per cent of the
ordinary share capital of a subsidiary it may elect to have profits or
losses of the subsidiary treated as profits or losses of the parent
company". For E.p.T., 'group treatment' is allowed whai the parent
2
company owns 90 per cent of the capital of the affiliated company.
1. See Laufenburger, Traite pp.213 et seq.
2. Report of the Committee on the Taxation of Trading Profits p.95
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This practice is suggested for Income Tax purposes, as lessening the
severity of that tax, but it is feared that this concession might be
exploited for the purpose of tax evasion.
According to the Egyptian legislation the Commercial and Industrial
Profits Tax (Com. and Ind. P.T.) is imposed on the net profits resulting
from all the operations carried out by the taxpayers, 'which would even¬
tually lead to 'group treatment'. In other words the profits and
losses of different companies could be accumulated in one account subject
to one tax. But this rule is not wholly observed by the Taxation
Department which, being forced with the exemption of charitable, religious
and other non-profit making concerns, had to impose the tax on the
separate legal concerns being run for profit.
In Prance, corporations are treated as separate legal units subject
. A ' '
to taxation (l'impot sur les benefices et revenus des societes et autres
personne morales). 'Group treatment' is allowed in order to stop any
2
drift towards double taxation.
Por income tax purposes, a corporation is considered in Britain
and Egypt as "a device by means of which a number of individuals can
conveniently do business".^ The Income tax and the Gem. and ind. P.T.
in practice bear upon the undistributed profits. If part of their
income is thought to be unreasonably accumulated by the corporation,
the Inland Revenue authorities might ask for an apportionment of that
1. This course is legalised by Law Po.146 of 1950
2. Laufenburger, op. cit. p.224
3. Spaulding, op. cit. p.87
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amount among the members of the corporation in order to subject it to
i p 9%
Surtax. A similar measure against tax evasion is taken fern Profits
Tax purposes, when the director's remuneration in the case of director-
controlled companies is limited to £2,500 per annum or 15^ of the profits
subject to a maximum of £15,000 per annum.^ In Egypt, the deduction
from the taxable profits of corporations of any part of income derived
from invested capital forming part of the assets of any undertaking, is
allowed. The same procedure is accepted in Britain; income received
directly or indirectly by way of dividend or distribution of profits
from a body corporate, being excluded from the profits liable to Profits
3
Tax. This provision seems to be as a measure to avoid double taxation.
g. Nationalised corporations and municipal trading bodies.
Neither the British nor the French Income Tax system exempts
nationalised corporations or any municipal trading body.^" This is
justified by the argument that any exemption would give public bodies
an unfair advantage over private traders. Moreover, it is claimed that
tax exemption can add an additional advantage to the existing monopoly.
Faced with the obligation to pay taxes, the public bodies could be
compelled to reduce the price of their service to what is enough to
cover the marginal cost. Besides, the charges "may be a useful payment
to public revenue unconsciously borne by the community which it is
5
unwise to disturb". In Egypt, public undertakings are not taxed.
1. Ibid, pp.87-8
2. Report of the Committee on the Taxation of Trading Profits, p.104
3. F. A. 1947.
4. Spaulding, op. cit. pp.151 et seq., F.A. 1947 and Memento Fiscal
pp.55 et seq.
5. Stamp, op. cit. p.36 t
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It is held that the corporation works predominantly for profit which
should he taxed, and this is not the case in public concerns, which work
for national benefit. The taxation of public corporations serves no
object because the Minister of Finance could draw on the reserves of
these corporations when necessary. In the case of municipal enterprises,
the surplus in their trading is necessary to enable local bodies to carry
their obligation to the public on behalf of the Central Government. If
re-allocation of the resources from one area to another is not inten^ded,
V
the tax would merely mean a waste in keeping accounts for taxation and
engaging public servants in unnecessary work,
h. The determination of taxable profits;
The determination of taxable profits in the case of corporations
varies according to the nature of the tax. For the ordinary income
and profits taxes, the taxable profit is that part realised from
business activities. A difficulty might arise, when a system of
schedular income taxes exists, if the profits of the concern came from
sources which have been taxed previously. In this case any part of
•j
the revenue which was previously taxed is to be exempted. In the
case of the S.P.T. the taxable profit of a corporation might be
determined by an average basis of some years, considered as normal, or
a proportion of the working or invested capital during the year of
1. In Fgypt it was made clear that the revenues on movable capital or
derived from cultivated lands and buildings, or exempted from tax¬
ation by virtue of any law, which are comprised in the assets of
the concern, will be deducted from the total amount of the net
profits liable to the tax on profits to the extent of the total
amount of these revenues after deducting their contribution in the
expenses and charges of utilisation on the basis of ^0o of the
amount of the said revenues. Art, 35 and % of the Law 1V^939»
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assessment.
The conception of average profits covers a variety of things such
as economic rent, variations in capital employed, fluctuations of risk
•j
etc., but on the whole it does not raise difficult problems, as in the
case of a proportion of a capital. There is a confusion between the
working and invested capital, which were often used in 3.P.T. and in
O
accounting discussions. Working or rotating capital could be inter¬
preted as that liquid part of the assets which could be used for tunning
the enterprise, in other words it is the difference between the cir-
culating assets and circulating liabilities. Working capital fluctuates
according to the nature of the business. The invested capital, which
is sometimes called the capital employed, might be interpreted as the
real capital owned by the corporation and utilised in all its activities,
and would not thus include any borrowed money even if this money were
employed in the business.^ According to F.A,(2), 1939, the capital
employed was defined as the assets acquired by purchase or otherwise,
as well as debts due to the business. In Egypt no dear definition
of invested capital was given, and it was only stated that the standard
profit could be a percentage "of the actual invested capital including
the reserve funds which may exist in the concern". Some taxpayers
exploited this ambiguity in the Act and increased their assets, by
leaving idle reserves in order to increase their standard profits. The
1. Stamp, J: Taxation During the War, p. 234
2. Ibid, pp.192 et seq.
3. Nawar, Y: Accounting and Auditing, Budgets Vol.Ill pp.140-1
(in Arabic)
4. Ibid, p.149
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British definition on the other hand, falls heavily on any Business
which depends on borrwed money to increase its activity, as such
credits are not counted as part of the capital employed.
The inclusion of casual profits in taxable income in Egypt which
it was thought at first, would eliminate evasion, was used against the
Taxation Department when the E.P.T. was applied. The taxpayers claimed
the right to add in their standard profits any casual gain.
It is clear that definitions for taxation purposes should be such
as not to lead to any confusion, or disturb the basic principles of
equity, or encourage evasion.
i. Intangible or psychic income and income in kind;
The income of an individual might be taken to mean what he actually
receives in money terms. But this does mot show the relative ability
of individuals to pay taxation, because money income does not include all
the gratuitous services enjoyed. If one lives in one's own heme, helped
by one's wife, and receives any material gifts, his real income is in¬
creased by the estimated value of these services and materials. To
ignore this item is to increase the real exemptions and the real degree
of progression. It would facilitate evasion and discriminate between
individuals. Fisher used the word 'psychic income' to mean all the
p
agreeable conscious experiences, and thus made it include all the items
which render certain satisfactions to the individual or simply all
tangible plus all intangible income. This psychic income might be the
1. Simons, op. cit. p.113.
2. Fisher, op. cit. pp.16? and 333
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best measure for the relative ability of individuals, but it could not
be used for taxation purposes, except in an arbitrary manner, objection¬
able to taxpayers, A conpromosing attitude is followed, and taxable
income is interpreted to include all income in kind which the individual
receives which has a market value. According to Pigou, it is only
"that part of real income which has a money counterpart" because "to
bring in other parts would involve such high administrative costs as
It 4
not to be worth-while , Thus the service of the wife to her
husband, the car to its owner and the casual gifts exchanged between
friends, are not counted for taxation, Simons wanted to tax 'leisure
income'. He said that "Income from consumers' capital is often a
2
large part of total income for individuals in the upper brackets".
Its exclusion would introduce a bias inconsistent with the system of
progression, differentiates against people of similar financial cir¬
cumstances and facilitating the opportunity for evasion. This view
might be important in our own difficult time when direct employment is
more urgently required to balance the economy of the community; but
Simons does not provide any accurate measure to calculate this 'leisure
income' for taxation.
The extent of the widening of the conception of income, to include
other benefits in kind, differs from one taxation system to another.
In Britain, as a rule, accommodation furnished rent-free to an employee
is not considered liable to taxation, except of course if it is sub-let
1, Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, pp,77-8 ^
2, Simons, op, cit, pp.113-4
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4
to a third party. This provision is not applied to State officers
who are in apartments belonging to the Crown. It seems that this
contradictory practice cccies from considering the benefit in the first
instance as related to the cost of running the business, and is necessary
from the point of view of the concern, and, after all, value cannot be
turned into money. In the latter case the officer is not obliged to
use the apartment except in a very small number of cases and they
enjoy the use of these tenements apartments as part of their remuneration.
On the whole, the general conception of taxable income in Britain com¬
prises money income and anything else capable of being turned to
pecuniary account. The Income Tax Commissioners reckon as incane,
tips, Christmas bonus and gratuitous pensions. In addition to that,
they assess for taxation the rental value of the house occupied by the
owner, less an arbitrary depreciation allowance, and the amount of
agricultural products consumed by the farmer from his farm.
The French system follows the lead of the British, and taxes all
benefits in kind that could be valued in money. In Egypt all income
in kind received by the taxpayer, in relation to the employment of any
factor of production, is subject to the Schedular-Income taxes. It is
stipulated in the legislation that taxes on earnings are assessed and
2
imposed by virtue of a benefit in cash or in kind. In the case of
the tax on General Income the legislator is more lenient. He does not
include the rental value of the home owned and resided in by the taxpayer.
1. Spaulding, op. cit. p.156
2. Art. 62. Law 14/1939
136.
Moreover, the taxpayer is allowed from his taxable income all losses
sustained through bankruptcy, the previous three years losses being
included for exemption. Also exempted are all grants provided to the
State or to any charitable society approved by the State to a maximum
of 3^> of annual income of the taxpayer.'' These provisions which
narrow the conception of income could make the tax ineffective.
Co-operative dividend;
The concept of money income raises certain problems as in the case
exemplified by Pigou where a society or a group of people is arranged as
to join together in a self-sufficing manner and where no money is used.
In this case there is no taxable money representative of the real
2
services that it renders. The co-operative societies think that no
profit arises if two individuals join together to serve each other, and
thus that the co-operative dividend should not be considered as a taxable
benefit.^ Goods in the co-operative society could be distributed at
the cost price, and thus the element of dividend would disappear. But
the co-operative society fixes the prices above marginal cost for
practical reasons, and there is no profit actually gained and thus co¬
operative discount and dividend distribution should not be added to the
taxable income of the individual. This view is not accepted by the non-
co-operatives who insist that those who enjoy the services of the co¬
operative societies have a greater ability to pay taxation. The three
income tax systems adhere to the former view and exempt co-operative
dividend from taxation.
1. Arts 6 and 7, Law 99/1949
2. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, footnote p.79
3. Stamp, The Fundamental Principles of Taxation, p. 34.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OP INCOME IN THE INCOME TAX FORMULA
(Continued)
I. THE JURIDICAL SPHERE:
The problem of liability to income tax is one of the obscure points
•which is embodied in modern income tax structure. A person might belong
to a certain nation, be permanently resident in a foreign country and
invest part of his capital in a third. He has then certain obligations
towards the three countries, but in the meantime, they have liabilities
towards him. Unless a solution is discovered to relieve him from double
taxation he will be left in bewilderment. The international law which
limits the power of any State to its juridical boundaries does not provide
sufficient guarantee in this case. If one agrees with Stamp the "State
•j
can tax beyond its borders in respect of property it protects".
If we set aside the juridical difficulties which arise from
historical, economic or social conditions and try to determine an
acceptable and just formula for taxation, we will be faced with the
2
conflict between 'situs* and 'ownership* or 'the residence* and 'origin*.
Moreover to apply any taxation principle, we will find ourselves tottering
between the 'benefit' and the 'ability' principles. Any tax legislator
will be indifferent towards the basic principles of taxation, whether
the tax should be on things or persons, and whether they should be on
the real or estimated income. He might try to search for the tax
1. Stamp, op. cit. p.126
2. Ibid, p. 117
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formula which seems to strengthen his own country's case; hut to do even
this is not an easy task. The interests of the creditor country are
different from those of the debtor, and to disregard this might encounter
the State in an awkward position. Sometimes tax legislation is care¬
lessly drafted and leads, intentionally or unintentionally, to inter¬
national double taxation which is by no means desirable for the welfare
of the world. The study of the different systems however complex they
may be, will reveal the degree of strength, influence and effective
administration of each.
The problem of liability to the present systems of income taxes in
Britaib, Egypt and Prance rests on three important criteria; citizen¬
ship, residence and the source of income.
i. Citizenship; Every citizen has a constitutional right in his country
and can claim all privileges rendered to his countrymen. This is not
sufficient reason for the British tax legislator to subject British
citizens to income tax whether resident in Britain or not. Exemption
A
does not include such amounts which are derived from within Britain,
The French system goes a little further and imposes the tax on the
citizens who are not permanently domiciled in Prance but have a residence
there. They pay an income tax on an arbitrary amount equal to six times
2
the rental value of the premises at their disposal. The Egyptian
citizen is rather at a disadvantage. He is subject to General income
tax wherever he may reside.-* The Egypt ion national, whether individual
1. Vasilu, V.G; The Income Tax in Great Britain and Roumania, p. 241
2. Memento Fiscal, p.61
3. Art. I Law No. 99 of 1949
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or incorporation, is also subject to the tax on the profits, interests
and redemptions paid to him by foreign establishments. Excepted
from this rule are all dividends, interest and other profits derived
from movable foreign values which Egyptian insurance and re-insurance
companies keep in deposit abroad, to constitute a guarantee or actuarial
reserve or any other reserves for the purpose of meeting all risks
involved in such operations. The French legislator grants this privilege
only if such reserves are deposited in accordance with foreign legislation.^
The liability of an Egyptian to income tax simply because of his
nationality may easily lead to double taxation and put him in an unfav¬
ourable position. The case of taxing foreign movable products is
justified on the principle that these products were the outcome of in¬
vestment of Egyptian capital, and that such a tax might possibly divert
Egyptian investors from foreign countries and induce them to invest in
3
the home market. But this is far-fetched reasoning and would not be
any guarantee against fraudulent evasion.
ii. Residence: To the citizen the tax is his share "which the State
appropriates in order to procure for itself the means necessary for the
production of general public services".^" But the outlook of the
foreigner who resides in a country is different. He looks at the tax
as the price he has to pay for the specific protection and maintenance
conferred on him by the State and his sources of income. Residence in
a country makes caie liable to the income tax imposed on it. This principle
1. Art. 5, Law No.14 of 1939
2. A1 Rifaei op. cit. p.261
3. Ibid p.269
4. De Marco, op. cit. p.111.
|
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is adopted in nearly all tax legislation. At one time in the history
of Rgypt, up till 1937 as has been noted, 'foreigners' were exempted
from all taxes on income according to the interpretation of the 'Mixed
Courts' of the terms of the Capitulations. But by the Montreux Agree¬
ment such unjust privilege was terminated. Tax legislators vary their
definition of the meaning of residence in regard to the individual and
the Corporation.
a. Residence of Individual;
The meaning of residence in Britain is a disputed question and the
existing acts and regulations provide no clear cut definition to assist
in its solution. In the case of the individual, he might be considered
resident if he stayed in the country "at one time or several times for
a period equal in the whole to six months in any year of assessment" and
the liability will be limited to that year of residence.
The time as so specified is not sufficient indication that the
person is residing in Britain because one must understand first the reason
for the person's presence in the country, as he might be a tourist, a
student or a patient. Another question which might be raised is to what
extent evidence of residence could be taken from the person's attitude
before or after the year of assessment. Besides, a person might be
resident but due to the spread of his business he might not stay in his
country for six months in the year. The Codification Committee held
the idea that probably the Acts were drawn at a time when "transport
1. Report of the Codification Committee, Vol.I, p.35
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facilities were rudimentary and the mobility of the population almost
1
negligible".
To overcame the former difficulties the regulations were stretched
widely and take as a resident one who maintains a place of abode in
Britain available for his use. He is taxable for any year in which he
V J
pays a visit even if it. shorter than six months, so long as his visits
became habitual year after year.2 One well-known definition of
residence in Britain was given in the case of Lloyd v. Sulley in 1884,
viz. that the place of residence is that in which the individual can
set himself down with his family and establishment, even if he occupies
3
it for only a portion of a year. The residence in Britain is within
the ambit of the incctne tax on all his profits, whether realised in
Britain or not, unless there is any bilateral agreement or the like by
which income from a foreign source is exempted. The long practice of
British taxation has carried the problem to the point of argument as to
whether to accept 'residence' as such as sufficient qualification for
income tax or ivhether it should be limited to 'principle residence'.
This latter suggestion might be of importance in stopping a drift to
double taxation. It was emphasised in some legal cases that the
liability of a resident to income tax on the part of his income derived
from foreign source, depended on whether he were engaged in the conduct
of the business or not. If he were not, he would be charged only, that
part which he received in Britain; but if he were, he would be liable
*. Ibid, p.35
2. Ibid, p.36
3. Vasiliu, op. cit. p.237-8
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4
to the tax on all his income whatever the situation of the business.
This resolution was taken to solve the problem of the professional who
might conduct activities outside his place of residence and the people
who owned shares or participated in foreign corporations.
In Egypt, residence is considered sufficient for subjection to the
tax on the yields of movable property and also to the general income tax.
The Schedular Income Tax Act made taxable "foreigners domiciled or
2
habitually residing in Egypt", But the Act omitted to give any defj- -
Inition of 'domicile' or 'habitual residence'. It was feared when the
Bill was drafted that such a definition might cause unwanted difficulties.
Dr., Al Rifaei holds the view that the foreigner can only be considered
resident if he intends to stay in the country.^ Accordingly, tourists,
students and those who stay to make scientific experiments are not taxed
on what they receive from outside Egypt. It seems that this interpret¬
ation is still vague and unsatisfactory. One's intention does not lead
to a precise meaning from which a tax collector can draw a conclusion
as regards liability to taxation.
The legislator defines residence more clearly in the General Income
Tax. A foreigner is considered domiciled if he has made Egypt the
4
centre of his residence and activity. If the foreigner is domiciled
in Egypt, he will be treated in the same way as a national and be
subject to the tax on his aggregate inccme wherever its source.
1. Spaulding, op. cit, p.48
2. Art. 4, Lav/ No.14/1939
3. Al Rifaei, op. cit. pp.269-70
4. Art. 2, Law No. 99/1949
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The French legislation subjects all residents to the General
Income Tax. The resident is stated to be one 'who keeps a lodging for
his use or possesses any property for a year at least or one who makes
France his main residence. The Frenchman who habitually resides in
France pays the tax on all his income realised in or out of the country.
The income of the domiciled foreigner is treated in the same manner with
the exception of the amount of income which he may have gained from
foreign sources, and he has to pay on it a general income tax. This
attitude is rather more moderate than the British or Egyptian practice.
The Frenchman who is neither domiciled nor habitually resident in
France is subject to the tax on the part he has earned in the country.
2
He also pays the progressive surtax; and it seems that he enjoys all
the abatements and allowances, unlike his British counterpart who cannot
benefit from them unless he is resident in Britain.
"b* Residence of Corporations;
In the case of corporations the definition of residence seems to
be much clearer than in the case of individuals because of the material
evidence that can be taken as an indication. Sane of the indications
are; the directors' meetings, the keeping of the corporation's acconts
and the issuing of balance-sheets. Lord Sumner stated in the case of
Todd v, Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. that "the word 'resident'
with its various qualifications 'actually','ordinarily*, 'temporarily'
and so forth, is used in a sense in every way appropriate to natural
persons, but only artificially applicable to incorporated persons, and
1. Laufenburger, op. cit. pp.150 et seq.
2. Ibid, p.154
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1
never really appropriate". A Corporation may not act physically like
2
an individual, but it "keeps house and does business". It is on this
point that the British practice is centred and the principle of 'control1
adopted. A Corporation may have more than one 'place of residence' but
it can only have one place of chief control. No consideration is thus
attached in the British system to the place of registration or country
of origin. The profits of a corporation are thus taxed, so long as it
is controlled in Britain."^ Subsidiary corporations in foreign countries
are treated as having a special identity and are exempted, unless they
are directly managed in Britain, or if they are mere shams to cloak the
activities of a British corporation.^ But on the whole the holding of
the total amount of another corporation's shares does not stand as
sufficient indication that the holding corporation is from the taxation
point of view controlling the subsidiary one. The 'doctrine of control'
does not clarify all the problems which may arise when the head office
of a corporation is in Britain but its main activities are carried in
another country as in the case of the Anglo-Egyptian Oil Field's Co.
which was compelled to pay the British Income Tax because it was consist
olered as directed from Britain and the E gyptian Tax because it was
5
resident in Egypt according to the Egyptian legislation.
The Egyptian Income Tax legislation treats as resident any
1. Quoted by the Income Tax Codification Committee Report Vol.I. p.39
2. Spaulding, op. cit. p.52
3. Report of the Codification Com. op. cit. p.4-0
4. Spaulding, op. cit. p.53
5. The Company transferred its head-office to Egypt last year, the
double taxation problem being one of the reasons.
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corporation which conducts "business in Egypt, even though its legal
A
head office or administrative board is outside the country. According
to the Egyptian Companies Act, all joint stock companies formed in
Egypt shall be called Egyptian and treated thus. This means that such
companies shall pay the tax in full on all their distributions; dividends,
interest and other profits derived from shares, etc. The same fcule is
applied to the foreign corporations resident in Egypt which distribute
2
certain dividends outside the country. If the foreign corporation
carries on business in countries other than Egypt, it is considered to
have distributed in Egypt an amount equivalent to the total profits of
the year subject to the tax on Com. and Ind. Profits after setting
aside 1($o as a special reserve.^ The resident corporations are also
taxed on their undistributed profits and pay the tax on such profits
again when they are redistributed or transferred from the country.
The tax on Com. and Ind, Profits which a resident corporation has to
pay is only on profits realised from operations in Egypt.
The treatment of corporations in Prance is similar to that in
A"
Egypt with a few modifications.
iii. The Source of Income: The country from which a person draws a
profit or interest is justified in taxing him simply because he has
benefited from the protection and the exercise of law of that country,
But to determine whether an income is obtained from within the country
is not so easy as it may seem. Under modern complication conditions of
1. Art. II bis. Law No. 59/1941
2. Art. 3. Law Mb, 14/1939
3. Art. II, Law Ho. 14/1939 as modified in 1941
4. A1 Rifaei, op. cit. pp.263 et seq.
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international trading, a person may be engaged in a series of transactions
and capital may be used to finance some operations located in different
countries, so that the place in 'which the profits are realised becomes
difficult to ascertain for fiscal purposes. A contract might be signed
in one country, the payments might be effected in another and the goods
might be purchased in a third. There is also the problem of agencies
which work for foreign firms. Their accounts do not show any clear
profits like those of tourist film trade and of purchasing raw material
agencies.
The problem is partly solved by the British adherence to the 'doctrine
of control'. If the seat of business control is within Britain, the
taxpayer"is liable to be assessed for Income Tax on the profits of the
•i
whole of its trading operations wherever they are carried on". The
remaining problems are dealt with in Britain, either according to bilateral
conventions or by determining whether a trade is exercised in Britain
2
and then taxing the non-resident as if he were a resident. If the
trading profits cannot be ascertained, they may be estimated on a percent¬
age of the turnover as is the practice in Egypt. There is no problem
about the case of individuals who receive income from foreign public
offices, because it is accepted in the tax legislation of almost all
countries that the State which provides the emoluments, pensions or
salaries, subjects them to its tax, vherever the receiver resides. The
1. The Royal Commission on the Income Tax of 1920 quoted by the
Codification Committee, op, cit. p.42.
2. Spaulding, op. cit. p.55
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same rule is applied in the several systems in the case of emoluments
paid by any office or individual, other than public, for duties perform-
•1
ed in the country,
Egyptian legislation raises acute problems with reference to the
Tax on Com, axil Ind, Profits, That tax is only payable op profits
realised in Egypt and not otherwise, and thus individuals and corporations
can divide their operations between that country and others. This raises
many complicated difficulties and increases the possibility of evasion.
The factors of the place of contract, the place of delivery of goods and
the place where the payment is maae, might be employed to limit the
scope of the problem but cannot solve it altogether. In spite of this
major defect in the Egyptian legislation, the system taxes the profit
that might arise from any casual transaction in Egypt, thus limiting tax
evasion.
French legislation is very clear in the matter of taxation of
profits which are realised by French residents without distinguishing
between the parts realised within and outside the country. In the case
of agencies and other foreign subsidiary corporations, their taxable
p
profits are estimated by various arbitrary means.
The non-residents who are liable to the British tax are not entitled
to personal allowances and other abatements except in special cases, e.g. in
1, Codification Com. Report p.54 and Egyptian Schedular Income Tax
■Art. 61
2. Memento Fiscal p.14
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the case of those who are British subjects, or individuals in the
service of any Missionary Society, or any native State under British
•j
protection, or those employed past or present by the Crown, etc.
The Egyptian and the French systems, on the other hand, do not raise
such issues and they provide the exemptions when the individual is
entitled to then without considering his residence.
II. DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED.
The real income at any period of time is the 'net' inflow that
2
accrues or generates during that period. The word 'net1 is very
Important as it indicates that an allowance should be provided to keep
the factors of production intact, or materially as productive as before.
It also means that the separation of product from the source was enacted
and that the tax could be levied without fear of evasion or double
taxation, De Marco put this point clearly when he stated that "the
translation of gross into net income, ... is merely a technical account¬
ing procedure, by means of which the total quantity of direct goods
produced annually in a country and the corresponding total tax-burden
are divided among those engaged in production and among the taxpayers"
in such a way that "no part of so-called gross or total income escapes
taxes on income".^
It is necessary to define 'net' income in such a way that the
definition will carry the same meaning to the various taxpayers who
1. Spaulding, op. cit. p. 57
2. Pigou, A.C. Income, p. 2
3. De Marco, op. cit. p. 221
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derive their income from different sources. A clear definition is also
important in order to gain the practical objective of the tax as the
distribution of the burden under any principle largely depends on what
is allowed for deduction from the gross income. The degree of perfection
in any tax scheme can be measured by its success in this particular point.
The notion of 'net' income is not clear cut, because the notion of
•i
keeping capital intact, which is insisted upon, is not itself clear.
According to Marshall, net income can be found by deducting from gross
income "the outgoings that belong to its production". This general
principle cannot settle the dispute which may arise between the tax
collector and the taxpayer in differentiating between •inccme cost* and
the disbursement of income. Het inccme is not a precise entity of a
known nature. "It is a portion of gross output selected and marked off
from the rest by a boundary line" determined by our own choice, and in
3
no way an objective fact. Hicks regarded a person's inccme "as the
level of a standard whose present value is the same as the present value
of his prospective receipts", or net receipts in the case of a firm.
The net receipts, he stated, are equal to the surplus minus the charges
arising out of past contracts, and to reach the profit, depaeciation
should be deducted or appreciation added.^ The position might be simple
if income could be clearly separated from its source, which is not
usually the case. A crop.fof instance, "takes away with it so much
1. Pigou, A.C: The Economic Journal Vol. 45, 1935, P.235
2. Marshall, A: Principles of Economics p.72
3. Pigou, op. cit. p.240
4. Hicks, J.R; Value and Capital p.196
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of the organic and inorganic elements" of the land, and to restore
its productivity we have to put hack into the ground what each crop has
taken, which is not easy to assess. Fisher admitted that there was a
chasm between accountancy and economics, with reference to income, and
it should be overcome to reach an acceptable solution far income tax
purposes. 'Net income', he enclosed was equal to the incomings minus
the outgoings. In simple terms his income formula was as follows;
Aggregate income is the algebraic sum of a, the money received from all
the person's properties less the money expended on them, plus b, the
money received for the person's work less its psychic cost, plus c, the
services rendered by his 'consumption goods' less the amount spent on
them, plus d, certain services rendered by the person's body-mind to
his stream of consciousness, less their 'real' cost, plus e, the services
rendered by 'cast' namely its use in furnishing money, less its dis-
2
services in absorbing money. The services and some of the cost in
kind he referred to, were those which could be measured or estimated in
f
money terms.
Every factor of production is depleted or depreciated in one way
or another through the process of production or through tame. In our
dynamic conditions it might even become obsolete. It is necessary
then that we lay aside part of the output to condensate for this
destructibility or loss of the assets of the ccumunity on which future
production and progress depehds. Someone may go as far as allowing
1. Smart, W; The Distribution of Income, p. 20
2. Fisher, J; Econometrica Vol. 5, 1937, pp.26-7
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for irksomeness of labour and the risk-taking of the enterprise and even
•i
saving of the individual or corporation.
The replacement of the loss in the value of the assets is one
factor in determining the 'net' taxable income. They may not cause
much dispute as accounting for the necessary expenses involved in the
process of earning income. There are the expenses on food, clothing
and shelter which are needed before any work can be done. There are
also the expenses on the instruments needed by a doctor, the books by
a lawyer and the like.
Deductions from gross income to determine the 'net' taxable part
differ in the various systems, and this is due partly to difference in
the notion of income, partly to historical practice and accounting
technique, and partly to the conception of equity. An analysis of
some deductible items in taxation practice will disclose the differences
in the treatment of income, and the degree of logic embodied in the
taxation laws under discussion. Income tax laws impose the tax either
on the income of the individual or the returns of the factors and iiiis
has its basis in the kind of deductions allowed,
i. Deductions allowed for the individual,
a. Minimum of subsistence;
The individual is like the machine, he needs a certain amount of
materials for his necessary upkeep and to maintain his productive force.
These needs differ according to the person's bodily metabolism and his
1. Ibid pp. 32 et seq.
2. Pigou, Studies in Public Finance, p.80 ^
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environment. It is true that in such a case it is difficult to
decide for any person "beforehand as to his perpetual necessities. But
in spite of that, one does not need to be precise, and an arbitrary
estimation of one's subsistence level could be drawn so that taxation
-Jshould encroach on its domain, A minimum amount of income should then
be allowed free of tax. Most countries agreed on this principle but
they differ according to their estimation of that minimum. During a
war or crisis, some writers think, the tax might strike at this minimum
in order to keep the people aware of their responsibilities in the
2
hard times being undergone.
In Britain the individual is allowed free of tax £110 of his annual
income which is increased by £70 for his wife, £60 for each child and
£50 for a housekeeper. He can also claim allowances for a daughter's
services or dependent relative according to the regulations. A married
man is granted an additional relief of five-sixths of his wife's
earnings up to a maximum of £110.
In Egypt it is assumed that the tax is levied on the returns of
the factors of production and thus personal exemption is limited to the
earned part of income. In spite of that the basic allowance is not
uniform and the individual can enjoy a multiplicity of exemption if he
has derived his income from more than one scheduled source^ The exempt
marginal income since 1950 is £E100 (£102.10.0) with an addition of
1. Laufenburger, op. cit. p.189
2. Groves, H.M; Viewpoints on Public Finance p.190
5. To stop this multiplicity which is against the principle of granting
personal allowances, an amendment to the law was made in 1950 preventing
any taxpayer from enjoying more than one exemption. The effectiveness
of the amendment seems to be doubtful so long as each source of income
is taxed separately.
-
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£220 for a wife and £230 for one child or more, if income is derived
from any source other than movable properties and providing that the
-j
total income does not exceed double the amount of the allowance.
Moreover, small traders are entitled to an exemption of half the rate
of the tax on Can. ana Ind. Profits if their capital employed in the
business does not exceed £2200 or their profits are less than £2300 per
annum, providing that they have no other source of inccme, or employ
in their business more than one labourer but they must keep proper
2
accounting. When applying the tax on general income the individual
is allowed another £250 for his wife and each child under his care with
a maximum of £2200. Phis disunity in providing for family allowances
in the Schedular Taxes and again in the General Income Tax results in
some sections being provided for by more than one allowance.
The French system gives more attention to the basic exemption than
its British or Egyptian counterparts, though the basic rates may be
less than those applied in Britain. First of all if the income is
earned through employment, profession or the carrying on of a business,
1. Before the law Wo.146 of 1950 that amount of exemption was only
given on income derived from commercial and industrial profits.
The margin in the case of income from salaries was £260 a year
for each tax earner without reference to the size of his family.
The liberal professionals were not allowed any income exemption
because their tax was calculated according to the rental value
of their premises.
2. This procedure which is applied by law No.146 of 1950 is quite logical.
In addition to lightening the burdens of the comparatively poor
traders, the measure is intended to encourage them to keep proper
accounting and thus continuous dispute between them and the Taxation
Department would be limited. According to the Industrial Census of
1945, about of the industrial concerns either run by their
owners or employ one labourer. As to commercial concerns, according
to 1937 Census, about 9^ of them had an invested capital less than
£2200. The number of those which were run by their owners was 1%
00,mtea See
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income up.to 200,000 frs. (£204. 1. 7) is assessed for taxation at half
that sum. But if the taxable amount is less than 10,800 frs. the -whole
amount is exempted, and if it ranges between 10,800 frs. and 43,200 frs.
the tax will be levied only on one-third.
Relief for children is calculated as a percentage of the income
with a maximum limit. The exemption for one child is 15o of the income
if that does not exceed 5,000 frs., for two children 3Cfo, for three 1%
and for four and more 10Q& with a maximum of 15,000 frs. for each child
after the second. In the meantime if the individual participates
effectively in the exercise of a business under the schedule of ccmmer-
2
cial and industrial profits he is entitled to 150,000 frs allowance,
b. Insurance expenses;
The deduction of the expenses paid by the individual to secure his
future maintenance or his heirs' financial position are a matter of
dispute between the writers in taxation. One may consider such expenses
as disbursement of income and another may look at them as the discounted
value of uncertain future receipts,^ These views influenced the
attitude towards insurance annuities in the different tax legislations.
In this case the British legislator seems to be more liberal than those
in Egypt and Prance. He allows for deduction on premiums, on policies
1. The Sunday Times' representative in Paris reported on March 2nd 1952
on the French Taxation system and referred to deductions through a
system of family coefficients. This seems to be different than the
system explained in Memento Fiscal p.41 which reported taxation
changes up till March 15th, 1951, and the 'Inventaire de la Situation
Financiere'of 1951.
2. Memento Fiscal p.16
3. Fisher, op. cit. pp.18-9
155.
for life, endowment with capital sum at death, deferred annuity for
widows or children, accident or sickness policies which include death
risks and contributions to the new national Insurance Schane. It is
stipulated that these allowed deductions should be limited in proportion
to income and to the capital sum assured. Hot more than one-sixth of
the total income of the year of assessment is allowed in the aggregate,
and also the allowance for any premium must not exceed Ifo of the capital
sum assured. Some premiums are not allowed, such as those on policies
which do not provide for a capital sum at death, on lives other than those
of the taxpayer or his wife, policies which do not include a life risk
and sickness or accident policies, unless thqy can cover death risk.
It seems that this stipulation is a precaution against attempts at
evasion.
In Egypt and Prance the exemption of insurance premiums or pension
reserves is applied to mges, salaries and emoluments. She amount is
4 n
7,5'° of the earnings in Egypt, and between j% and 5° • in Prance.
These arbitrary percentages follow those applied by the State in dealing
with its employees. The General Income Tax in Egypt allows also for
deduction on all premiums for life insurance or pension without any
3limit. This provision, while it universalises the deductions of
premiums to all income taxpayers, leaves the door wide open for evasion
and gives an undue privilege to a certain class of the people. The
French system, on the other hand, limits the exemption from the equivalent
1. Art. 62 Law No.14 of 1939
2. Memento, op. cit. pp.40 and 42
3. Art. 7, Law No. 99 of 1949
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tax (surtax© progressive) to the amount paid for social insurance.1
c. Professional expenses;
In addition to these deductions the three income tax systems allow
for other expenditure, which is exclusively for the purpose of earning
income and not of a capital nature such as lighting, heating, telephone,
repairs to "business premises and subscriptions to hospitals and first
aid societies from which the "business staff benefits.
In Egypt the range allowed for deduction was widened as a result
of the pressure of the interested classes. Since 1948 all grants and
subscriptions paid to social or religious institutions recognised by
the Government are allowed for deduction from the gross profit up to
a limit of of the profits. Most of these expenses are not an
'income-cost' and the Taxation Department fought unsuccessfully against
this amendment of the law. The same procedure was taken in framing
the tax on General Income in 1949 and all grants to charities and the
like paid by the individual to the State or other benevolent institutions
is deducted up to a maximum of j$> of the annual income of the individual.
It is argued that the tax should only strike the net amount at the dis¬
posal of the individual and that these grants curtail his purchasing
power and should thus be deducted. But such grants have no relation
to the earning of income; they are disbursement of that income. It
is customary in Egypt to find some people distributing a considerable
amount on social schemes for the sake of getting a State honour.
The TVench have a special scheme to deduct prafressional expenses
in addition to the general one followed by other tax systems. These
1. Art 39, Law No.14 of 1939 as amended by Law No. 138 of 1948.
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professional expenses are varied in amount according to the job
practiced; dramatic artists and musicians, for instance are allowed
20'o, journalists 3QL, commercial travellers 3C$>, "bus drivers and
1
conductors 2Cfo and mannequins 10p and so on.
d. Taxes paid on schedular incomes;
There is a problem with regard to the duality of income tax in
Egypt and France in the imposition of taxes on the schedules of income
and then on the total income. According to the two systems, the
'direct' taxes paid on the different schedules are deductable from the
gross income charged for general income tax. ^ This practice increases
the rate of the tax more than that given in the scale of general income
tax which should be the governing factor. If we take the simple case
of an individual, whose income is realised from profits, we find that
he has to pay £E12,000 as profits tax and EE28,570 on the net income
or an aggregate of £E40,070 i.e. 4Cfo» But if he has to pay only the
tax on the general income the charge would have been £E33,370 i.e. ~5~5/°
(1950 rates).
The French writers are very liberal in their viewpoint in stating
that taxes payable on general income in one year must be deducted from
the income received in that year, and that, otherwise, there will be a
case of double taxation.^ To this charge Plehn furnished the best
answer stating that "income tax laws are logical in not allowing the
income tax itself as a deduction. This is primarily because it is a
1. Memento Fiscal, p.43
2. Ibid p. 60 and Law 99 o£ 1949
a
3. AJLlix, E & Lecercle^ M. Inrpot sur le Revenu^ Tom. Ie, p.208
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personal tax and not so easily confused with "business taxes".
e. Interest on personal loans;
The interest on personal loans is another bone of contention in
income taxation. It seems that the British legislator holds rigidly
to the principle that expenditure can only be deductable if it is for
the purpose of earning income and thus interest on personal credits has
no relation to business activity and is not deductable. In Egypt and
Prance this restriction is not applied and the individual may debit his
taxable income account by the total of the interest on his personal loans.
f. The carrying forward of the personal expenses;
If we agree on treating human beings as other physical factors of
2
production, in need of a minimum of subsistence to keep them intact,
we have to accept the deduction of sick expenses and apply the carrying
forward of any part not being enjoyed from the subsistence allowance
because of unemployment or when the income fails to reach to minimum
level. This point does not arise in Britain which provides aid for the
unemployed. But in Egypt, and in some cases in Prance, an unemployed
person is left to find a way out. He may fall into debt or become
destitute. I think it will be just as beneficial for the community to
allow the individual to carry forward the part of the minimum exemption
which he was unable to use.
1. Plehn, C.C: Introduction to Public Finance, p.244.
2. According to Laufenburger, op. cit. p.189. ^"On peut appliquer la
notion de I'amortissement a la personalite humaine et dise que le
minimum d'existence lui permet de lutter contre I'ususe prematuree
de ses forces, comme I'amortissement proprement dit sert au
renouvellement de la machine".
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ii. Allowed deductions in computing business profits.
She problem of allowed deductions from business profits is very
delicate, due to their repercussion in the development and progress of
business activity and their effect on the incentive to invest and
produce. The highly progressive rate of taxation makes the computation
of profit in particular periods a matter of a highest importance. The
distinction should be made clear between expenditure which is incurred
in the course and as part of the process for realising the profit, and
the expenses which are merely a disbursement of these profits. The
conception of income should also be present^ in our mind, in order that
deduction would be logical, and, if capital increment is accepted as
income, capital decrement should also be deducted.
In the process of production the instruments used may be impaired
by depletion, depreciation or obsolescence, and allowance is necessary
to set against the deterioration which results from such conditions.
a. Depletion.
The term 'depletion* is used to describe the process of using up
the factor of production. The taxation practice allows such depletion
which is due to the physical exhaustion of the factor but not due to
abnormal circumstances, such as war or earthquake. The latter sort of
depletion is treated as capital loss, because it is not relevant to
current net income.
Until recently Britain provided no allowance whatsoever for the
depletion of wasting assets, such as minerals, oil, gas, timber and other
1. Pigou, Scon. Journal, op. cit. p.22jO
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natural deposits. It was held that allowance for depletion should not
A
be granted "in respect of a right to the income derived from any asset".
This principle was criticised especially in relation to British mining
concerns operating in foreign countries, as it put than in an unfavouable
position compared with similar foreign concerns which were allowed such
an allowance. The Royal Commission on the Income Tax of 1920, agreed
that "when the right of future profits has been purchased from a vendor
who is entirely outside the scope of British Income Tax...an allowance
p
should be made for the amortisation of the capital sunk in the purchase"
This principle was adopted only in 1 949, following a recommendation by
the Departmental Committee on Taxation and Overseas Minerals. The
Committee stated that "the grant of a depletion allowance might enable
the concern to give a better return to its shareholders or might enable
it to create additional reserves for development and extension"."' Thus
they recommend the grant of depletion allowance to British concerns
running overseas mineral deposits in respect of capital expenditure,
based on what was laid out on the acquisition of the mineral rights by
the first British resident, or company controlled in Britain or on the
capital cost of the mineral rights to the person entitled to the
4
allowance.
There seems no reason why this practice should not be extended to
all capital expended in the acquisition of any mineral right.
1. Report on Taxation of Trade Profits, p.77
2. Quoted by Ibid, pp.77-8
3. Report of the Departmental Committee on Taxation and Overseas Minerals
Cmd. 7728 p.4
4. Ibid p. 11
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Depriving the mining concerns from depletion, allowance could only he
justified if no capital were spent on the mineral right. If it was
feared that providing such an allowance might result in the escape of
the vendor from income tax, a special tax might he levied on him in
spite of the fact that such a right is considered an increment of
value.
The assumption that mineral rights are not considered depreciable
because the vendor might escape paying the tax in one way or another,
does not arise in Egypt. According to the Egyptian law of ownership,
the individual is entitled to ownership of the surface of the land only,
anything underneath the surface, such as mines or minerals, is exclusively
owned by the State which can dispose of it through a concession of
limited duration after the approval of Parliament. This reservation
is a legacy of the old rules, which allowed the usufruct of land but not
its ownership for the individual. These rules were broken down in the
second part of the last century.
In principle the Egyptian and French practice accepts the deduction
of reserves necessary for depletion of the capital.. This is in con¬
formity with their concept of income which includes increment and
decrement of capital in the profit and loss account.
In the same category is the reserve which is set aside to pay for
the establishments of a concern, which might be asked to surrender them
without compensation on the expiry of its concession. These establishments
are clearly of a wasting nature but still the British practice does not
162.
1
allow any deduction in this case, unlike the Egyptian and French
practice. The Egyptian law makes it clear that the tax does not apply
"to companies holding a concession from the Government or from other
public authorities, when they prove that the redemption of the capital
in whole or in part ... is justified by the loss of the company's assets
wholly or partly, either through the progressive wear and tear of the
said assets, or by reason of the obligation of the company to hand over
?
these assets to the authority which granted the concession,"
b. Depreciation.
This tern is used to describe the loss of value of the asset due
to physical wear and tear, and it does not refer to any dimunition in
the market value of the asset. The allowance for wear and tear is in
the aggregate equal to the cost of the depreciated asset.
In spite of the fact that depreciation is an important item in
computing business profit, it was not legally accepted in the British
Income Tax practice until 1878. The tax Commissioners used to allow
deduction for wear and tear before that time in certain cases, but
3
without any legal authorisation. Since 1878 depreciation allowance
has been given to traders and was extended in 1925 to include profession¬
als.^"
Almost all Income Tax laws approve the deduction of wear and tear
allowance from gross profit without any reservation so long as the plant
1. Report on the Taxation of Trade Profits p.79
2. Art. 2, Law No. 14 of 1939
3. Vasiliu, op. cit. p.67
4. Spaulding, op. cit. p.188
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or machinery was in use during the period of production. The British
system does not give "a depreciation allowance as an expense in
computing the profits of a period unless the plant had been in use for
the whole or at least a substantial part of that period". After 1949
the rate of depreciation was allowed to increase "where a particular
2
machine is worked overtime". The depreciation rate in Egypt and France
is variable and fluctuates according to the running time of the machine
compared with normal working.-*
The difference between the two practices is a result of the outlook
towards the allowance. In Britain, a claim for depreciation allowance
should be made separately, and when approved it can be deducted from the
gross assessment. The Egyptian and French practices follow the
accounting logic and deduct the depreciation in computing the amount
4
of profits on which the assessment is made. The difference might look
simple, but it goes beyond historical or practical considerations.
According to the British practice the concern has the right to claim or
not to claim depreciation allowances and it might be better for it,
sometimes, not to make any claim, if that would mean a loss whose recovery
might be doubtful, in the limited time of carrying over. The British
1. Report on the Taxation of Trade Profits p. 87
2. Ibid, p. 90
3. Egyptian Income Tax Regulations.
4. Art. 39 of the Law 14 of 1939 reads as follows "The net profit liable
to tax shall be determined on the basis of the result of the
operations ... after deduction of all charges and especially ...
actual depreciation effected in the sphere of what is habitually
practised in accordance with the usages and with the nature of
every industry, trade or work".
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system has another effect in that "the profits of sane periods may "be
assessed two or more times and the profits of other periods may not come
1
into assessment at all".
It is suggested that the logic in the Egyptian and French practice
should not deprive the concerns of the possibility of shifting the
2
depreciation allowance from the "bad year to the profitable one.
/
b. Depreciation of intangible assets;
There are also intangible assets which raise the problem of
allowance for their depreciation such as patents, copyrights and goodwill.
These items do not wear in the same way as the tangible assets but their
value may gradually diminish.
The British legislator is hesitant to allow any deduction in
respect of deterioration or diminution of capital assets employed in
the business. "No clear principle is deducible from the treatment of
wasting assets under existing law",^ but in fact allowance is given for
replacement of fixed assets or stocks. But great progress has been
made since the end of the war, when the economic problems necessitated
a reconsideration of the depreciation principle. In 1945, the taxpayer
is entitled to write off the cost price of a patent by instalments over
a number of years. The acceptance of this principle increased the
concept of income as 'the capital sum received for the sale of patent
right', which became liable to the tax. The Committee on the Taxation of
1. Report on the Taxation of Trade Profits p.67
2. A1 Rifaei op. cit. p. 342
3. Report op. cit. p. 63 and Report of the Income Tax Codification
Com. p. 84
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Trading Profits accepted as a guiding principle the vievr that relief
should "be given to different assets and expenditure which is at present
•i
treated as capital expenditure. But they stick to the principle that
there should "be decay or exhaustion through use "before any allowance is
given.
In the case of goodwill, there is no indication that an initial loss
is incurred, or that the goodwill is used up or consumed wholly or partly
in the course of carrying on the "business, and thus any allowance for
2
its depreciation could not "be granted. Edwards came to the same
conclusion from a different angle. He stated that goodwill "is merely
the difference between the value of the business at a moment of time" and
cannot be written up "even if it is clear beyond aH reasonable doubt
that the value of the business has risen",^
The Egyptian and French legislators based depreciation allowances
on their definition of income. It is quite acceptable then that capital
gains and losses are included in the profit and loss account of any
concern. Accordingly, patents, copyrights and goodwill are deductable
elements.4
c. Obsolescence;
The term obsolescence is used to mean the losses -vrtiich are sustained
when the value of the asset deteriorates, due to changing conditions of
the business in which it is used. The value of any factor is mostly
derived from the value of its products. Thus any charge in the fashion,
1. Report on Taxation of Trading Profits p. 64
2. Ibid p. 65
3. Edwards, R.S: Lectures on the Nature and Measurement of Income
(1938) VIII p. 4
4. A1 Rifaei, ip. cit. pp. 343-4
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in the pattern of industry or in the movement of population, would affect
the demand on producers' goods and their value might go down, if their
services were no longer desired. "The price of a piece of machinery"
stated Edwards, "is the present value of the flow of services expected to
"be derived from the rights to its possession".
Annual deduction for obsolescence is not allowed in any of the
Egyptian or the French systems. In Britain, in addition to the allowances
granted for the rationalisation of industry by F.A. 1935, other initial
allowances were granted by F.A. 1945, for machinery and plant, in order
to facilitate any replacement because of obsolescence. Mien the
machinery or plant is replaced or scrapped a balancing account is made
and the profits and loss accounts is to be debited or credited by the
amount due.
The Egyptian practice is less liberal in this course; it only
allows any capital loss, if the given depreciation plus the price of scrap
is not enough to pay for the prime cost of plant or machinery when sold.
Any replacement which is listed as a new asset is entitled to deductions
in the normal way.
During the war prices of capital goods were excessively high, and
it was considered just to allow business concerns a special reserve to
amortize the probable depreciation in the value of stocks purchased and
2
the installations established during the war. If any machine was
brought after January 1st, 1940, two accounts should be opened for it:
1. Edwards, op. cit. Ill, p. 1.
2. Art. 7. Law No. 60 of 1941
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in the first, the price of the machine at the pre-war price and in the
second, the difference between the estimated and the real price. The
first account would bear the normal depreciation rate and the second
should be written off by the termination of the E.P.T. The amounts
deducted in accordance with stocks, were not to exceed 2% of the excess
profits of the year and in accordance with installations were not to
exceed 5($>, a maximum of 6q/0 of excess profits would be allowed for the
aggregate reserves. This special treatment came to an end in 1950
when the E.P.T. was abolished.
The French practice up to 1938 was similar to that adopted in
Egypt, but the war made it impossible to leave it without alteration.
According to the existing scheme, the cost of an existing plant is to
be multiplied by an index calculated from statistical figures of the
1
wholesale of 87 industrial products. The coefficient used is 1 for 1939,
2
1.25, 1.35, 1.5 and 2.0 for the following years. In favour of the
corporations which establish dwellings for their workers, they are allowed
an exceptional amortisement of in the first year and then the residue
to be amortised in 5Q& with an annual rate of 1.2Q6.^
The problem of computing the profit after allowing for the higher
cost of replacing fixed assets and stocks at this time of inflation is
causing wideworld controversy. It is alleged that the rigidity of the
system of depreciation is responsible for the intensification of the
trade cycle. During inflation the profits are overvalued and depreciations
1. Foimery, op. cit. p. 201
2. Ibid pp. 180-1
3. Memento, op. cit. p. 18
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under-valued; the contrary occurs in time of deflation. The problem
of depreciation is the result of the accounting practice which followed
the classical hypothesis of a static state. But in the dynamic state
changes are continuous and the value of the assets fluctuate rapidly.
The Tucker Committee, after discussing the problem of depreciation and
replacement and the suggestion by business-men of a "revalorisation"
scheme, or a special replacement allowance, objected to them both,
because they do not satisfy the test of being equitable between different
A
classes of business, or practicable in administration. If ihere is a
real difficulty in accepting either proposal, the rates of depreciation
should be increased; in other words, the time of amortization should be
reduced as much as possible. The Egyptian practice of giving a special
reserve for depreciation when E.P.T. was applied or the French systemJ J
might give a solution to the problem in Britain. Lacey proposes "that
an appropriate retrospective adjustment might be (suitable) to create
2
a reserve against current stock values".
d. Other deductions from gross income:
To ascertain 'net' income, other deductions, in addition to those
affecting the invested capital, should be taken into consideration.
Any allowed deduction should be exclusively laid out or expended for
the purposes of the trade. In this category there are the losses
sustained during the business, bad debts, taxes, advertising, subscriptions,
bonuses and pensions to the employees, etc.
1. Tucker, Report p. 41
2. Lacey, K: Economic Journal Vol. 61, 1951, pp. 756-776
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(1) Losses.
Loss "by fire, theft and burglary which are not covered by insurance
could be debited to the profit and loss account. A person or a
corporation which has incurred a loss in a trade may carry forward the
loss, and set it against the profits, in the following years of assess¬
ment. The Egyptian system limits the period of carrying forward to
1
three successive years compared with six in Britain and five in Prance.
A special provision was made in Britain during the war through which
the war years i.e. 1 939-40 to 1945-6 were ignored in computing the
six-year period.
It seems that the time limit for carrying forward the losses is
of an historic nature, and is based on the assumption that an indefinite
time would result in a strain on the tax collectors. But allowance
2
against wear and tear can be carried as long as fifty years and even
indefinitely, and there is no reason why business losses should not be
carried forward in the same manner.^
The application of this proposal would lessen risk-taking to a large
extent and would, most probably, encourage long term investments^ where
some years have to pass before any profit can be realised. In the mean¬
time as the proposal might lead to tax evasion through the incorporation
of losing concerns with those incurring profits, precautions should be
taken against such a possibility,
1. A1 Rifaei, op. cit. p. 346, Law No.14 of 1939 Art. 57 and. Report
of Taxation on Trade Profitsp. 28
2. The smallest rate of depreciation in Egypt is 2fa for buildings
3. Report of Taxation on Trade Profits p. 28
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The British Income Tax law enables the taxpayer to set a "business
loss against other income for the same year but does not allow setting
■\
the loss against non-business income in any other year. The Egyptian
and French General Income Taxes allow the loss resulting only from the
closing down of the business or its liquidation to be set against income,
incurred from any other source, the losses of the three or the five
2
years preceding to the closure. It does not seem that the two laws
allow the business losses of one year to be carried forward and set
against non-business profits in any other year.
The Tucker Committee reccranenas that the system of carrying
forward should be allowed for one year only, as it is feared that any
extension would open the door to tax evasion.
(2) Bad debts.
The different tax systems do not allow any appropriation to reserves
for doubtful debts but accept the deduction of bad debts when it is
proved to the tax Commissioners that they were considered lost. If
anything is recovered from the written-off debts, the receipt should be
credited to the profit and loss account,
(3) Taxes;
Business taxes and local rates are deductable from the tax on Com.
and Ind. Profits in Egypt and France, British legislation allows also
the Profits tax to be deducted from the Inccme Tax.
The deduction of the foreign income tax is allowed in Britain
1. Ibid p. ,29
2. Art. 7, Law 99 of 19bS and Memento p. 61
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except where relief is claimed under reciprocal agreement. This is
taken to lighten the "burden on the concerns which are taxed in Britain
as well as abroad. But there is a problem arising from the claim of
more than one country to a priority in taxing the profits of a concern.
In the case of the Suez Coal Co. the concern deducted the Income Tax
and the N.D.C. paid in Britain from its taxable profits in Egypt. The
company is considered as resident in Britain because its board of
directors meets there, but its enterprise is carried on in T^ypt. The
Egyptian court refused to recognise the deduction and ccupelled the
company to pay the Egyptian schedular tax on all the profits realised
i*1 Egypt, International agreement should be concluded to relieve the
corporations operating in more than one country from double taxation.
(4) Subscriptions and donations.
Any subscription or donation which is given purely to maintain the
business or to a benevolent institution from which the business ataff
benefits is deducted finder any system. But if the charities and
donations have no convention with the business, they are not deductable
except in Egypt where they are allowed to the maximum of ~5fo of the net
profit of the concern. This latter practice deprives the Government
of large amounts which should be considered as disbursement of profit
and not an income-cost. The necessary amount for 1Holiday with Bay'
schemes which are applied in Britain and a reserve for employers'
bonuses, limited to two-months pay in Egypt, are allcured as a deduction
for tax purposes.2
1. A1 Rifaei pp. 338-40
2. The Report on the Taxation of Trading Profits, p. 62 and Art. 39
of the law No. 14 of 1939
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To hasten economic progress after the war, Britain allowed as
deductable all sums expended, not of a capital nature, on scientific
research undertaken by the concern or on its behalf through a
university or otherwise, if the expenditure be carried in instalments
On the whole, the deductable amounts from gross profits in order
to reach the 'net* taxable part depend mostly on the custom or practice
in the industry and trade as well as on other practical, economic and
financial considerations.
The following table shows the deductions allowed from the 'net
true' income in Britain. As no such information is available for
Bgypt or Prance, no comparison can be made.
of one-fifth every year.
1
£Mn.
Wet True Income for 1949-50
Income below the exemption limit
Charities, Colleges, Hospitals, etc.
(Personal allowances and deductions
(Allowances for children, dependent,
( etc.
Life assurance
5,140.0
125.0
35.5
50.0
9,430.1
5,348.5
Taxable Income
At one-third
At two-thirds
At Standard rate
694.0
971.0
2,416.6
Tax Chargeable
Double Taxation Relief
1,482.9
36.0
Wet Produce of the Tax 1.446.9
Source: Report of the Inland Revenue 1951 Ctad. 8436 p.42.
1. Draft, Income Tax Consolidation Bill pp.250-1.
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CHAPTER V
DIVERSION PRCM THE UNIVERSALIII PRINCIPLE.
EXEMPT INCOME AND THE PROBLEM OP DOUBLE TAXATION.
In a, general and absolute manner the principle that all citizens
are equal before the law in matters of taxation, underlies the political
constitutions of modem States. This universality principle leads to
the supposition that no citizen receiving an income may escape the
liability towards the State, and that those who enjoy a given income
must receive the same fiscal treatment. Such a principle is constitution¬
ally accepted as a safeguard against the old privileges when the dominant
classes in society were exempted from taxation while the burden was
borne by the masses. But this equality of all citizens before the law
of taxation could not be held in a rigidly objective sense, and
complexities in the socio-economic framework resulted in an intentional
and non-intentional diversion from that canon. In the existing tax
laws we find that some incomes are exempt while at the same tame others
are taxed more than once. The following is an attempt to analyse
these two contradictory tendencies.
I. Income Exempt;
Before discussing incane exempt in its different aspects, there
is the logical exemption given to the State and its institutions. It
might be agreed that there is no need of provision of exenpting the
State from taxation because taxes are levied for its own functions, and
1. De Marco, op. cit. p. 166
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it would be illogical if it had to tax itself. In spite of that,
provisions had to be made to counteract the taxes which strike wealth
objectively without regard to the beneficiary of the incone. It is
a constitutional principle that no exemption whatsoever shall be given
except in the cases provided for by law. In the three legislations
under comparison exemption from taxation covers:- The returns of State
departments, the Mint, the Arsenal, the State Press, the Stock dividends
belonging to the State and the State domain. Laufenburger holds the
view that the reason for any exemption of a State department should be
the unproductivity of a revenue or income. This led him to suggest
1
the imposition of taxation on public domain. The French legislation
extends exemption to the industries monopolised by the State, such
as alcohol and tobacco, where no competition with private enterprise
2
arises.
The transference of any State property to an individual makes it
subject to the tax. But the Mixed Courts in Bgypt held the view that
the exemption should be maintained, if the transference was temporary,
on types of concession, on the termination of which the property was
3
to be restored to the State.
In addition to the exemptions provided for State departments and
their transactions and those given for minimum of subsistence and
family upkeep which were previously discussed, other exempt ions are
allowed for political, social and economic reasons. These exemptions
1. Laufenburger, op. cit. pp. 171-172
2. Ibid, p. 112
3. A1 Rifaei, op. cit. pp. 195-196
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may be permanent or occasional and may be absolute or limited, in
accordance with the circumstances which called for them,
a. Exemption for political reasons;
In the old days exemption from taxation was part of the political
privilege enjoyed by the secular and ecclesiastical classes. The
change in the politico-social order of society terminated that privilege;
but the existing parliamentary regime attempted to create new ones in
-j
favour of the powerful parties and to attract votes in the election.
The Goverrment when exempting a certain income and granting a certain
allowance, never admits that it has done so for any reason but the
welfare of the masses and the prosperity of the nation.
(i) Exemptions for the Sovereign;
Passing from the point in the meantime, we find a remnant of the
old political privilege in the exemption of the Royal Family from
taxation. Up till 1689 in Britain and 1878 in Egypt, there was no
separation of the income of the Sovereign and that of the Government.
The products of the Kings' estates and the contribution of his vassals
used to form the source of public expenditure. The Revolution in
Britain and the financial crisis in Egypt resulted in the Sovereign
relinquishing most of his lands and revenues in return for regular votes
2
of funds for his personal and his household requirements.
From the constitutional point of view, the King enjoys large
1. Laufenburger, op. cit. p. 16 9
2. Ogg, F.A.L* English Government and Politics, p. 103 and Henein, G:
Land and Taxation in Egypt (in Arabic) p. 46
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personal immunities and privileges. "He cannot "be called to account
for his private conduct in any court of law "by any legal process".
He is not "bound by any Act of Parliament unless by specific mention or
by direct inference. Accordingly the Crown in its official capacity,
is not liable to Income fax. By the Crown Private Estates Act of 1862,
the private estates of the King are, however, subject to taxation.
Similarly any private trading projects realised by the King are subject
to taxation. In Egypt the Financial Crisis of the 1870's which was
of international importance and resulted in the Khedive's surrender
of his estates, necessitated the imposition of the tax on all lands
3
without exception. Wow the King owns land and rents dwellings and
he pays tax on them like any other individual. In the same manner he
pays the tax on the return of immovable property which is of an
impersonal character. When the Schedular Income Taxes were imposed,
it was debated whether the Royal allotment was taxable or not. The
general opinion was in favour of exempting it simply because the
allotments were fixed by approval of Parliament on the King's accession
to the throne, and, when once approved, could not be altered without a
constitutional change.
The problem which has yet to be solved is the application of the
general income tax to the income of the Sovereign realised from all
1. Ogg: Ibid, p. 102 and Art. 33 of the Egyptian Constitution
2. Bolting, J.G.G: The Inequalities of English Income Tax, M.Sc.Thesis,
London, 1944. This conclusion is different from that which Ogg
stated in p. 103 that the Monarch in Britain is exempt from
taxation of both his income and his property.
3. The land tax as was stated before was assigned as a guarantee for
the debt charges.
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sources other than his personal allotment. The writer's view is that
the King's income should be made liable to the tax with its progressive
rate in the same manner as is any other individual's. This could be
justified by the understanding that the products of the King's estates
compete in the market with those of other individuals, and that the
Civil List allotment is enough for the necessary functions of the King.
(■*-■*-) Exemptions for diplomatic representatives:
Certain immunities from income tax are given to diplomatic
representatives of foreign countries. These immunities are based on
an extra-territorial jurisdiction enjoyed by these representatives
1
and on reciprocal treatment. But this immunity is not absolute and
differs between one country and another.
In Britain the tax is charged under Sch. A. "in respect of any
house or tenement occupied by the accredited Minister of any foreign
2
State". in Egypt Embassies and Consular buildings are exempted if
3
the property is owned by a foreign State. The French legislator is
4
more logical in allowing the exemption on a reciprocal basis. With
reference to the emoluments which the foreign representatives receive
fran their own Governments, it is obvious that the country of
residence does not apply the tax to them as they are already subject
to their own country's tax. But the case is different in relation to
the income received from investments within or without the countxy of
1. Laufehburger, op. cit. p. 170
2. Draft. Income Tax Consolidation Bill j> a f
3. Art. 2. House Tax Law of 1884
4. Formery, op. cit. p. 110
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residence. According to the British system, no tax is charged "in
respect of the stock or dividends of any accredited Minister of any
foreign State" resident in the country. In Egypt and Prance the
Schedular Income Taxes are largely of a non-personal character and are
applied to the return without any reference to the beneficiary.
In addition to these exemptions there are others which concern
Egypt because of its political position. Up till 1937 'foreigners'
were privileged by the Capitulations and exempted from all direct taxes.
No direct tax could be imposed on them without the approval of their
Governments and the Court of Appeal had the right to judge the
constitutional validity of any law as far as 'foreigners' were concerned.
This practice which weighed the scale heqvily against Egyptians was
abolished as we have seen in 1937. Besides, there were other privileges
and immunities given to the British Forces in Egypt according to the
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.^ In a convention attached to that Treaty
British Camps and members of the Services were immune from all taxation,
other than the municipal rates for services enjoyed. But no exemption
from taxation was granted to the members of the Forces who were owners
of real property, nor from the taxation on commercial and industrial
profits. The members of the Military Missions, as well as U.N.R.E.A.
were also accorded semi-diplomatic status, but as individuals; when
dealing in business transactions, they were subject to the tax. The
N.A.A.F. I. and other Clubs which belong to the Forces were also exempt
1, Consolidation Bill, p. 69.
2. Art. 9 of the Treaty.
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from taxation.
b. Exemption of charitable and educational institutions;
Long "before the modern State took responsibility for the welfare
of the public, this function was carried on by different charitable
bodies. The take-over was incomplete and some of these bodies had to
remain in order to supply the public with their traditional service.
The charitable institutions do not work for profit but to alleviate
the burdens of the masses, whether material or moral.
The exemption of charitable bodies, like any other exemption, was
a matter of controversy. Some taxpayers hold the view that every
exemption throws an additional burden upon the rest of the community.
Moreover, it is argued that in functioning, these bodies are hindering
the State frcm playing its full rSle in the welfare sphere. To the
individualist any attempt to repeal or to curtail the relief enjoyed
by charities means / in crease of the responsibility of the State; in
other words, an increase in the rate of taxation and in the directional
power of the State. It is also feared that taxing charitable bodies
will result in the termination of this humanitarian activity which
links individuals together and lessens the material friction between
classes. Income Tax laws adhere to the latter view, but they differ
in their definition of charitable purposes.
The British law exempts charitable bodies or trustees "for
charitable purposes in respect of their rents, dividends and interest,
2
in so far as they are applied to charitable purposes". The definition
1. See Report of the Rcyal Commission on the Income Tax, Cmd. 615, p.68
(attempts made to curtail the allowances by Gladstone in 1863 have ^
failed).
2. Ibid, p.67 ^
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of the last phrase dates back to Elizabethan times and embodies; the
relief of poverty, the advancement of education and science, the advance¬
ment of religion and practically all other purposes beneficial to
•i
society. The House of Lords emphasised that definition in 1891.
The Boyal Commission on the Inccsae Tax of 1920 criticised this wide
pdefinition and called for a specific re-definition by Parliament. In
the P.A. 1922, "Charity" was limited to any "body of persons or trust
established for charitable purposes only",^ but the definition of
charitable purposes did not change.
The British system is very generous in granting exemptions to
charitable bodies. It exempts land, tenements and heritages owned
and occupied by charities as well as profits of a trade carried on by
any charity if such profits are applied solely to the purposes of the
charity, and also rents, interest, dividends and annual payments
4
belonging to them. There is a proviso that, in all cases of property
owned by a "charity", if any portion is in the use and enjoyment of
any individual it shall be returned in assessment if his total income
exceeds the limit of personal exemption.
According to the former rule, the following institutions are free
of tax; hospitals, almshouses, public schools, colleges, universities,
research institutions, scientific associations and places of worship.
This category includes also the British Museum, the agricultural societies
and the local authority sewers.
1. Ibid, pp. 67-68
2. Ibid, p.68
3. Report of the Codification Committee, op. cit. p.227
4. Consolidation Bill, pp.348-349
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The exemption given to charitable societies and for charitable
functions is restricted in Egypt and Prance. Under the Egyptian law
the land which is destined only for the Benefit of the destitute and
mosques, churches and other buildings specified for the poor are exempt
from taxation. But the lands and buildings owned by any religious
-j
or charitable institutions are subject to the tax. This rule is
nearly similar to that applied in France,^ where, it seems, these
restrictions are related to historical conditions. In 1813 the Viceroy
of Egypt, Mohamed Ali seized all the land which was redistributed after
being surveyed and assessed for taxation. The privileges of religious
and charitable institutions were abolished and only those lands which
were destined strictly for the benefit of the poor were saved from the
axe. As to the land tax, it was revised when Egypt was passing through
a severe economic and political crisis and no room c ould be spared for
exemptions except those which have been previously described. In
Prance, the Revolution deprived the Church of most of its property and
opposed all kinds of privileges whatever their form. Since then
people are suspicious of any exemption from taxation.
In the case of the Schedular Income Taxes, no allowance is given
for charitable institutions in the case of the impersonal tax on the
return of moveable property, but in the personal commercial and
industrial profits tax( exemption is granted on their receipts from
donations, subscriptions and the like. If these institutions run any
lucrative business they are bound to pay the tax even if the profits are
1. Art. 7, Law No.113 of 1939 (Land Tax) and Art. 2, Decree of 1884
(House Tax)
2. Formery, op. cit. p.110
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intended to pay for their functions according to Egyptian and French
•i
practice.
When income tax was first imposed in 1939 in Egypt, the legislator
laid special emphasis upon exempting all the educational institutes: hut
in 1941 this privilege was limited to those established by charitable
or religious associations. This action was justified as a measure
against tax evasion, because it was found that some private schools or
colleges for shorthand, typewriting, linguistics, music and dancing
realised a clear pfofit and should thus be treated like any other
commercial concern. But this argument is not enough because the word
•educational institute' can be clearly defined. Taxing private schools
may hamper their activities at a time when they are helping to educate
the people in a country a considerable number of whose population is
illiterate. Most of these schools receive annual subsidies from the
State and according to the definition of income by the Taxation Department
they have to credit their balance sheet with that sum, a principle which
2
apparently contradicts the educational policy of the Government,
c. Exemption for social expediency:
The personal minimum allowance to keep the human body intact does
not usually follow the poverty line. It fluctuates according to
political and economic conditions, but on the whole, in a progressive
state such as Britain, the margin is kept higher than the subsistence
level for social expediency reasons.
1. Egyptian Tax Eegulations and Laufenburger, op. cit. p.172
2. The continuous criticism to the Government,attitude bore fruit and
by law passed in October 1951, educational institutions are
re-exempted.
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The great depression of 1930 had the powerful effect of raising
to a higher level generally the standard rate of exemption in order to
increase the propensity to consume.'' France follows the same policy
and the minimum income exempted from taxation is comparatively higher
than the subsistence level and fluctuates according to the socio-economic
changes. In Egypt, the average rate of taxation is low and thus little
importance is given to personal exemption. The principle is not always
respected. Some people may get an exemption exceeding the minimum of
subsistence, as in the case of earnings from commercial and industrial
transactions which is HEM 00 for a single person; others enjoy an
exemption below the poverty line, that is ££14.3 of the land rentaj. value;
and the section receiving interest from moveable property are not allowed
any tax exemption. In addition to this inequality of help in raising
social standards, the tax exemptions given in Egypt are static and do
not follow any change in prices or the level of subsistence.
The benevolent bearing on the income tax structure is felt in
providing special relief for old people. In Britain, if the individual
or his wife have reached the age of 65 and his total inccme does not
exceed £500 per annum, he is entitled to a deduction equal to one-fifth
of that income; that means he has to pay taxation only on four-fifths
of his income. In Egypt exemption for old age is only allowed to the
professional classes, who pay no tax on their earnings when they reach
the age of 60 years. This exemption is criticised as creating an
unreasonable privilege which is not allowed to any other section of the
1. Taylor, P.E: The Economics of Public Finance, pp.4^0 and 604
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taxpayers. Moreover, there is no proof that the earnings of professional
people are so drastically reduced after reaching the age of 60 as to
justify such a sweeping exemption.
Hie taxation systems did not fail to recognise the importance of
educating children on whom the responsibilities of the future rest.
Thils children's allowance is extended after the normal school leaving
age if they continue full-time studies at any university, college, school
1
or other educational establishment. Unlike the British practice, the
Egyptian law limits the age of the child in this case to 25 years and
requires that he should be attached to a higher school or university
2
and not otherwise. Moreover, the British law states clearly that no
relief shall be allowed if the child is entitled to ian income of his
own exceeding the limit of allowance (£60). Scholarships, bursaries
and other educational endowments are not considered income in this
respect following the strict definition of income used for taxation
5
purposes in Britain. The Egyptian legislator misses this point and
grants educational allowance regardless of the child's financial
position, thus leaving the door open for evasion.
Other exemptions from taxation are provided in Britain for income
received in respect of disabilities incurred during service in the
Grown forces, and for retired pay of disabled officers granted on account
of medical unfitness attributed to or aggravated by naval, military or
air force service.*1- Similarly, there is exempted from taxation all
1. Consolidation Bill, p. 138
2. .Art 10, Law No. 99 of 1949
3. Consolidation Bill, p. 139
4. Ibid, p. 287 and Memento Fiscal, p. 42
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compensation paid for war injuries and allowances given to widows or
■\
children of the forces. The Egyptian law does not make any reference
to exemption for such consequences of national service.
The income tax laws in Britain abd France do not reckon in
computing inccme, the unemployment benefit, sickness and maternity aid
and death grants which are provided under the National Insurance and
2
Assistance Acts. Again the Egyptian law seems to be inflexible and
considers all benefits received as taxable inccme.
d. Exemption of friendly societies, trade unions, etc;
Taxation is not intended to inflict unnecessary hardship upon the
individual. It is the main function of the State to collect taxation
in order to assure a maximum social satisfaction of all. If exemption
from taxation is allowed for any institution, it must be on the under¬
standing that it performs a function "which the Government would other-
3
wise be called upon to assume". The registered friendly societies
are of long standing in the British social structure. They were formed
to insure their members against poverty and destitution. When income
tax was imposed in Britain the members of these societies were below
the exemption limit then prevailing and thus they were not subject to
the tax.^1" The argument that these societies compete with life
assurance companies did not prevent the continuation of their exemption,
but certain limitations had to be set to suit the existing conditions.
Now a registered society may be exempt from taxation if it assures to
1. Ibid, p. 285
2. Ibid, p. 283 and Memento, p. 42
3. Seligman, Studies in Public Finance, p. 140
4. The Royal Cormnission on Inccme Tax, p. 67
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any person a sum not exceeding £500 in gross or £104 a year "by way
of annuity. The unregistered friendly societies can be exempted
if its income does not exceed £160 a year. The exemption given in
2
this case is from tax under Schedules A, C. and D.
Trades Unions are another form of association ■whose function is
the performance of certain services to their members. They rank
high in the British social framework and thus they are exempted from
taxation on Schedules & and Dtin respect of their interest and
dividends which are provided to meet their purposes, and so long as
they assure to any person a sum similar to that referred to in the
case of the friendly societies. Trades Unions are treated in Egypt
and Prance in the same manner as the non-profit and charitable concerns.
They enjoy tax exemption only on their funds, but not on their invest¬
ments or the utilisation of their capital. In Egypt the aid and
annuities granted by them to their members are considered financial
benefits subject to the tax. This seems to be harsh treatment of
these organisations which are still young in Egypt.
Co-operative societies are other institutions which work mainly
to reduce the cost of living for their members and assure their welfare.
When the income tax was imposed in Britain they were fully recognised
3
and the legislator had to exempt them from taxation.
1. Consolidation Bill, p. 344
2. Ibid, p. 344
3. The first attempt in co-operative movement in Britain was in Scotland
in 1761, but the most influential one was the Rochdale Pioneers
in 1844. See the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
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Up to the tame of the Royal Commission of Income Tax in 1 920, the co¬
operative societies were exempt from taxes under Schedules C. and D. on
1
their trading profits, hank interest and dividends on investment.
Later on when these societies became well established and entered into
competition with non-co-operative concerns, these exemptions were the
subject of heated controversy and had to be withdrawn in 1933-4. But
the co-operative societies are still entitled to an allowance in
respect of payments such as: money actually expended for educational
purposes; normal subscriptions to hospitals and convalescent homes
from which the employees or members may derive benefit, subscriptions
to Co-operative Guilds and subscriptions to the general fund of the
Co-opetative Union. But their payments for political purposes are not
deductable costs. The members of the co-operative societies in
Britain are liable to income tax on their share interest, and only the
•disposal surplus* which is regarded as a deferred discount, is untaxed.
Co-operative agricultural societies are of special importance in
Egypt. The country is mainly dependent on agriculture and the
peasants are relatively poor. The least the Government can do is to
permit the exemption of the co-operative societies whose main object is
raising the standard of living of its poor members through the reduction
in the cost of their purchases, the elimination of the profits going
to middle-men, and the increase in the power of bargaining. In
addition to the exemption of the agricultural co-operative societies,
I.The Royal Commission on the Inccme Tax, p. 119 ^
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the Egyptian legislator exempts other co-operative associations for
consumption which limit their operations to the collection of the
orders of their members, and to the distribution in their stores and
warehouses of articles of food products and goods which are the object
of these orders. The special privilege of the co-operative societies
was abolished by a law passed in October, 1951, which leaves the
condition more vague. The exemption allowed by that law covers all
concerns which do not work for profit and all agricultural societies
which are not in the form of joint stock companies (Art. 72, law No.174
of 1951).
Co-operative societies get more attention and widespread exemption
in Prance. The legislator exempts from taxation co-operative societies
for production, transforming, canning and selling the agricultural
products. If they trade in a distinctive place other than the centre
•\
of production they will be subject to taxation at a half-rate.
Distributive co-operative societies are also exempt if they limit their
2
dealings to their members.
e. Exemption to further economic development:
The problems of post-war reconstruction and the dire need for
increasing productivity pressed the Ministers of Finance to give
certain tax exemption for individuals or corporations to stimulate
their efforts to this end.
We have noticed how Britain has provided special treatment in
1. Laufenburger, op. cit. p. 171 and Pormery, op. cit. p. 170
2. Pormery, op. cit. pp. 247-8
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favour of capital expenditure on scientific research since 1944,
following the course taken in 1935, when deductions from profits of
contributions for rationalisation of industry were allowed. The
Egyptian and French legislators, in their turn, give more attention
to constructional and development schemes. In France the extraction
of oil is free from taxation because the need for oil is urgent and its
•i
prospects in the country are remote. Similarly, Egypt exempts
forest lands from taxation to encourage forest planting, and France
gives a temporary exemption of 20 years for the same reason. Moreover,
in France newly constructed buildings are exempt from taxation for the
first two years, and flats constructed to let to the working classes
enjoy an exemption for 10 to 15 years,
f. Other tax exemptions;
Egypt exempts agricultural profits from income tax except if
they are realised by a joint stock company. The Taxation Committee
of 1938 justified this action by the fact that agriculture had been
3
the main source of taxation before any schedular inccme tax was imposed.
In reality the main source of taxation was and still is the indirect
taxes which are largely borne by the masses. It is no exaggeration to
state that land is undertaxed in Egypt. Behind this privilege is the
dominating power of landlords in parliament.
The professionals are another privileged class. They are exempted
from the tax on professional income for the first five years of the
practice,^ a concession which has no parallel in the whole tax structure.
1. Laufenburger, op, cit. p. 171 and Foimery, op. cit, p. 112
2. Memento Fiscal, p. 58
3. Report of the Taxation Committee, p. 54
4. Art. 71, Law No. 14 of 1939
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In addition to these exemptions from taxation there are others
which raise controversial points, and are "better given in greater
detail. Hie first is the exemption of State securities and the second
is the exemption of savings.
(Exemption of State securities.
According to Seligman, the first obvious reason for the tax
exemption of Government securities was war, when the need for revenue
A
was great while credit was apt to weaken. This practice which might
be justified during a time of emergency was extended to normal times
as an easy way of borrowing at a low rate of interest. In a static
state and if the loan had to be redeemed by a fixed date one could
assess the gain and loss of exempting State ^guids from taxation. On
the other hand, in a dynamic State, where the Government responsibilities
tend to increase, pushing up the average rate of taxation and where
tax-free State bonds are perpetual, it would be difficult to assess the
net loss which would result from such a bond issue. De Marco, who held
the 'capitalisation theory', thought that tax-free bonds are discounted
p
and consolidated in the selling price. Accordingly, if taxes on
income increase and the rate of interest remains the same, then the
price of tax-exempt bonds would rise and the State could step in and
repay the loan, or convert it to another with a lower rate of interest,
or even to other taxable ones. "The fallacy of this argument",
according to Seligman, "is due to the fact that it neglects a consideration
1, Seligman, op. cit. p. 11*0
2. De Marco, op. cit. p. 297
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■i
of the market conditions". The tax-exempt State securities tend to
nullify the progressive rates of taxation, to undermine the equity
principle, to interfere with the flow of new investments to open the
2
road for tax evasion. The exemption works like a subsidy in the form
of relief from surtax and with every increase in the tax rate a windfall
3of gains would be enjoyed by the bond-holders. Contracting a loan,
for other purposes than productive expenditure is in itself a favourable
procedure to the high income brackets, as the State could, instead,
Impose a tax on them to meet such needs.
In spite of all these glairing defects, the Egyptian and French
systems exempt their State bonds from taxation. This situation
could be accepted in Egypt when the country was tied by the 'old' inter¬
national obligationsj but these obligations were dropped when the 'old
debt' was converted in 1943, and other loans were contracted under
favourable political and economic conditions. What is the most flagrant
and least pardonable and indefensible act by the Minister of Finance is
freeing the 'new' bonds from any future tax and thus giving a death blow
to the supplementary graduated income tax which had been recently
imposed. This exemption means the gradual increase of the obligations
of those who are already taxed, by any increase in Government needs,
especially if one bears in mind that the National Loan is timed and
cannot be converted or redeemed before 1973.
In addition to the exemption of the National Loan, the Treasury
1. Seligman, op. cit. p. 150
2. Allen, E.D: and Brownlee^, O.H: Economics of Public Finance, p. 240
3. Simons, op. cit. pp.175 et seq.
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Bonds Mortgage Debentures issued, by the Mortgage Credit Bank, and
some other securities of the Provincial and Municipal Councils are
1
also free of present and future taxation. The aggregate amount of
the tax-free securities in the market is not less than £El50 m. With
an average fate of interest of J/o, and taxation at the total loss
to the Government amounts to £E1.1 m. per annum.
In Franc,e the exemption of the National Defence Securities,
Liberation Bonds and other treasury bonds seems to be influenced by
political intrigues and the appalling economic conditions of the country.
The problem is getting more complicated because of the tremendous
increase in the issue of the tax-free Sons du Tresttr. The amount of
State bonds, which was 160 milliards francs at the end of 1940, reached
2
925 milliards francs at the end of 1948. If the rate of interest on
the latter amount is on the average 3>o and the average rate of taxation
is 3(fo, the aggregate loss to the State is 5.6 milliards francs per
annum, an^ equivalent of the excess of O.^o in the interest on the
whole debt.
Only minor exemption is given in Britain to State securities and
has little effect on the tax structure or the money market. The United
Kingdom savings certificates issued by the Treasury "under which the
purchase, by virtue of an immediate payment, becomes entitled after the
expiration of a specified period to receive seme greater sum" are not
liable to the tax provided that the amount of these certificates held
1. Cf. A1 Rifaei, op. cit. pp. 233-4
2. Laufenburger, op. cit. p. 175
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by the person does not exceed a certain figure authorised by the
A
Treasury, The exemption also includes the interest on the tax i-eserve
p
certificates issued by the Treasury. The importance of the non-
exemption of State securities from taxation could be visualised by the
fact that the high rates of surtax would be ineffective. The national
debt in Britain became, to a great extent, self-supporting.^
(ii.) Exemption of savings.
The problem of balancing the national economy after the war raised
the issue of exempting savings from taxation.
J.S. Mill was alive to the needs of economic expansion during
his time and justified, in his discussion, the adequacy of exempting
savings and insurance premiums from taxation. He condemned the taxing
of savings as being double taxation, a view which was followed later by
the neo-classicists Marshall, Fisher and Pigou. The incane of any
person, emphasised Fisher, is that part which he can rightfully or
properly use as income, and when savings are taken out of incane, they
become no longer income but capital.^" Pigou puts it clear that "an
income tax ... differentiates against saving, by striking savings both
when they are made and also when they yield their fruits".-^ This
Thesis is based on the assumption that nothing is income unless it is
consumed and called on the remission of the tax expenditure, to the
6
extent that this remission conduces to social progress.
1. Consolidation Bill, p. 122
2. Ibid, p. 124
3. Hicks, U.K: JPublic Finance, p. 30 y
4. Fisher, I; Econometrics, Vol. 5, 1937, p. 23
5. Pigou, A.C: "A Study in Public Finance, p. 118 l-'
6. Seligman in Encyclopaedia of The Social Sciences, Art. Income Tax
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Savings are in reality income whose consumption is postponed.
One cannot consider a part of income as capital in the same year of
its formation. According to Bastable, "Income out of which savings
are made cannot be the same as the subsequent income produced by these
savings". In taxing income and then the return of savings, there is
in reality taxation in two incidences occurring in two different years.
The fallacy of the notion of double taxation in taxing savings seems
to need no more proof after Stamp, De Marco and MacG-regor. The problem
confronting us now is how to deal with savings in taxation as a socio¬
economic phenomenon. Balancing the national economy is of great
importance and equality in distributing taxation is necessary too.
Social and economic stability are the two faces of the coin of progress.
Generally speaking, savings are taxed in all the tax systems under
comparison as they are means of income disbursement. On the other
hand, some personal savings which are merely suspended expenditure to
assure a stable standard of living for the person and his family, or to
meet other unforeseen contingencies receive favourable treatment.
In Britain, as far back as 1853, Gladstone defended the grant of
allowance for life insurance premiums as a mitigation of the taxation
of savings. This allowance is probably responsible for the development
of insurance sense in Britain and is a major factor in the prosperity
of insurance companies. The Royal Commission on the Incane Tax of 1920,
justified the State "in looking with favourable aspect upon Life Insurance
1. Quoted by MacGregor; The Economic Journal, Vol.46, 1936, p.393
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and in treating inccme that is saved and applied in this manner with
special indulgence", even if that meant unfairly acting against those
1
who cannot save. Die existing British Income Tax law allows a
deduction of one-fifth of the total income on premiums on a policy of
insurance on the life of the person or his wife, provided it does not
p
exceed a certain amount. Policies taken out before 22nd June, 1916,
receive special treatment and the allowance given fluctuates according
3
to the size of the income.
Allowances for insurance premiums are also granted in Bgypt and
Prance, but in the fomer country without limitation of the amount
deducted in the case of the General Income Tax. This would open the
road to fraudulent evasion and reduce the degree of effectiveness in
the progressive rate.^" Moreover, as insurance premiums are also
allowed for deduction from the income liable to the tax on salaries
and wages, the absence of clear rules governing such a deduction might
lead to a double enjoyment.
II. The Problem of Multiple and Double Taxation.
At the existing stage of world economic development the excessive
need for taxation has resulted somehow in confusing the manner in which
income taxes are levied. A constitutional conflict between the central
government and local authorities might result in imposing a tax more
than once on the same tax base. The State itself in using different
1. Royal Commission, p. 65 u
2. Consolidation Bill, p. 143
3. Ibid, pp. 148-9
4. Art 7, Law Ho. 99 of 1949
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conceptions to assess the taxable income might indulge in the same
difficulty.
As between countries, the overlapping of the tax systems creates
a problem of international significance. A person who is considered
as resident in more than one country or as investing his money in other
places than that of his domicile, becomes liable to a higher rate of
taxation than another person of similar socio-economic standing who is
subject to one tax jurisdiction only. Such an extra burden is a
direct consequence of double taxation which, it is argued, is an important
factor in disturbing international economic stability.
Hie problem of double taxation could then be studied in two
spheres: within one country and between two several countries. To
start with, it seems better to differentiate between domestic and
international double taxation and use the term 'multiple' for the
A
former case and 'double' for the latter,
a. Multiple taxation.
It is important to clarify one point; that the imposition of a
schedular tax and then a general tax is not multiple taxation because
2
the latter impost is really a surtax. Also, the taxpayer cannot
complain of multiplicity "if all incomes were taxed twice at comparable
rates" or if the income tax is supplemented by an E.P.T., because these
1. The traditional tern is 'double taxation' which was used by the
League of Nations as well as by most of the writers on Public
Finance. Lately the author of the 'Effect of Taxation on Foreign
Trade and Investment* published by the United Nations in 1950 used
the term international 'multiple taxation' instead of 'double
taxation'.
2. Laufenburger, op. cit. p. 180
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are cases of high tax and no more. The multiplicity exists when
some incomes are exposed to more than one tax while others are not.
Multiple taxation may be either intentional or unintentional.
The former is mostly due to a certain legal confusion and the latter
results from using more than one concept in assessing taxable incomes.
These difficulties do not arise when the aggregate income of the
individual is subject to the tax as a unit, as is the case of the
British Income Tax.
The French legislator imposes the Com. and Ind. Profits Tax on
legal entities and thus subjects corporations to a separate tax when
they realise a profitj then when the same profits are distributed,
they become subject again to the tax on Moveable Property. This duality
is based on a false premise that the income of a corporation becomes
a second income when distributed. Individual enterprises, on the other
hand, pay the tax once when the profits are realised. This discrimination
against corporations seems to restrict corporate formation and to limit
economic development which is largely carried on by them.
In Egypt the tax on Com. and Ind. Profits strikes only that part
which is not subject to the tax on Moveable Property, i.e. the un¬
distributed profits. But again when this part is distributed in a
later year, it has to bear the tax on Moveable Property. Taxpayers
have complained against this injustice, but the cases brought to court
against the ruling of the Taxation Department have not succeeded.
The Special Levy imposed in Egypt during the last war on cotton
1. Taylor, op. cit. p. 432
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transactions is another case of multiple taxation and is a clear
violation of the equity principle. The levy discriminated against
cotton dealers as it subjected them to that tax on their profitable
transactions and in addition they had to pay the tax on Com. and Ind.
Profits. Agricultural profits in Egypt also raise peculiar questions,
for if any are realised by joint stock companies, the tax on Com. and
Ind. Profits has to be paid in addition to land tax; but if agricultural
profits are realised by an individual, he has to pay only the latter
tax, thus putting joint stock companies in sun unfavourable position
compared with individuals.
This multiplicity in a tax which burdens certain categories of
enterprises or profits can be avoided if we admit that the tax is paid
in one way or another by the individual and that it therefore ought to
»
be imposed on him but not on the forms of income as such, i.e. tax
•in rem'.
2. The problem of multiple taxation in a federal State is of great
importance, It was even considered by Seligman as of greater importance
1
than international double taxation. Seligman showed the grievance of
multiple taxation in his example of a man who might reside in one State,
have his legal domicile in a second, derive his income frcm railroad
securities which might be in a safe deposit vault in a third State;
the railway itself might have its chief office in a fourth State, and
2
its tracks might traverse several other States. l/here and how this
1. See the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Art. 'Double Taxation'.
2. Seligman, Income Tax, pp. 647-8.
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income should be taxed, is undoubtedly puzzling.
In the three countries under discussion, the overlapping of
judicial power is very limited and the local bodies are authorised to
tax on a limited scale so as not to encroach upon the taxation structure
of the Central Government. There is a ceiling in relation to income
above which local taxes cannot rise without economic dislocation
resulting.^
In Britain the rates which are imposed on persons occupying land
p
and buildings are the only levies permitted to local authorities.
The French 'Communes' participate with the State in some of its taxes
and are allowed to impose an additional amount on the 'old' direct
impersonal taxes which are kept operative for this purpose and are limited
3
by law of the State's General Council, But they are not allowed by
any means to tax profits of enterprises or the revenue of the individuals.
In Egypt the law allows an additional rate ranging ffom to 11/a
on the existing taxes. When that law was made, the only functioning
taxes were those on land and houses. During the last war the Provincial
Councils extended the additional taxes to the newly imposed Schedular
Income Taxes and the E.P.T. The Municipality of Alexandria levied a
rate of 2.f$> on the amount of the tax on Com. and Ind. Profits and on
the tax on Moveable Frqperty as well as an excess rate of on the E.P. T.
1. Hicks, op. cit. p. 272
2. Except in Scotland where the rates are imposed half on the owner
and half on the occupier.
3. The 'Centimes Additionnels' are imposed on land, houses, patent or
licence on commercial and industrial concerns and on habitation:
See Laufenburger, op. cit. pp. 179 et seq arid Formery, op. cit.
PP. 374-5.
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This procedure was followed by other provincial councils and one of them
1
went as far as making the excess rate 1Q?S.
These additional imposts may not be within the exact meaning of
multiple taxation but they can be included in this category because
they raise the same problem.
This policy of the Local Authorities was fiercely criticised on
two points; first, the constitutional right of these Authorities to
levy such taxes, and, second, the repercussion of such levies on the
location of industry and other business concerns. When the problem was
presented to Parliament the Constitutional Committee of the Senate House
emphasised the Constitutional right of the Local Councils to impose such
2
extra rates. The British Chamber of Commerce in Egypt attacked the
taxes from another angle and condemned than as being unfair, penalising
the companies whose head offices were in the jurisdiction of certain
municipalities and threatening the dislocation of the administrative
domicile of business.^ This vigorous criticism brought in an amended
law in September 1944 temporarily solving the problem and pointing out
that "An additional tax on Com. and Ind. Profits may be levied by virtue
of a law, on behalf of the municipal and village councils". Later on,
the Government passed a Law I\To, 155 of 1950 imposing an overall excess
tax of 1Qo above the Scheduler Inccme Taxes for the benefit of Local
Authorities except the Municipality of Alexandria which was allowed to
retain its excess taxes. The legislator was careful when he drafted
I.This was imposed by the Municipality of Mansourah, Official Journal
13.1.1944.
2. Official Journal, Parliamentary Ed. No. 24, 1944
3. The Journal of the British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt, May 1943, p.65
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the tax on General Income for he prevented the local authorities from
1
imposing any excess levy on that tax. The main weakness of the local
authorities intruding in the sphere of income taxation is the direct
result of rendering ineffective the progression of the tax.
b. Double taxation;
The large scale exploitation of income taxation is responsible for
aggravating the problem of double taxation. Every country is setting
its system in the form which can bring in the greatest amount of revenue.
In doing so, they imperil the free movement of work and capital in the
international sphere and curtail the world's aggregate welfare. The
problem of double taxation simply arose through the extension of tax
jurisdiction and the overlapping of tax ideals and technique practised
by different tax authorities, regardless of the personal status of the
income recipient or his ability to pay.
0) Theories underlying the imposition of income taxation.
To understand the problem of double taxation, from the point of
view of the inter-relationship between the individual and the State, one
has to clarify the arguments underlying the imposition of income taxation.
The two old theories of taxation are the 'cost theory' and the
2
'benefit theory'. They sprang from the exchange theory which
originated frotn 'social contract' hypothesis. Under the *oas|r theory',
it was held that one ought to be taxed in accordance with the cost of
the service performed by the State. According to the 'benefit theory'
1. Art. 23, Law No. 99 of 1949
2. See: Stamp, op. cit., Dalton, H; Principles of Public Finance,
Formery, op. cit. and Profs. Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp:
Report on Double Taxation.
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the tax ought to he imposed in relation to the particular benefits
conferred by t&e State upon the individual. It is therefore a quid
pro quo. Neither of the two theories is helpful in solving the problem
of double taxation, especially if the individual is resident in one
country and so enjoys some physical protection and civil rights. In
the meantime his property may be situated in another country where it
is maintained and defended from spoilation. Neither theory is adopted
in the tax systems under discussion, as they limit the State functions,
restrict its inter-relation with the individual and fail to consider
the faculty of each taxpayer to bear taxation.
The two theories have been largely superceded by the theories
•i
of sacrifice, ability to pay and the Hobsonian theory. They include
what there is of value in the two old theories and are largely suitable
for modern socip-economic conditions. The theories of sacrifice are
based on the assumption that the tax constitutes a privation for the
person who is subject to it. One believes that this privation should
be equal as between the taxpayers; another suggests that the tax burden
as a whole should be so arranged, so as to make the total direct real
burden as small as possible. The 'ability to pay' theory starts from
the supposition that there is an agreed amount needed by the State and
that every individual ought to contribute to meet it in accordance with
his financial ability. The Hobsonian theory is a product of the economic
difficulties of the World War I. It emphasises the importance that the
1. Ibid, Pigou, op. cit. Hicks, op. cit. De Marco, op. cit. and
Allen and Brownleete, op. cit.
203,
tax should not remove or impair any instrument of production or
frustrate any element of consumption; thus the tax should only be on
the 'surplus' after making allowance for risk-taking and for that
portion which is necessary to stimulate industrial development.
These theories did not govern international competence in taxation,
neither did they help to construct a solid basis for distributing tax
burdens between nationals and foreigners, and between residents in the
country and those who derive their interests from it. Besides, countries
do not appeal to theoretical reasoning, but rather to their national
benefit. They occupy different economic positions and their needs may
be contradictorys they may be capital-importing or capital-exporting,
and they may be under-developed or fully developed.
(2) Political and economic allegiance:
The problem facing every tax legislator is to what extent he can
use political or economic allegiance as a basis for his tax formula and
how to avert double taxation without sacrificing his country's interest,
with minimum disturbance to the stability of the capital market.
Political allegiance has ceased to have any significance in Britain
and Prance, but it is adopted in the Egyptian Income Tax system.
Accordingly, all Egyptians are liable to the tax on their general income
and remain so, even if they reside permanently abroad and derive no
income from their home land. Such a practice is bound to burden the
Egyptian citizen with more than one tax, rand put than in a relatively
unequal position compared with the foreign residents who might be
exempted in their own country. The Egyptian tax legislation is ambiguous
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and contradictory. On the one hand, the Schedular Income Taxes are
levied on incomes derived from within the country except in the case
of the returns of moveable property, which "belong to citizens or
residents and are derived frail within or without the country. On the
other hand, the legislator imposes the General Income Tax on the total
income without reference to the origin of any part of it. That means
that the taxpayer has to pay taxation on income which is already exempted
from the Schedular Taxes,
Judging "by the criterion of the political status or political
•l
allegiance, the taxpayer is faced with a dilemma that might have a
certain "bearing on his movements, his investments or even his retaining
his citizenship altogether. The international movement of population
and capital in our modern age makes political allegiance an inadequate
2
test factor of individual fiscal obligation. Prom the point of view
of the State the application of political allegiance creates seme
technical and administrative difficulties which cannot be easily overcome.
The effect of this ruling in Egypt seems to be insignificant as the
citizens who reside permanently abroad are very few. Even if they were
subject to the tax, they are beyond the jurisdiction of their country
and automatically the right of the State to claim the amount due from
than lapses after five years.
The force of Economic Allegiance is the most significant criterion
underlying modem tax structure. In the place of his permanent residence
1. De Marco, op, cit. p, 301
2, League of Nations: Report on Double Taxation by Profs, Bruins,
Einaudi, Seligman and Sir J, Stamp, p. 19
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and the location of his wealth, the individual derives certain advantages;
thus he ought to contribute to the expenses of the Government of his
domicile and that of 'situs' in accordance with any adopted principle.
The division among several Governments of the amount which the individual
can afford to pay, depends on where his true economic interests are
•j
found, as the Scientific Experts of the League of Nations stated in 1923#
The three countries under discussion lay stress on the principles
of 'situs' and domicile with nearly equal emphasis to determine a
suitable opportunity for double taxation. In using one principle or
another every country is influenced by its historical development and
generally follows what is thought to be financially desirable and
economically expedient. The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations,
attributed double taxation to three factors; first, the co-existence
of personal and impersonal tax liability; second, the application of
different criteria in regard to personal tax liability, or different
definitions of the bases of such liability, and third, the use of
2
different tests of impersonal tax liability.
In Egypt and France the taxes on the returns of land, houses and
moveable property and on the profits of corporations, are impersonal.
They are exacted from these returns when they are realised in their
territory regardless of the personal status of the recipient. Britain
in turn taxes income realised from foreign possessions, whatever the
source, which might be brought into the country by one of its residents.
Thus the resident in Britain who receives a profit earned in Egypt or
1. Ibid, p. 20
2. League of Nations; London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions
Commentary and Test
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Prance will be exposed to double taxation. We have also noticed how
the different interpretations of the terms 'resident' in Britain and in
Prance would lead to double taxation.
The following table simplifies the practice of taxing income in
each of the three States compared with that suggested in the London
Bilateral Convention model to avoid double taxation drawn up for the
League of Nations in 1 946 counter to Mexico Draft of 1943.
Source of Income Preponderant Element
London Britain Egypt Prance
Model
Real Property 0 0 0 0
Mortgages (property) 0 0 C&D 0
Mortgages on sea and/or air vessels O(Reg) 0 C&D 0
Ind. & Com. or Agric. enterprises x D D D D
Operation of ships or aircraft D D D D
Labour or personal services xx D D D D
Liberal professions x D D D D
Govt. Payments not to Com. agents 0 0 0 0
Shares in Corporations D D E&O E&O
Shares belonging to foreign domiciled Co. D 0 E&O 0
Bonds, Securities, Debentures etc. D D E&O E&O
Immoveable Prop., Mines, Quarry, etc. 0 0 0 0
Use of patent, Formula, Trade Mark 0 0 0 , 0
Pensions and Life Annuities D D mo1 D
All factors xxx D D mo D
D = Domicile 0 = Origin
x If the person is considered as having more than one residence his
tax liability in each place would be equal to what he got from
services rendered there.
xx If a person remains in a second State more than 183 days he shall
be taxable therein in respect of the remuneration he earned
during his stay there.
xxx The State of domicile retains the right to tax the entire income,
but deducts from its tax on such entire income an amount equal
to the tax collected by the other State.
If the taxpayer is considered as domiciled in more than one State,
the tax which depends on fiscal domicile shall be imposed in each
State in proportion to the period of stay in each or according to
any proportion agreeable to the competent administrators.
(See London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions, 1946)
1. If they were given for work done in Egypt.
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The problem of double taxation is not considered a factor disturbing
the fiscal structure in Egypt. As an under-developed country, Egypt
*
does not have an important stake in relieving double tax burdens resting
on the foreign investments of (her) own citizens. She is more
interested in deterring capital flight from domestic investment. Double
taxation in this case acts like a tariff to keep capital from flowing
freely outside the country. The legislator attaches great importance
to the source of income as a tax criterion. The tax is a quid pro quo,
in exchange for the profits gained from the country or "for the depletable
2
natural resources taken out by foreign companies".
No clear or powerful reasons yet show that the financial sacrifice
of allowing any exemption for double taxation is compensated by real
benefit to economic development.^ For the time being it seems to be
politically undesirable to grant any relief to foreign traders and
investors as the people would find in it a return to the awkward system
of Capitulations. The attempts made by Britain and U.S.A. to conclude
bilateral conventions with Egypt on the prevention of double taxation,
after the imposition of the Schedular Taxes in 1939> 3icL not succeed.
The Government advisers were against any such convention which did not
prove to be of significant benefit to Egypt.
Britain and Prance had been aware of the problem of double taxation
since World War I, but Britain was quicker to act to solve it. In 1 916
and 1918 she granted temporary relief to persons dealing with the
1. U.N.O: International Tax Agreements, Vol. II, p. XI.
2. Ibid, p. XI
3. U.N.O: The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment, p,4.
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Commonwealth pending a permanent scheme, which was shortly afterwards
adopted. She Sub-Committee of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax
of 1920 stated that the essential homogenity of the Commonwealth and the
need for equity necessitated that, (a) no citizen of the Commonwealth
was to he penalised because he invested his money outside his domicile;
(b) the existence of double taxation would operate as a hindrance to the
Imperial trade and the welfare of the whole; (c) it would be unwise to
call upon any State to sacrifice more revenue than was absolutely
essential; and, (d) the need for equity necessitated that such excessive
■1
double taxation had to be eliminated. The Royal Commission then
recommended a deduction from the appropriate rate of the British Income
Tax equal to the whole rate of the Dominion tax charged in respect of
the same income, provided that the exemption should not exceed one-half
p
of the rate of the British tax.
Several agreements were concluded wiih the Commonwealth and up to
the P.A, 1950, relief of one half the amount of the corresponding
British income tax on account of taxes paid to the Commonwealth was
allowed. This relief was increased after 1950 to three-quarters of the
tax, and after allowing 5C$ credit for all foreign taxes.^
The French do not seem to have given the same treatment to the
investors in their Colonies, and no agreement of that sort has appeared
in the collection of conventions published by the League of Nations
and the United Nations Organisation.
1. The Royal Conmiss ion, pp. 16 9-170
2. Ibid, p. 16
3. Internation Tax Agreements, Vol. II, p.IX
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The problem of double taxation was one of the main topics studied
by the League of Nations and was called to the especial attention of
its successor. The League's Scientific and Government Experts on
double taxation submitted certain solutions and drafted model bilateral
conventions as a guide to the Nations. But during the inter-war period
agreements concluded were limited to international shipping enterprises
and foreign commercial agencies. But since the end of the last war,
with the spread of high income taxation, the desirability of freezing
foreign trade and investment from avoidable encumbrances has become
1
urgent. The Economic and Social Council in its resolution of 1949
called on Member Governments to conclude bilateral agreements to eliminate
2
double taxation.
Between 1935 and 1 950 the number of bilateral agreements concluded
between Britain and other nations was 63; only 17 out of this figure
were with nations outside the Commonwealth. In comparison, Prance
concluded 7 and Egypt none. These agreements were on income and property
taxes, on the taxation of Com. and Ind. enterprises and air and maritime
transport enterprises.
The last of this chain of agreements up to 1950 was that concluded
between Britain and Prance for the avoidance of double taxation, with
respect to taxes on income (including surtax and profits tax).
According to this convention "the industrial or commercial profits of
a United Kingdom enterprise shall not be subject to Prench tax unless
1. The effects of Taxation on Poreign Trade and Investment,
pp. 34 et seq.
2, International Tax Agreements, p. X
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the enterprise carries on a trade or business in France through a
permanent establishment situated therein". If the enterprise carries
on a trade or business, it might be taxed by France, only on the part
of the profit which is attributed to that permanent establishment,
The same rule applies to the French enterprise which might be operating
2
in Britain, If a Company is a resident of Britain and derives profits
from a permanent establishment in France, these profits shall not be
subject to more than 1Q§ for taxes on profits and moveable property.
Moreover, profits which a resident of one of the contracting countries
derives from operating ships or aircraft, is exempted from tax in the
other country. The Convention dealt on the whole with most of the
problems of double taxation that might arise between the two countries.
The awkwardness of the double taxation induced some liberal writers
to support its termination for the sake of world welfare. For instance,
Pigou said, "if all States were in an equally strong position for
levying taxes on foreigners, it would be to the advantage of them all
both collectively and individually, to enter into agreement not to make
3
these levies". And the Committee of Experts of the League of hations
recommended the division of income between origin and domicile in a
priori manner believing that "what each country would lose in the one
case it would roughly gain in the other". But the problem is further
h
reaqing than the prerogative power of the State to impose taxation and
1. See the International Tax Agreements, Vol, II, pp.115-122.
2. A Company is regarded in the Convention as resident in Britain if
its business is managed and controlled there, and as having its
fiscal domicile in France if its business is managed and conducted
in that country,
3. Pigou, op, cit, p, 170
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the unwarranted assumption that the interests of different countries
A
in terminating double taxation are equal.
Countries are of different economic standards and any proposal
for this purpose "must satisfy the revenue needs of the taxing Government
as well as the conditions under which desirable investment can be
2
attracted to the country", Ihile the defects of double taxation are
unpredictable, still the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment
in 1948 state<V;it is doubtful whether super-imposition of taxes by
several governmental authorities should be considered obnoxious per se
and it is even more doubtful whether it is always restrictive of
3
international trade".
1. Eao, V.K.R.V; Taxation of Income in India, p. 221
2. The effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade, p.3
3. Ibid, p. 36
PART III
IMPACT. DICIDEKCS and SOCIAL EFFECTS of
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CHAPTER VI
THE IMPACT and IHCIDMCE of HmCCME TAXATION
Before going on with our analysis, a definition of the terms which
are to he used is necessary in order to clarify their concepts. The
change in the structure and outlook towards taxation results in the
1
modification of these terms.
The Colwyn Committee looked at "incidence" in the narrow sense and
applied the term to the state or location of the final burden of the tax,
in other words on vdiom the more immediate burden of the tax as a tax
2 3rests. This indicates the short period consequences only. But the
term "incidence" will be used here in a more general sense to cover not
only the initial burden of a tax but also the whole range of economic
consequential changes in the long run as well as in the short.
The term "impact" will be used to mean the direct effect on the
physical and moral entities who are legally responsible for the payment
of the tax.
It should also be noted that the law of interrelation of prices gives
an indication of the influence of taxation on the course of the supply and
demand curves,^" but one has to be careful not to commit the error of
attributing certain phenomenal changes to the imposition of a certain
tax or an increase in its rate is very rarely possible.
In a state of free selection, very many factors coincide to
determine the value of any material. Some of these factors are
1. Hicks, U.K; The Terminology of Tax Analysis, Economic Journal
Vol.56, 1946, pp.38 et seq.
2. The Colwyn Committee Report, p.106
3. Black D; The Incidence of Income Taxes, pp. 31-2
4. Von Mering, 0: The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, p. 2.
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psychological and imponderable, a fact which immediately reduces our
conclusions to mere indications of possible trends. Even them, no
living community remains in a static state and allowances have to be
made for the ex post hypothesis, and reliance on ex ante assumptions
is not enough to help it\understanding the interrelation of the factors
which influence price determination.
When we speak about equilibrium it is also difficult to point to
where it exists in a dynamic state. The Government imposes taxation
which is borne by individuals and then it distributes what is collected
in various ways to serve specific purposes. Every action in the body
economico-politic^ is counted not specifically directly bu rather in a
complex diversity of movements. This dynamic course of action and
counter-action makes an exact assessment of any one impost a very
difficult, if not an impossible task. But this difficulty should not
deter us from analysing the incidence and impact of certain taxes and
employing certain statistics as probable indicators to the argument;
at the same time we admit that any conclusion arrived at by such means
is not proof in itself of the point under discussion.
The subject can be dealt with from different angles and the co¬
ordination of several factors in the socio-economic and political
framework sets up varied problems which vary in importance according
to the time and the ttate of the community. In the following pages
we will limit our discussion to the problems which have faced Britain,
Egypt and Prance in recent years, problems in which income taxes help
or can help still in solving them.
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A
I. Income Taxation and the Problem of the Balance of Payments,
The last war and the complications of its aftermath undermine the
fundamental "basis of international economic equilibrium in a way which
threatens to disrupt the internal economic stability and menace the
existing standard of living. The problan appears in a succession of
adverse balances of payments which if not checked must be followed by
the devaluation of the currency, intensification of inflation and
increasing prices, then the adverse balance of payments and so on in
a disastrous spiral.
The problem has a definite influence on planning financial policies.
But before explaining the effectiveness of these policies in which income
taxation has played a noticeable part, a diagnosis of the disease is
essential.
Some may blame high State expenditure, especially on welfare,
accompanied by excessive taxation as increasing consumption, sacrificing
the future for the present, curtailing the incentive to produce and
1. The position of the balance of payments in the three countries after
the war was as follows ••
In Mn. Currency Unit
x Britain Egypt France
£ £E U.S. jg
1946 - 348 - 19.4 - 2580
1947 - 558 - 13.7 - 1560
1948 - 26 - 12.2 - 1552
1949 + 5 + 4.9 - 735
1950 + 244 - 14.0 - 218
1951 - 521 - 15.0
x Including Grants
Sources; U.K. Balance of payments Cmd. 8065 and 8505.
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
Vol. V, Jan. 1952. National Bank of Egypt, Economic ^Bulletin.
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Economic Survey, Hansard Vol. 497,
1952, pp. 1273-4
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pressing down the propensity to save. Others may put the responsibility
for the deteriorating situation on the selfishness of the richer countries,
the excessive expenditure on rearmament, the increase of profit margins
2
and the vast tax evasion.
The problem confronting us therefore may be attributed to any of
these reasons, or to certain inherent structural changes in international
trade, accelerated by the war and the post-war political tension. The
diversity of views seems to be instigated by differences in the politico-
economic outlook and ideological hypotheses; these are beyond the
present limited scope of analysis.
■Whatever the reasons, the sympton of the disequilibrium in the
balance of payments it the heavy drag on the resources of a country,
with the result of pulling down its standard of living. In the free
market the economic forces through the flexibility of the exchange rate
and the movement of capital tend to restore equilibrium to the balance.
But in a state of barriers and trade control the problem gets so much
more complicated that one has to admit that the simple measures of the
pre-war standard are ineffective.
There is a relationship between national income and the balance of
payments equation. Changes in income entail changes in the same
direction in the demand for imports. This in turn, £ends to bring
another change in exports and domestic income. Accordingly an increase
in domestic income will swell the demand for imports and internal
1. The Times. 22.8.1949
2. Balogh, T: The Dollar Crisis.
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products unless the increment is set aside as savings. Similarly, a
subsidy, is equivalent to an increase in the effective income as it
reduces the price below the prime cost. If a subsidy is granted to
imported goods, it will mean an increase in the 'marginal propensity to
import' and increase imports unless that amount is limited. If it is
granted to certain domestic products and services, it will result in
stimulating the propensity to consume and reduce the volume of exports,
unless the amount allocated for consumption is limited.
The country which subsidises imported goods, in order to assure a
C
certain standard of living or employment, would place the exporting
country in a better bargaining position than if the demand price were
left free. If the mechanism of exchange adjustment is not sufficient
to restore equilibrium, the propensity to import should be curtailed and
the level of export increased. Consumption could be cut to the lowest
\
point possible without causing health and efficiency to deteriorate.
And if a general cut in wages and profits could be carried over night,
the adverse balance might be arrested without disturbing domestic
2
employment. But it seems that when the wage level has risen, any
reduction would be strongly resisted;^ also the entrepreneur would
insist on increasing the margin of profit as an inducement to indulge
in more risk-taking.
To solve the problem in a liberal manner, the Government can embark
on several measures; (1) to reduce consumers' subsidies, which are
1. Hawtrey, R.G; The Balance of Payments and the Standard of Living,p.66
2. ITurkse, PL; Domestic and International Equilibrium, The New Economics,
Ed. Harris, p. 277.
3. Ilawtrey, op. cit. p. 21.
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A
tantamount to a negative taxation, (2) to raise the rate of taxation
if it is low, carry the progression to a higher stage, and close the
income through enforced saving, on the hasis suggested "by Keynes during
incentives to work and produce should he encenraged in a way that an
increased margin of extra work should he lightly taxed and discrimination
in taxation among firms could he maintained according to the degree of
risk-taking. Hie export drive might also he stimulated if the price
of exports were comparatively low.
The fiscal measures taken after the war hy the three countries
under consideration seem to he ineffective in bridging the gap in the
balance of payments. The failure appears to he with the socio-political
forces which prevent the fullest utilisation of economic factors. The
opportunity for manoeuvering hy any Minister of Finance is limited.
In Britain, excessive taxation is a legacy of the last war and its
reduction after the war was not an easy job. It was considered as
hampering the incentive to produce and to work and was even held in
some quarters as being partly responsible for the relative increase in
prices. On the other hand, the expansion of welfare expenditure seems
to have gone further than was anticipated,^ This policy of redistribution
1. Ibid, p. 123
2. Keynes, J.M: How to Pay for the War
3. The highest estimate of the "Social Security Budget" as given hy
Beveridge was £697 Mn. in 1 945 compared with the actual figures of
£1156 in 1950. See Hagenhuch, W: The Social Services, London and
Cambridge Economic Service, Vol. 29, 1951, p. 71
loopholes through which to absorb some of the
2the last war, and encourage private saving. On the other hand,
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in favour of the lower income groups is alleged to be increasing the
aggregate demand on consumers' goods and reducing the propensity to save
and invest. In 1949 the net earnings of the manual workers including
family allowances increased by 3C$ and for all workers by 2f/o compared
^ pwith 1938. In the meantime the level of output per man rose by 16^.
■What is more, out of direct taxes on income collected in 195^ , about
2K.lfa was returned in the shape of subsidies, an amount which is
equivalent to 92. ^0 of the adverse balance of payments in that year,^
Hawtrey rejects the criticism pointing "to the lavish expenditure on
social services as a contributory cause of Great Britain's economic
weakness",^ simply because these services are met from revenue and
do not involve any additional spending by the community. But if such a
policy tends to diminish saving, as he admits, it is quite obvious that
they would give rise to effective demand and lead to increasing the strain
on the community's resources. That means a redistribution of the
resources in favour of the less saving section, increases the amount of
loose money which retains high standard of expenditure.
The outcome of these difficulties, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
has expressed thus: "The state of the internal economy was such as to
hanper the expansion of exports and to stimulate an increase of imports.
Production did not increase so much as was expected and the Budget failed
5
to produce any general decline in personal consumption". The continuation
1. U.N.O. Economic Survey of Europe in 1949, p.24 and Changes in Wages,
The Economist, 28.1.1951
2. Economic Survey, op. cit. p. 24
3. Preliminary National Income and Expenditure Estimates, 1948-1951 ~"
Cmd. 8486
4. Ibid, p. 51
5. Hansard, op. cit. p. 1273
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of such a state of affairs would probably lead to unemployment, Y/ith
nearly all sources of taxation tapped in Britain, the Chancellor does
not have much choice except to return to the traditional policy that the
role of the State can be more effective if the State turns to remove
barriers to incentive, eliminate all forces hostile to innovation, and
relax its grip on private enterprise. At the same time, the Chancellor
has to take into consideration the reaction of any measure to a rather
sensitive and powerful factor in production, i.e. the Trades Unions.
The Chancellor emphasised the discouraging effect of high incone
taxes on production and hard work and preferred to tackle the problem
from the liberal side by increasing the amount free of tax and leaving
the choice to the individual to consume or not the goods, the prices
-1
of which will be slightly increased. The policy is designed to raise
the starting point of tax liability, lower the rate on the earned income
2
and make the graduation less steep. To counteract political manoeuvres
the Chancellor puts into operation an Excess Profits Levy, E.P.L. of a
general character and not confined to concerns on armament contracts.
The levy will apply to companies and other bodies but not to individuals.
It is to be charged on the excess over the normal standard of profits,
being the average of those realised between 1947 and 1949, at a rate of
1, The cost of food subsidies was welcomed by some quarters and
considered "not only as a means of restoring some realism to the
national pattern of consumption, but also as a first step towards
dismantling some of the swollen commitments of the State" so that
when the defence emergency passes a reduction of the heavy burdens
of taxation can be effected. See The Economist, 15.3.1952.
2. Hansard, op. cit. pp.1304-5
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3Qo and a compensating reduction to the P.T.^
She former proposal turns one's attention to the long debated
controversy of direct versus indirect taxes on which Little shed more
light, concluding that it is an illusion to suppose that, from the purely
theoretical point of view, there is a case against indirect taxation.
The supply of labour may be greater under suitable indirect tax than
p
under direct tax. Income Tax, which can be considered as a subsidy
on leisure is a good tax only "in so far as the demand for leisure is
highly inelastic".-' As to the latter proposal it seems to contradict
the main theme of encouraging production. An E.P. T. reduces the margin
of competition and is inequitable in its incidence.^ But still, if
trading profits of companies increased in the same proportion as in the
past year the E.P.L. will absorb 31/£ of that increase.-"
In Egypt, unlike Britain, the rate of income taxation is very low
as we have seen before and some sources of income are completely exempt.
The tax therefore cannot be blamed for any adverse gap in the balance of
payments which could be plugged if the income tax were utilised for this
purpose. The main item in the foreign trade is cotton which forms
1. Ibid, pp. 1291-2
2. De Scitovsky-, T: The Reconstruction of the Theory of Tariffs. The
Review of Economic Studies Vol. IX pp. 89-97 (1941-42)
3. Little, I.M.D: Economic Journal Vol.61, 1951, p.584 ^
1+. Eawtrey, op. cit. p.105 and P.B.I. Statement, The Times, 18.3.52.
5. The Financial Statement, 1952-3 and The Preliminary Rational
Income and Expenditure Cmd. 8486
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about 8Qo of the total exports. Any rise in its price would cause a
marked improvement in the balance of payments. The adverse in the
balance is usually met by drawing on the accumulated sterling balances,
p
by foreign loans and by a small amount of foreign investment. Seme
of these measures are temporary and ways have to be explored to close
the gap, it is suggested that a tax might be imposed on the allowances
given to Elgyptian tourists, who spent in 1949 an amount exceeding that
3
brought in by foreign tourists by £El0.3, which in itself is equal to
about one third of the trade gap in that year. Besides, closing the
loopholes in the income tax structure and imposing a tax on exempted
income seems to be enough not only to return equilibrium to the balance
of payments, but also to provide the Government with ample suns to
execute some of the long postponed social and economic projects.
In the case of France it is noticed that she followed the course
taken by most of the European countries after the war in expanding her
welfare services and financing them by taxation. In addition to that,
the wage structure was changed in favour of the lower-paid workers.
Real earnings including social services expanded by 2Qa in 1949 over
5 - 6
those in 1 938 while the output per man increased by 2>S only. In
1. The proposition was 8G/o in 1950, see The Pocket Book of Statistics,
Egypt 1949 and 1950.
2. Hassan, A.M; The Problem of the Sterling Balances; The Bulletin of
the Egyptian Education Bureau, No.45, May-June, 1950 and U.N.O.
Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, p.18
3. It is estimated that the figure was more than double that amount in
1951, see Hassan, A.M; The Financial and Economic Position of
Egypt, The Bulletin No. 51, January 1951
4. U.N.O, Economic Survey, op. cit. p. 22
5. Ibid, p. 24
6. Ibid, p, 6
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spite of that the proportion of national income allocated for personal
consumption dropped "by yf0 which went to expand d ernes tic capital net
1
formation.
The problem of the "balance of payments took a different shape in
Prance to that in Britain. Prance cannot cut her imports, which are
2
mostly capital goods and raw materials, or increase her exports, which
are fundamentally consumers goods of a non-attractable type in such bad
tames. The traditional way to close the gap is to let the value of the
3
currency drop and encourage exports and curtail imports. Prom her
liberation in 1944 up till 1949, the franc was devalued three times and
its exchange rate with the U.S.$/ fell by 8&/o in this period.^1"
With this background of instability the people are unwilling to
hold franc currency; they keep their balances in foreign currencies,
and invest them in domestic securities and real property.^ The normal
rate of taxation is comparatively high enough to make ends meet; but
with the sharp fall of the exchange rate, the lag in the tax payment,
the loopholes in the tax structure, the exemption of State securities,
the favouritism of certain taxpayers accompanied by mass fraud, make the
Government measures ineffective to solve the problem of the balance of
6
payments.
1. Ibid, p. 23
2. The index of industrial production showed a fall of in 1945
compared with 1938 level. See Bareau, P: The Economic Regeneration
of Prance, Lloyds Bank Review, April 1947, pp. fl-25
3. The free rate in December 1 951 "was 433 frs. for $, a reduction of 11/o
compared with the official controlled price. See Internat ional
Financial Statistics, op. cit. pp. 44-5
4. Bareau, op. cit. p. 12
5. In the short tun, Prance has to rely upon the Export Inport Bank
credits, sales of Gold and American aid.
6. Ibid and Coulter, S: French Taxes 'Without Tears. The Sunday Times.
2.3.1952
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Thus income tax did not deteriorate a condition which was already
inferior. On the contrary, the tax could have played its role in
relieving Prance of its crisis, if the people did not bear a grudge
against it and suspect any measure taken by the Government. The political
instability, in its turn, prevents the utilisation of any kind of fiscal
measure v/hich might solve the problem. We have noticed lately the fall
of Faure's Government whose proposals of an overall increase of in
income taxes and other increase in the companies tax did not receive the
approval of the Assembly. The new Government of Pinay is following
a different course, based mainly on improving the tax administration and
p
imposing heavy penalties for fraudulent evasion and cut-off expenditure.
Judging by past practice, it does not seem that income tax can be a
stabilising factor in the unstable French conditions.
II. Income Taxation and the Price Level.
Entrepreneurs often blame income tax for being a potent factor in
inflating prices and depressing trade. This view recalls the question
as to whether income tax can be shifted or not. This controversy is as
old as the tax itself, and one cannot pretend that a satisfactory answer
may be given in a short space of intellectual discussion.
The differences seem to arise, in the first place^from the confusion
between the general income tax and partial income taxes; in the second,
from considering the tax from the supply or from the demand side; and
in the third, from understanding and weighing the role of the State in
1. The Times. 25.2.52
2. The Economist, 15.3.52, p.634
i.
the economic sphere.
The direct effect of the imposition of a general income tax is the
curtailment of the purchasing power of the taxpayers. If the revenue was
not expended "by the Government and was more than what the people used to
save or hoard, the demand for goods and services would he contracted and
prices fall. This is because, in the short run, the s imply STurve
remains the same while the demand curve drops. The decrease in demand
which occurs because of the tax does not necessarily equal the amount
of the tax, even if it is proportional, simply because of the differences
in the elasticity of demand for the various commodities. In the long
run supply will be altered as the factors of production are reallocated
to suit the new position, taking into consideration the degree of
1
flexibility of these factors. The level of prices will then be
determined by the point of intersection of the new supply and demand
curves. This point will be down to the left or to the right according
to the degree of falling of each curve. The policj? which adopts a
budgetary surplus as a measure to curb inflation assumes that the fall
in demand due to the tax will be more than the fall in supply.
Taking the normal condition in which income tax is imposed and spent
in a neutral manner, the question can be dealt with differently. The
orthodox economists look at it from the producer's angle. They believe
that income tax does not affect the price level. Having everyone taxed
from whatever source he gets his income, there is no taxless field into
1, Webb (Hicks) U: Taxation and Production, The Review of Economic
Studies Vol, II, 1934, pp. 18-30
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which he can escape, Paying the tax, the individual cannot improve
his position by transferring his capital and energies to another business
1
or occupation. This might be true if the weight of the tax on the
individuals and on the factors of production were the same. But the
sensitiveness of the taxpayers is different, and their response to the
tax would alter their relative state as consumers and as producers.
On the other hand the entrepreneurs argue that, as producers, they
aim at obtaining a given net return on their capital and efforts, and
that, if this return is reduced by increased income taxation, they will
2
put up prices to recoup themselves for the difference. If this view
is correct then the measures taken to combat inflation by excessively
taxing profits are ineffective and might worsen the situation. In reply,
the Classical economists, followed by seme contemporary writers, insist
that income tax is imposed on the surplus over cost, and on the intra-
marginal and not on the marginal producers, who do not realise any
profit. Income tax, it is stated, is not a cost of production, "but a
5
cost of success in business". Profits are the result of a multiplicity
of what perhaps may be very insignificant factors and it is difficult
to foretell with any degree of accuracy the amount of profit before the
end of the working period. Besides, business profits are a consequence,
rather than a cause, of prices. Price is determined by supply and
demand at a point close to the cost of production, and if a producer
1. Seligman, Studies in Public Finance, p. 69
2. The Colwyn Report, p. 108
3. Dalton, op. cit. p. 82
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dares to increase his supply price, under competition, he will lose
1
to his competitors to the more efficient producers. Even the
monopolist, it is emphasised, who is after a maximum profit, cannot
determine the market price.
All this is true if prices are determined by the non-profit
enterprises which merely cover their outlay, but in actual conditions,
prices are determined by profit-making concerns, which, in their various
hazardous business spheres and activities require a definite margin of
2
profit to cover the risk involved. "If the enterprise is to pay its
way" stated Hawtrey, "it must receive a price, for its product sufficient
to cover prime costs and to contribute a margin towards overheads costs ".^
Compensation for risk is considered here as a cost. Following IvSarshall
and his concepts of "normal profits" and the representative firm, a
margin of profit should enter into the cost of production.^1" Enjoying
one profit is not the procedure of the normal firm and could not be the
one that determines prices in the short run. The greater the risk,
the 1anger should be the margin; if this is not obtained, the individual
may be reluctant to take the risk, and be content with a smaller, but
a surer, return. This proves one point; that in calculating his
costs the entrepreneur adds a limited margin for risk-taking but not
all his remuneration, and he cannot possibly pass to the consumer his
1. Seligman, op. cit. p. 70
2. Black, D; The Incidence of Income Taxes, pp. 5-17
3. Hawtrey, R.G: The Nature of Profit, Economic Journal, Vol.61, 1951,
£.493
4. Interest and insurance on all capital are considered as part of the
cost. See Robertson, D.H; The Colwyn Committee, The Inccme Tax
and the Price Level, The Economic Journal, Vol.37, 1927, pp. 199 et seq
See also Hotelling, H; The General Welfare in Relation to problems
of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, Econometrica, July 1938
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"disproportionate "burden of progressive taxation".
In normal conditions, the entrepreneur as an individual, motivated
"by profit urge, "tries to introduce or to maintain a difference between
\
his selling price and his buying prices or costs of factors", it is
true that he can influence the latter factor more strongly than the
former through systematic research into possible internal and external
economies. But every increase of taxation depriving him of this
difference may discourage his activity or make him rely on achieving the
same end through combining some economic units. The former attitude
tends to keep the costs high and the latter results in centralising
production in bigger units, which may be able to curtail competition,
so as to keep a quasi-monopolistic margin.
Excessive taxation and excess profits taxes in particular, falling
indiscriminately upon increments of profit tend to weaken the natural
resistance of the entrepreneurs to increasing costs, especially wage
demands. No amount of pressure will ever persuade the business man to
reduce costs and eliminate waste spending so long as the most, if not
all of his extra profits are seized by the State. Thus high taxation
might inflate prices but would not depress them. If enough allowance
is not given far depreciation, depletion and obsolescence, taking into
consideration the changing value of capital, efficiency will deteriorate
marginal costs will rise and competition for foreign markets will
1. Marchal, J; The Construction of New Theory of Profit, The American
Economic Review, Vol. XLI," 1 951, p. 551
2. Hicks, J.R. and Others: The Taxation of War Wealth, p. 44
J
probably collapse.
Clark shows that in any non-totalitarian community 2% of the
1
national income is the limit for taxation. If the proportion were to
exceed that amount, the condition would "become sensitive to a drop in
the value of money and the community would become willing to accept such
a depreciation.
A tax on the general income is accepted by those who believe in the
principle of neutrality. It would yield maximum revenue with minimum
interference in the individual actions. But those who believe in the
need for influencing the allocation of resources and the distribution of
inccme and wealth, adhere to the system of partial taxes through which
such aims could be attained.
Unlike the general income tax, the partial income taxes are widely
considered shiftable. It is obvious that, generally speaking, an
individual will not continue to keep his capital or employ his energy in
a particular kind of activity which is subject to a special tax or to a
comparatively higher tax, if by transferring his capital or energy to
2
some other field he can enjoy a higher net return. The shifting of a
tax depends on its rate, the manner in which it is imposed and the nature
of each factor of production. If the rates of the tax on the returns
of each factor are different, as is the case in Egypt, the allocation of
1. Hie limit in the countries where wealth and inccme are more equal is
about 2(fo, see Clark, C; Public Finance and Changes in Value of
Money, Economic Journal, Vol. 55, "1945, pp. 571-389
2. Seligman, op. cit. p. 66, Webb (Hicks) U: Taxation and Production,
op. cit, and Benham, F,C: Taxation and the Relative Prices of Factors
of Production, Economica, Vol. II, 1935, pp.198-203
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the factox-s would possibly "be altered. Generally speaking, the
demand on the factors of production is derived from the demand on their
products and the value of these factors are determined by the rate of
their returns. If the rate of return changes, owing to the imposition
of a tax, the new equilibrium will be determined by the changes caused
by demand on the factors under the new conditions. The shifting of
any factor of production from one position to another will, of course,
bring about an increase in supply in the new position, and a decrease
in the old one, a new point of equilibrium of locating the products will
thus be determined. Before any such change can take place, however,
the owner of the factor has to take into account the cost of shifting
and the possibility that others will shift too to the favourable position.
If the owner of the factor discovers that these fresh difficulties have
rendered a shifting hardly worth while, he may retain it in its original
position. This does not mean that no change is likelly in the field of
investment, as it may be expected that new investments will be diverted
to where the return is moi-e profitable.
The other important factor which affects price determination and
should not be ignored is State policy in expenditure. The revenue is
usually spent in varied proportions on administration, defence, social
welfare, constructive projects and on aid for industry and trade. If
taxation means a curtailment in the money income of the taxpayers the
expenditure will have a counter effect by increasing the real income
in the shape of social and economic security. Through a better arrangement
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of the factors of production, the State can increase the national
dividend; and through redistributing the returns amongst the members
it induces an augmentation of the aggregate welfare. This would occur
when, according to Pigou, "the real yield of the last unit of resources
expended hy the Government (is) equal to the real yield of the last
unit left in the hands of the representative citizens".
Under normal conditions, with the State interfering as little as
possible in the economic and social field, the disturbance caused by its
expenditure will have little effect on the allocation of resources.
But in the case of embarking on a policy of a large scale interference,
the repercussion on the allocation of resources will be significant.
The propensity to save and consume will be radically changed and the
effective demand will be such as to alter the general level of prices.
Besides, the policy of transferring a quantity of money from where its
purchasing power is low, to where the purchasing power is high, will tend
to change both the value of money and the price level, Keynes* view
on this fact is worths quoting. In 1923, referring to the level of the
franc, he stated that such a level "is going to be settled in the long
run, not by speculation or the balance of trade,,.. but by the porportion
of his earned income which the French taxpayer will permit to be taken
2
from him to pay the claims of the French rentier". In Britain the
distribution of income before and after income taxation, in the post war
period, shows that the relative proportion which -was lost by earners of
1, Pigou, A.C: Studies in Public Finance, p, 34
2, Quoted by Clark, op, cit, p, 372
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A
rent, dividends and interest was mostly gained "by wage earners.
After this discussion one has to come to the conclusion that income
taxation has a certain hearing on the level of prices and on the allocation
of the factors of production. The British system of preserving unity in
income tax is superior from the point of view of neutrality in the
economic field. It spreads the burdens on the returns without aiscrimin-
2
ation. The Egyptian system on the other hand is criticised by economists
and business men as creating arbitrary means through which certain
activities are favoured at the expense of others. The supporters of the
system think that the differentiation in the tax rates, if well studied,
might assist in seme indirect planning. This opinion cannot be taken
seriously because the differentiation is often employed to satisfy
certain pressure groups. During the last war, when the need for revenue
was urgent, the only schedule which bore the brunt of the increase was
commercial and industrial profits. In the meantime, the agricultural
section escaped paying any excess tax over its pre-war level. The
defect of such a system of partial taxation made France divert frcm it
in 1948. France now imposes a standard rate on the returns of all
factors but she still adopts the system of separate treatment.
1. Proportions gained and lost;
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Eages +3 +3 +2 +3 +2
Rent, Dividend, etc, -4 -3 -3 -3 -3
See Rational Income and Expenditure Cmd. 8203
2. Hicks, U.K: The Finance of British Government, p. 249
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The excessive increase in the rate of income taxes in Britain and
relatively in Prance, while it was expected to curtail consumption and
was thought to be effective in coping with the problem of inflation, has
-j
proved to be disappointing and even to result in an adverse reaction.
Any increase in income taxes is graduated on the different classes, with
the middle and upper strata of the community bearing the largest part.
p
This tends to reduce savings or the funds available for investment,
but does not reveal the main evil which is a case of more money chasing
a shrinking amount of goods.
Clark's calculation that taxes cannot exceed 2% of the national
income without resulting in a depreciation in the value of money seems
to be less by 5fo than the maximum limit reached in Britain in the
post war period.
If the existing welfare state has to be accepted, an amount of
3Q/b taken out of the net national income seems to be the maximum for
taxation. This amount is similar to that stated by the Physiocrat,
Baudeau.^
1. Kalecki, M; See Studies in War Economics, p. 9"!
2. Hicks, TJ.K: The Finance of British Government, p. 250
3. G-ide, C: and Rist, C: History of Economic Doctrines, p. 39
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'The following table follows Clark's example and shows the changes
in the cost of living index and the amounts and proportion of taxation
exacted from the net national income in Britain.
X in £ Mn. X
Year Cost of Living Taxes % Taxes National Central Govt.
1948 = 100 of National on Income Surplus or Deficit
Income Income f0 on c/a N. I.
1946 89 2642 31.7 1209 8311 - 12.3
1947 94 2679 30.2 1023 8876 - 5.2
1948 100 2989 30.2 1056 9896 + 4.4
1949 103 3216 30.1 1190 10671 + 4.7
1950 106 3294 29.7 1353 11089 + 5.9
1951 115 3553 30.9 1464 11532 + 4.6
x Minus subsidies and E.P.T. refunds
xx Minus depreciation
Sources; National Income and Expenditure Cmd. 8203 and
Preliminary National Income and Expenditure Cmd. 8486.
In the first two years the Anglo-American loan was operating; in
the following year aids through European Recovery Programme, E.R.P.
were granted. The devaluation of the £ occurred in September 1949
with a reduction of 30.3b in exchange with the U.S. j2>.
In the case of Prance the position appears to be different as the
deterioration in the value was instigated rather by other powerful
factors than by those of taxation, Income taxes take only about half
the proportion, taken by the British tax from the national income. All
taxes absorb from 1 7.6^ to 26.3a in Prance"' compared with about 3C$
in Britain. But in spite of that, changes in prices in Prance are
1. The figures used for the national income are taken from the
International Financial Statistics aire even lower than those
calculated by the French Ministry of Finance, cf. Revue
a'Economic Politique, Mars-Juin 1951, pp.200 et seq.
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mpre violent, as can be seen in the following table; (the absence of
a strict price control system in Prance similar to that in Britain has
to be allowed for).
Year Retail Price Taxation Direct Tax Nat. Inc. Central Govt,
1948 = 100 % of N.I. fo of N.I. Mid. Mrs. Deficit
fo of N.I.
1946 39 17.6 3.4 2618 12.9
1947 63 20.7 5.4 3303 12.0
1948 100 19.3 5.3 5430 14.4
1949 109 22.7 5.8 6530 10.3
1950 121 26.3 7.9 1395 8.2
Sources: Ministeres des Finances, du Budget et des Affaires
Economiques: Inventaire de la Situation Financiere
1951, and International Financial Statistics, op. ci$.
No similar conparison can be drawn with Egypt, but it is quite
evident that taxation which ranges between 8f0 and ICR of the national
income cannot be expected to be markedly responsible for the deterioration
in the value of money.
Another cause of the failure of income taxes and surtaxes as fiscal
measures to stop price increases once they have started, is their slowness
in collection. Owing to the methods of accounting and the technical
difficulty of assessment, income tax is collected not on current but on
1
past income and some years may elapse before full payment is enacted.
During time of rising prices, such a lag, which is tantamount to giving
O
taxpayers loans without interest, would accelerate inflation. It is
1. Hicks, U.K: Lags in Tax Collection, The Review of Sconanic Studies
Vol. VIII, 1940-41, pp. 89-99
2. In France and Egypt the lag in tax collection is even worse and
considered as a contributory factor in accelerating inflation.
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noticeable that arrears of E.P.D. appeared in the Inland Revenue Reports
during World War II.
It seems that the best method of taxing at a time of inflation,
with reference to income tax is to exact the largest proportion from the
sources which are capable of producing revenue more quickly,
III. Income Taxation and Employment.
Pull employment has been the major issue of public policy since
the great depression of 1930. Having the tool of taxation, it is
argued, the Government could utilise it in order to achieve full employ¬
ment. Economic thought has had to work out the implications created
by this new factor.
The Classicists assumed the existence of a self balancing state,
in which the economic forces are capable and powerful enough to restore
equilibrium whenever it is disturbed. In such a state, all factors of
production are fully utilised and the returns are equal at the margin.
Thus it can never appear more than frictional unemployment or sectional
•l
over production. Any interference in the setting of this natural
order, as they understand it, will result in a chain of counteractions
till the equilibrium is again restored. The stronger the interference,
the longer would be the time to regain such equilibrium and the greater
the community's loss. Taxation is considered here as a sort of
interference since it means a diversion from the natural order and the
deflection of some resources of members of society "from purposes which
1. Schumacher, E.F: See The Economics of Pull Employment,
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they would have selected for themselves to purposes which sire selected
for them". Thus it should "be limited so as to inflict as little as
possible on the economic structure.
When the socio-economic pattern gets more complicated, it becomes
apparent that no invisible hand, declares Pigou, "can be relied on to
produce a good arrangement of the whole from a combination of separate
2
treatments of the parts". Accordingly, the State can use taxation to
increase the aggregate welfare by imposing it on industries working
under the law of decreasing return and subsidising those governed by
law of increasing return. But in following such a course, the principle
of private property should be preserved, as it is the corner stone of
progress.'' The Marshallian adherents retain the assumption of
equilibrium even if G/o or 1Qa of the working people are unemployed,
4
because the social loss involved in such a case is insignificant.
The appearance of a slump is attributed to the failure of the State and
its class allies, central banks and other local organisations as well
5
as to the inflexibility of wages. It is through an economy campaign
and settling wages in conformity with prices and reducing taxation,
that the problem of unemployment can be overcome. There is no clear
case to accept the superiority of State actions over those of individuals;
nor does the success of State management during a war make a prima facie
6
case for its being equally successful in time of peace.
1. Wicksteed, P.H; Common Sense of Political Economy Vol.II, p. 66o
2. Pigou, A.C; The Economics of Welfare, p. 195
3. Marshall, A: Principles of Economics, p. 48
4. Pigou, A.G: Employment and Equilibrium, p. 15
&. Pigou, A.C: Economics of Welfare, pp. 336 and 549
5. pigou, A.S; Economics in Practice
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The reduction of taxation in the case of slump would increase the
margin of saving in individual hands, and an increase in investment
would thereby follow. But to embark on a policy of free grants would
not solve the problem. Marshall has made it clear that transferring
money from the well-to-do and giving it to the needy group, if not
accompanied by an increase in the earning power of the coming generation,
■1
might tend to lower future wages.
Economy measures as a way of solving the problem of unemployment
p
proved to be futile and helped to worsen the situation, not only in
Britain but also in Egypt and Prance. The problem was too acute and
complicated to be solved by leaving the economic forces free to act and
the Government to be neutral. The number of unemployed in Britain in
the inter-war period ranged between 10/q and 22f0', in Egypt it was even
more. In Prance nearly one-third of the industrial production capacity
x
was idle. It became true, declared Keynes, that the Classical theory
"represents the way in which we should like our Economy to behave. But
L
to assume that it actually does so is to assume our difficulties away"."
The problem looked like one of under-consumption rather than one
of over-production and the Keynesians tried to solve it accordingly.
Their formula of "Investment Multiplier" is significant for it combines
the degree of propensity to consume with that of investment. They
defined it as being equal to a reciprocal of one minus the marginal
1, Marshall, A; Official Papers, p. 225
2, Robinson, J: The Problem of Pull Employment, p. 33
3. Bareau, op. cit.
4. Keynes, J.M: The General Theory of Employment, p. 34 ;
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propensity to consume. Thus any small portion of investment would
result, by successive movements, in creating a case of full employment.
In a state of confusion and uncertainty the Government has to play a
1
part side by side with the factors of production. It can execute
a scheme of public works and other welfare projects to increase the
2
propensity to consume which in its turn would accelerate employment.
Even digging holes in the ground would achieve the purpose, if nothing
else could be done. This theory has dominated the economic planners
and policy makers in Britain since the Coalition Government set up
during the last war. The Beveridge plan of 1942 and the Hnployment
Policy of 1944 were designed on the former lines and with the main object
of supplying certain social welfare services and thereby increasing the
propensity of society to consume. This intention was revealed in the
White Paper on the Employment Policy when it wan stated that the
standard rate of continuation for a social insurance scheme "would be
3
assessed on the basis of a forecast of the average level of unemployment".
The same tendency is reflected in the policies of most of the world
in the post-war period as most of the countries either executed or "have
accumulated reserves or "shelves" of public works to be put in operation
in a case of a decline in employment.^ In 1949 a committee of inter¬
national experts made some recommendations in order to maintain full
1. Ibid, p. 380
2. Ibid, pp. 129-131
3. Employment Policy Cmd. 6527, p. 23
4. U.N.O; Maintenance of Pull Employment, p. 15
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employment. They said, "where effective demand is deficient, it can
be augmented by increased government expenditure or reduced taxation"
if the standard of taxation is high enough that any reduction would be
1
adequate. The idea became generally accepted that deliberate and
continued action should be taken by Government in order to maintain
effective demand at full employment level through changes in taxation
and expenditure.
The post-war conditions in Britain and Prance did not need much
interference to accelerate full employment. The demand for labour to
rebuild the shattered economy was so immense that some industries were
facing the problem of lack of manpower. There was no urgent need for
any outside injection of effective demand. In spite of that the two
Governments were engaged on vast social and economic schanes which
created a situation termed by some economists as "over-employment".
Some of these projects were necessary to fulfil certain promises given
during the war, but most of the expenditure has exceeded what was
thought to be necessary or adequate, A large proportion of the national
income was used to effect certain changes in the economic pattern so as
to satisfy political ends with no direct relation to the problem of full
employment.^ Such an extensive policy implied a comparatively high
1. U.N.O. National and International Measures of Pull Employment, p.77
2. In Britain projects to nationalise coal mines, gas, electricity,
railways and some other means of transport, the Bank of England
and a section of the steel industry ware executed. Similar projects
were carried through by Prance, embracing coal mines, tlje railways,
gas, electric generation and distribution on important section of
the engineering industry, the Bank of Prance, the four large
deposit banks and the insurance companies. See Bareau, op, cit.
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level of taxation and an inevitable diminution of saving.
The need to rearm afterwards threatens to break down economic
stability and it became clear that unemployment might follow. Economists
did not explain the exact ratio,, when speaking about "consunption-income",
A
to assure full employment. Hansen believes that in the midst of in
institutional development we tend"to lower the ratio of consumption to
income and to increase the proportion of income saved which does not
fit in with the problem concerning Britain nowadays. The excessive
dose of "consumption-income" does not work as a stabilising factor but
rather as an inflationary one threatening to disrup stability, A large
part of the resources is dominated now by the Government in Britain
and comparatively little margin is left to individual enterprise. It
is feared that if unemployment on a considerable scale were to occur,
it would be quite difficult for entrepreneurs to engage in worthwhile
investment schemes, simply because taxation had eaten up most of their
reserves and what had been allowed for depreciation and depletion was
far from enough to pay for renewals. As for the people, they would
become in less need to save or take the risk of investment. The number
of unemployed is increasing now; their figure reached 393,000 in
February 1952,,with an increase of 60,000 above the average for the past
four years and 91,000 more than in February last year. A rearrangement
of State expenditure has to be made and a reduction in its rate seems
to be necessary to reduce the rate of taxation. But what items of
1. Perloff, H. S. in Income, Employment and Public Policy, p.204
2. Hansen, A.H. Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle, p. 238
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expenditure are to "be cut is a matter which can be settled nowadays
only by politicians rather than economists.
If the expenditure problem cannot be easily solved, there is left
the tax structure which could be rearranged in a more favourable way.
The system of imposing one tax on the unified incane, was quite acceptable
when the neutrality of the State was thought to be necessary. But since
the imposition of additional taxes on profits this neutrality is
disappearing. Income taxes could be imposed on the separate schedules
according to a formula embracing risk-taking, the nature of the factor
supplying the return and the ability of the incane earners to pay. If
the administrative machine renders the suggestion difficult, a differential
tion between earned and unearned income could be introduced through the
1
imposition of a "poll tax" or by lowering the starting point for surtax.
But if neutrality is still insisted upon, personal allowances could be
cut, a standard income, comparatively lower than the existing one (about
£500) would be taxed at a flat rate and additional tax could become
payable by charging a higher rate on the excess over that amount.2
In spite of the difficulties facing the Chancellor of the Exchequer
in Britain, he is still following the right track - unlike his counterpart
in Prance, In the post-war boom and full employment period, the French
II
Budget was "underbalanced" either because of tax evasion or because of
the exemption of certain classes or incomes. This deficit budgeting,
which threatens to be a permanent feature is stimulating inflation and
1. Meade, J.E: Planning and the Price Mechanism, pp.105-7
2. Chambers; Taxation and Incentives, Lloyds Bank Review, April 1948
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thereby increasing the cost of production. The problem of the
unemployed might be dealt with if the budgetary balance were restored.
Then, through differentiating the tax on the earning of each factor
of production, encouragement could be given to the section able to
expand its investments and increase its demand on labour.
With reference to Egypt, the problem of unemployment is a feature
of an over populated country with a small minority dominating its wealth
and the vast majority extremely poor. The Government's finance sways
towards favouring the former with the result that not only their share
in taxation is small but also State expenditure is designed in such a
way as to benefit them. In 1949-50 only 1QS of the budgetary receipts
were collected from Schedular income taxes, f$> from taxes on property,
5Qb from indirect taxes, and the rest from State Railways and State
A
domain etc. Allowing money to fructify in the pockets of the rich
classes seems to be damaging the economic economic stability of the
country. In the first place, the absence of a reasonable standard
of education, of health and of training facilities lowers productivity
and reduces national income. In the second, the more affluent classes
have not the initiative or grasp of the situation to direct their
behaviour towards productive investment. They either spend most of
2
their income on buying land without reference to its return or engage
1. Pocket Book of Statistics, Egypt, 1949 an^ 1950
2. Land is the most coveted and respected kind of ownership, thus
demand on it is widespread and keen. The tremendous increase in
the demand for it without equivalent increase in the supply results
automatically in a continuous increase in the price.
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in stock or cotton exchange speculations. Gregory proposed that public
investment of any type would be beneficial to the underdevelcped world.
Up to a certain point, "there is no real cleavage of national advantage
between the investment in the building up of public capital, of roads,
offices, school buildings, hospitals and the like, or in expenditure in
intangibles such as doctors and trained personnel of all sorts. A
high rate of income taxes when spent by the Government would increase
"income-creative" power in the community and would tend to readjust the
demand on each factor of production in a more rational way. This
solution is confined to conditions where the profit motive of the
individuals is inferior and cannot be relied upon to achieve an economic
good.
With the State taking the initiative to employ the increasing
surplus of labour it does not need to base its calculations on any rate
2
of return or even to limit its programme to certain projects of public
utility pattern. The adequate ratio taken by taxation in such a case
may be limited by the amount necessary to achieve full employment but not
to disturb the allocation of manpower in the enployed section.
IV. Income Taxation and Incentives;
A rational economic policy is that based on maintaining a high
standard of living. In conformity with this principle taxation has to
1. Gregory, Sir T: The Problems of the Under-Developed World, Lloyds
Bank Review, Oct. 1948.
2. Strumlin, S.G: The Time Factor in Capital Investment Projects,
See International Economic Papers No.1, p. 164
244.
be planned so as to be kept low where it interferes with production
1
level, and high where it does not. It is important then to study the
impact of taxation on the motives that lead individuals to produce,
Production depends on the twin factors, capitalists and labour.
In an individualistic state, these factors are motivated by the profit
urge or by the superiority in competition according to Schumpeter's
modernised assumption or by a blend of psychological and social as well
2
as economic interests, according to Groves. In each case, the main
interest of the capitalist lies in employing his money on any right of
value he acquires at an acceptable price. The labourer in his turn
has a store of energy which he can dispose of at an suitable reward.
A high tax rate on the return of either of them, other things being
equal, would restrain his economic motivation. And with every increase
in its rate, the more would be the need for incentive so as not to let
production go down.
The imposition of taxation on business concerns as such is likely
to restrain business activity more than taxes upon individuals.^
Business production and ownership are distinct frcm each other because
the entrepreneur can still manage successfully and increase production,
even if the reward of the shareholder is limited. The need for more
revenue has compelled the Government to impose taxes on profits of
enterprises; but successive increases seem to hamper risk-taking, and
short term investments. To-day in Britain, income and profits taxes
1. Bough, R: Conflict and Harmony in Taxation, See Viewpoints on
Public Finance, Ed. Groves, p. 719
2. Groves, H.M; Production, Jobs and Taxes, p. 11
3. Ibid, p. 11
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absorb, on the average, approximately 53'o of all taxable profits
•j
compared with just over 3Qt in 1 938. This high proportion of
taxation in addition to the imposition of E.P.L. seems to discourage
risk-talcing. The latter tax which was originally meant to curtail
rearmament profiteering, is levied in such a way as to hit every
industry so long as its profits exceed certain standards. Thus it
penalises success and puts a premium on stagnation.
The imposition of a flat rate on the profit of industry as is the
case in Britain, Egypt and France, without reference to its status,
whether it is monopolistic or not, and without considering its product¬
ive nature, whether working under increasing or decreasing returns, is
bound to increase the relative power of the monopolistic type of firm
and discourage the competitive. Per contra, a relative increase in
the tax rate of monopolistic firms and those working under decreasing
2
returns, would work as a bounty for efficient firms.
The investor is an important element in production. He is
motivated in his decision by the reward he receives from investing his
savings. The greater the reward, the stronger is the propensity to
invest. But the higher the tax, the less is the propensity to save and
invest. It is important then that taxation should not increase enough
to slacken saving during a time of inflation or to divert individuals
to short time investment or speculation, in a way to reduce the average
risk-taking. In post-war Britain and Prance there is an indication
1. The proportion will reach 63^0 by the new budgetary measures. See
VTincott, H: . The Equity in Eclipse, Lloyds Bank Review, April
1951, and The Times Review of Industry, April 1952, p. 7.
2. Birck, L.V: The Theory of Marginal Value, pp. 200 et seq.
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1that investments are directed to State securities. Jhese are the less
risky investments and are favoured in France because of their exemption
from taxation.
Examining now the relation between taxation and the amount of
effort, we find Pigou gives the order of merit among tax formulae to
poll-taxes, regressive income taxes, proportionate taxes and lastly
2
progressive taxes. But that does not mean that the principle of
equity in taxation can be sacrificed or that poll-taxes can be ehough
to supply the Government needs. Progressive taxation may be adopted
even though it discourages a small section, if the bigger section, by
being exempted from or benefited by State expenditure, were to increase
its productivity and morale.
It may be agreed that the best tax system is that of 'the least
aggregate sacrifice' but it seems to be impracticable in our present
state of affairs. Such a tax formula would lead, as Bdgeworth asserted,
to a kind of dull equality and upset the function of maintaining and
developing knowledge and culture and tend to cripple those of higher
3
quality. It would greatly affect the taxpayer, and leave him with
little margin of interest after the tax.^"
The excessive progression in the British inccme tax seems to depress
initiative and drastically reduce the incentive to work. When the
effective rate on an individual income reaches 94° (when that income
1. 'fincott, op. cit. and Bareau, op. cit.
2. Pigou, Studies in Public Finance, pp.67-9 and Henderson, Economic
Journal, Vol.58, December, 1948
3. Edgeworth, F.Y: Papers Relating to Political Economy, Vol. H, p.104
4. Ibid, p. 111
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is £100,000), it is expected that no urge will induce him to increase
his income. The inevitable consequence is the destruction of a fertile
source of a tax. Seme taxpayers might be tempted to smuggle their
money out of the country for investment abroad where the rate of taxation
is lower and the prospects are brighter. Others might direct their
attention to deals in antiques, paintings, old books and ornaments which
increase in price through time. The number of contributors to surtax:
in Britain decreased by 7545 between 1947-3 and 1949-50, and the net
tax assessed was reduced by £S8.2 Mn, The number of income earners
over £100,000 decreased from 93 in 1938-9 to 39 in 1949-50, in spite of
•1
the increase in prices. High progressive income taxation will
inevitably reduce the supply of highly productive personal services.
V
It will render saving on a large scale difficult, thereby diverting these
same sources from "capital-creation" to consumption uses.
The effect of income tax on the incentive to work depends on
several factors which are interdependent, such as the quantity of the
individual's elasticity of demand for income in terms of effort, the
type of work, the tax formula and the policy of State expenditure, in
addition to the personal psychological reaction. If the individual
is interested in earning a certain amount of income, then any reduction
of that amount by taxation will induce him to work harder, But this
principle is objectionable, as being too harsh and undemocratic. Its
application would lead to social conflict, as it results in making the
1. Inland Revenue Reports 1947 and 1951
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sacrifice regressive according to the level of inccme. It is thought
that if increasing production is the intention, it would rather "be
better to leave more income untaxed, the more the work is being done.
The more attractive the real income is the more will people offer their
work.
The individual, who is free to supply his labour or withhold it,
compares the utility of incerne and leisure with the disability of work,
and tries to equalise the marginal unit of pleasure with the pain
1
experienced in achieving it. The more the inccme received, in other
words, the greater the pleasure it confers on the person through its use,
2
the less will be his desire for more work. Thus when net income after
tax is comparatively high, and can assure a reasonable standard of
living, it is left to the State to call on individuals through other
ways to increase their production.
In most of the fields of salaried enterprise, the position looks
different, for both work and remuneration are fixed. The taxpayer
cannot increase his amount of work to earn more, to pay for his
increased taxation, nor can he reduce his liability by cutting down his
output.^ In Britain where joint-stock companies dominate the £ield of
production, and in normal conditions, only a little part of the resources
is idle, the individual has at best only a scanty chance of adjusting
his output of work to his liability for taxation. That does not mean
1. According to the Ilarginalist School, work is connected with pain
2. Jevons, W.S; The Theory of Political Economy, p. 176
3. Colwyn Committee Report, p. 380
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that heavy taxation has no direct reaction on the amount of work. '//hen
they are heavily taxed, the workers may press for increased wages, for a
reduction of working hours, and for a longer holiday with pay, or they
a
may refuse to do extra work and abstain from their job. The demand for
labour may be high, but if the reward after taxation is low, some married
women would withdrawn their work from the market and be content to do
2
their housework instead of depending on a domestic at lower salary.
During the last war the percentage of absenteeism from coal production
in Britain gradually increased until in 1943 it doubled the pre-war
figure and reached 1G.% in 1945 compared with G.l$> in 1938.'' In spite
of the increase in the earnings by about 134o between 1938 and 1949, still
the percentage of absenteeism was doubled.^1" Our example will illustrate
the position. If a worker earned £400 a year in 1950 he had to pay
a tax of £55. 10. 0. when his earnings through overtime increased, he
was obliged to pay a progressive percentage; on the first £50 he would
pay £12, and on the second £50 the amount of tax would be increased by
5another £1 8.
In Egypt and Prance the rate of income tax is very moderate and
1. Hicks, U.K: Public Finance, pp. 218-9
2. Paish, F.W: Economic Incentive in War Time, Economica Vol. VIII,
1941, pp. 239-248
3. One has to take into consideration that some absenteeism was due
to war conditions
4. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1938-1949
5. In 1941 the sudden rise of the curve between zero liability and
a marginal rate of 6/6 is obviously deterrent to personal efforrt,
cf. Hicks, U.K. op. cit. p. 216
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progression is of a low degree so as not to hamper the incentive to
work. If the rate of taxation is high, the reaction on labour force
will be clearer because a large part of labour is still free to move in
the field of production and a substantial position of the resources is
idle.
To solve the problem of incentive through taxation measures is not
easy in Britain. Any increase in the wage bill would, widen the
inflationary gap. If the necessary consumers' goods are rationed and
purchase tax on other goods is high, the worker cannot enjoy the
pleasure of earning more, because either he will be prevented from
exceeding his ration or he will not get much if he consumes other goods.
And if an important part of the services on which he would have spent
his income are supplied gratis, e.g. welfare services, it seems doubtful
that he would care much to work overtime or increase his productivity.
The inducement to work harder, in a welfare state, seems to be small,
unless a sense of patriotism develops. To write down the welfare
expenditure in Britain may look hypothetically easy, bufactually, it is
rather difficult, because of the existence of a strong labour groups
whose co-operation in production and whose votes in elections are
fundamental to a stable condition.
In a state of suspicion between employers and employees, the
Government could appeal to the patriotism of both groups and ask for
an extra one or two hours of work every week, the price of which could
be listed separately and put at the Government's disposal. If this
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appeared impracticable a differentiation of the rate of taxation
according to the type of work could be made and a reduced rate on
overtime earnings could be applied. 'There is another possibility:
freeing consumers' goods from rationing and limiting their prices
after allowing a small margin for producers and traders, other welfare
services to be left untouched. If political manoeuvres rendered the
abolition of rationing impossible, it could be limited to a minimum
and anyone who exceeds the minimum of work needed could be supplied
with personal coupons entitling him to buy extra rationed materials,
1
In this case no special rate of taxation for extra earnings is needed.
Anoth suggestion was made by the Liberal Party in 1949# It was
based on sweeping away the present system of income tax allowances by
assessment, imposing a flat rate of income tax on all incomes and
replacing allowances by a system of weekly basic payments to all persons,
children as well as adults. The high rates of taxation and personal
allowances tend to be dangerously negative in effect and to place a
premium upon leisure. A flat rate of 5/- in. the £ was thought of as
the maximum at which anything approaching full incentive can be
preserved. A supplementary tax on the higher income groups, exceeding
£600 per annum, at a rate of 2/- for earned and 3/- for unearned
2
incomes.
But however logical a scheme may look, it needs the approval of
1. Mrs. Hicks suggests a return to the traditional methods of collection
but to support the tax with a simple proportional tax deducted
from all wages and salaries at a low rate. op. cit. p. 221.
2. Reform of Income Tax and Social Security Payments, a Liberal Party
Yellow Book.
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the interested groups who seem to "be motivated "by their personal interest
rather than "by any common principle.
253-
CHAPTER VII
SOCIAL OUTLOOK PIT THE EFFECT OF INCOME TAXATION
Being in control of the social order, the State demands from each
individual a certain amount of sacrifice in order to meet its obligations
which are gradually increasing in the course of natural development or
international tension. The distribution of these obligations amongst
the citizens is quite complex, as the position of the individual in
society is very different than in other organisations. In society
there is a compulsion for sacrifice without personal reciprocal benefit.
It is for the individual and immeasurable benefit of the whole that
material and even physical sacrifices have continuously to be made.
It is agreed that equality in distributing such a sacrifice or
burden should be the governing principle of any State. But this
equality is not an absolute criterion, it differs according to the socio¬
economic structure of society and to the determinant philosophic ideal.
Some of these differences may arise from the varied conception of the
State. The State may be considered but a juridical, establishment, with
no material reality and functioning within a limited mandate. Others
may consider it a creation of society to look after its common interests
2
with unlimited power to fulfil this pledge. "The State is indeed not
an organism and still less a superorganism",^ but it is unquestionably
a means to an end. It has to function in such a way as not to impair
1. Duverger, M: Les Finances Publiques, p. 8
2. List, Fj National System of Political Economy
3. Seligman: See Viewpoints in Public Finance, op. cit. p.4
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the productivity of any factor in the socio-economic order or hamper
the increase of the aggregate "welfare of the community. The decisive
measure in any controversy should he the equalisation between the
marginal private and social net product.
To have an accurate picture of the degree of equity and sacrifice
in a specific tax formula is impossible except in reference to the
1
taxation structure of which it forms part. Any desirable tax
distribution could be obtained in a system where the faults of one tax
2
would be offset by the virtues of another. Moreover, the effects of
a certain tax system on the determination of income and wealth allocation,
cannot be judged without studying at the same time State policy in the
field of expenditure.
But as out study is confined to income taxes, the following
discussion can be taken as explaining their probable social effects.
In addition, it should be remembered that such effects would, in their
turn, tend to influence the shape and size of the national income in
the long run.''
I. The Equity and Justice of Income Taxes.
The terms 'equity' and 'justice' have no objective sense; they
4
are expressions of relative states of human consciousness. They
cannot be taken as such but in comparison with a certain unified measure
or standard; not in a vacuum or isolation but in an actively dynamic
gociety composed of individuals of conflicting behaviour, ideas and aims.
1. Edgeworth, op, cit. p. 130
2. Hicks, U.K: Public Finance, p. 150
3. Hicks, U.K: The Finance of British Government, p. 265
4. Sidgwick believed that 'equality' is good in itself. See Pigou,
Studies in Public Finance, p. 5*
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This subjectivity in the terns 'equity' and 'justice', may bring varied
meanings to different classes of people and may make any enquiry rather
inaccurate, unless a certain standard of judgment is assumed.
In a community composed of different individuals, motivated by self-
interest and aiming at maximising their satisfaction through money terms,
any revenue being raised by the State is bound to inflict on the
individuals a certain sacrifice and cause a decrease in their satisfaction
(ignoring the counter effect of State expenditure). The distribution
of this sacrifice amongst the contributors has been and still is the
subject-mabter of heated controversy. But before proceeding with our
analysis let us assume that similar situations produce similar mental
reactions and that similar individuals in similarly situated positions
would be treated similarly,
J.S, Mill linked the conception of 'equality' in taxation with a
humanitarian and ethical criterion. He thought of apportioning the
continuation in such a way that each indibidual should feel neither more
nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every other
1
person experienced from his, after providing for a certain minimum of
income sufficient for the necessities of life, discounting savings and
amounts destined for insurance premiums. Accepting equal sacrifice
does not denote that taxation should be proportional to the individual's
2
income, as Mill erroneously thought. The proportional rate may be
1, Mill, J.S: op. cit, p, 805
2, Edgeworth, op. cit,' pp. 237-8
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acceptable on the marginal assumption if the marginal utility of income,
after the limit of exemption, does not diminish at all, as income
increases. It may also be justified if all incones are received from
the work of people of equal social and economic status and if such
incomes are equivalent to the pain inflicted on the receiver. But in
actual life, income is derived from different sources, people are in
different positions, and, in general, the positive relation between the
1
size of income and the energy expended by the earner is insignificant.
In such circumstances, the rate of taxation has to vary according to
the several factors affecting income as well as the position if its
earner. In the meantime progression has to be applied, with rates
following the income utility curve, increasing with the steepness of
2
the curve rather than following the rectangular hyperbola.
Deduction from "the greatest quantum of happiness principle" is
that of 'minimum sacrifice',^ which denotes that the total direct real
burden on society should be as small as possible. The abstract
mechanism of that principle would result in the richer being taxed "for
the benefit of the poorer to the point at which complete equality of
fortunates is attained"In the case of any specific amount of
taxation needed, it has to be exacted by slashing the tops of the higher
incomes.
In practice the principlesof sacrifice are difficult to accept as
1. In some cases the relation between work and income is negative.
2. Ibid, pp. 107-8
3. Ibid, pp. 103 and 241
4. Pigou, op. cit* p. 103
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satisfactory measures of equity, for they rely on arbitrary inter¬
personal assessment of utilities. Individuals differ in their behaviour,
1
judgements and responses. Besides, to the individual who experiences
it, sacrifice is not a common article but a relative state. The
principle of 'least aggregate sacrifice' is further criticised as being
unjust in penalising the individual far augmenting his income over a
certain amount and thus erecting a barrier against superiority and the
symbol of success.
In practical, experience, tax systems do not usually follow any
specific theoretical formulae, because they are resultants of different
politico-social and economic components in society. When these
components are balanced, it can be said that the taxation structure is
more equitable than whey they are unbalanced. In spite of this fact,
the commonly desirable principles in an ideal tax system seem to
provide a sort of modified formula of the 'least sacrifice'.
A minimum standard of welfare for every individual has been
generally recognised for many years in Britain and Prance. Progress
towards that end was accelerated at a high rate in the last fifty years.
The two countries tried to secure such a minimum not only through
exemption from taxation but also by direct grants and subsidies, a
process which implies a comparatively high level of taxation on the
p
richer classes in varying degrees. In Egypt, the rich classes have
1. ICendrick, M; The Ability to pay, See Viewpoints in Public Finance,
p. 19.
2. The Economist gives an interesting comparison between British and
French welfare state in relation to taxation. See The Economist
March, 22nd, 1952, pp.. 735-6
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the upper hand i$ directing public policy and run it in a way to
assure their own superiority. It can be logically expected that the
proportion of taxation out of national income is small.
About 4Q'c> of the British national income is surrendered in direct
1
and indirect taxes compared with 38/q in Prance and only 8,%t in Egypt.
Of these amounts over 5Q6 is raised from income taxation in Britain
compared with 3QS in Prance and 2f$S in Egypt. Assuming that income
taxes are borne by the comparatively better-off classes, these figures
would indicate that the poor section of the people are more severely hit
in Egypt compared with those in Britain and Prance; and that while the
French pay nearly as much of their national income as the British, yet
most of the burden is regressively distributed.
a. Equity in the distribution of tax burden in Britain;
The distribution of the income tax burden shows the same tendency.
In Britain income derived from business and professions while amounting
to about a quarter of the net true income in 1949-50, yet bore more than
half the income tax: collected, as seen in the following table:-
In £ M.
Sch. A G D x Tn-i_l Total
Ret True income 396 203 2478 6355 9430
Ret produce of tax 102 81 776 488 1447
Tax in fo of Income 25.8 40.1 31.5 7.7 15.3
« Income derived from the occupation of land being usually under Sch.
B, was transferred to Sch. D.
Source: Inland Revenue Report, 1951, Cmd. 8436.
1. Preliminary Rational Income and Expenditure Estimates. 1948-51
Cmd. 8486; International Financial Statistics Jan. 1952;
Inventaire de la Situation Pinanciere 1951; and Estimates of
Rational Income by the Egyptian Statistical Department.
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Moreover, k-2?o of the income tax came from the group incomes of
£2000 and over and only 1 J/a was contributed by the groups whose
income was less than £500, as shown in 1949 figures given below.
Range of Income Mo, of Incomes Income and Surtax paid
£ in 1000 in £ M.
Under 250 - 24
250-500 ^<7 10310 186
500-1000 2443 239
1000-2000 545 189
2000-10,000 219 324
10000 and over 11 146
Total; i 1108
Source: National Income and Expenditure of the U.K.
1946-50, Cmd. 8203
The rate of progression in the British system is so sharp that
it creates an inccme ceiling of about £9400 per annum (1949-50 rates)
A
which one had to get from a taxable income of £223,500. It is little
wonder then that the number of taxed incomes on the latter amount was
only 40, according to 1949-50 assessments.
This tax distribution can well be considered as equitable and in
conformity with the principle of 'least sacrifice'. But to what
extent such a system is just is a matter of controversy. The low
income groups hail it because it frees thai from being any noticeable
fiscal obligation and gives a high value to their labour. The middle
classes complain that it depresses their faculties and lessens their
chances to plan for a better future. The high income groups in their
turn consider it as a destructive process to the natural order of
1, Being the highest average income according to Inland Revenue
calculations, Sec. Report, 1951, Cmd. 8436.
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difference, penalising great efforts for more production.
Criticisms are unavoidable so long as the attitude to the State
and individual obligations towards society are confused. But what is
of special interest is the women1s view. They comprise over a quarter
1
of the working population in Britain and are enrolled in a lower scale
reward compared with men. If the law of marginal utility is applied
and a woman gets the same satisfaction as a man in consuming a unit of
income, then the utility of a unit of income in terns of effort would
be higher for a woman than for a man at the same income level. This
mecessitates that so long as 'equal pay for equal work' is not applied,
a scale of less progressive rates should be adopted when taxing the
earnings of women.
b. Equity in the distribution of the tax burden in Egypt:
The Egyptian tax structure and the tax returns are clear indications
of how the system is based on a kind of politico-social and economic
favouritism worse than that practised in Prance. The holders of State
securities are completely immune from income taxation, present or
future, with the result that every increase in the demand for revenue
has to be borne by other sections of the community. This exemption
gives thorn unrequited benefit which increases with every addition to
taxation. The second favoured section in the community is that which
derives its income from agriculture. Agricultural profits are exempt
from Schedular taxes unless they are formed by joint-stock companies,
1. U.K. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1938-49
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the profit of which are comparatively low. The amendment of October,
1951, emphasised this exemption and put off all attempts by the
Taxation Department to override that rule. Besides, when the tax on
general income is applied, agricultural profits are calculated according
to the rental values (minus 20/5 for maintenance), which are already
under-es timated.
No material is available to show how the national income is
distributed among different income groups or how each income group
contributes to the tax. In spite of this difficulty the mal-distribution
of wealth and income is not denied and the figures for land ownership
give some indication of the state of affairs in the whole economic field.
About 945 of the owners hold not more than five acres and their aggregate
holdings are 35'°; at the same time about 0.44/5 hold over 50 acres and
4 1
their holdings equal 35a of the total land. While wealth and income
are concentrated in the hands of a very small number and the proportion
of income tax out of national income is small too, most of the burden
seems to be borne by the middle classes, and specifically by the section
who pay through 'the stoppage at the source" mechanism, i.e. wage and
o
salary earners and receivers of inc one from moveable property. The
imposition of the tax on general income does not seen to have improved
such a situation; even the later increase in the rate of progression
1. These figures are for 1949. See the Pocket Book of Statistics,
1 949 and 1950.
2. It was estimated in 1942 that income-earners of over £32120 per
annum contributed £3216.5 m. in taxation, while the rest of the
population paid £E14.1 m., leaving seme £EH5 m. derived from
small taxes and fees or representing the income of State enterprises.
See Issawi, C: Egypt, p. 142.
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and the sharpening of the sliding scale would not result in an
effective change. The expected receipt from the General Income Tax:
for the Budgetary year 195*1-2 is about 3Qo of the total yield of income
taxation.1
Between 85;o and 9Q6 of income taxes are contributed by those who
derive their earnings from commercial and industrial activities. Income
from moveable property provides about one-third of the former figure.
Host of the burden is borne by the middle classes whose activities are
concentrated in individual and partnership concerns. In the case of
earnings from moveable property the rate is flat and no concession
or allowance for personal needs whatsoever is granted. Earners of
commercial and industrial profits secure some suitable allowances provided
that income does not reach more than the allowance figure; apart from
that the tax rate is flat. Such proportional taxes are against the
equity principle as they inflict a more awkward burden on those in the
lower brackets than on those in the higher brackets as well as dis¬
proportionate enjoyment.
The same trend can be found in the tax on non-commercial profits.
Up till 1950 liberal professions were taxed according to the rent of
their premises. When severe criticism was waged against such favourit¬
ism, they were made subject to the same sliding scale as was applied to
wages and salaries, in spite of the disparity between the two groups.
According to a recent change in October 1951, they became subject to a
1. The new sliding scale is 8/0 for incomes between £E1 000 and £Bl500
(£1025-1537). See National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin
Vol. IV, No. 4, 1951
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flat rate, thereby hitting severely the low income groups compared with
those on the high reaches.
Such inequality in distributing public burdens breeds a sense of
insecurity and a feeling of distrust of the governing classes, who
are suspected by the people of running State affairs for their own ends.
This widespread feeling, strikes a heavy blow at private ownership and
disturbs the investment of capital. It might also create a kind of
politico-social tension which would threaten to disrupt the social
framework and economic stability.
c. Equity in the distribution of the tax burden in France:
The French system is more suitable for tax discrimination and can
be more effectively employed than the British if a tax formula is made
so as to account for sacrifice in parting with one's income, the relative
difficulty in acquiring that income and the differences in the size of
income attributed to differences in the nature of the factors of
production. The British system was designed, as we have seen, at a time
when the neutrality of the State concerning individuals was held to be
best suited to maximise welfare, and when the nature of income itself
in relation to the factors of production was not very clear.
In spite of that the French system is employed in such a way as
to provide undue privileges to the rich and agricultural classes, in
addition to the loopholes which mostly benefit people of complex income.
The graduation of the tax on which an equitable distribution could be
arrived at is not effectively carried out. The progressive surtax (the
tax on general income) is based on the Schedular taxes, which are badly
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managed. State securities are free of tax, some incomes are calculated
according to fictitious assessments or taxed at lower rates, and even
'the stoppage at the source' principle which was put into practice in
1 939 for income derived from work, and was held to "be a technical
improvement, was terminated in 1949.
The tax "burden is shared "by most of the social classes in France.
About 7Q6 of the actual inccrne is taxed there compared with 56/6 only in
2
Britain. The average rate of taxation in France in 1950 was 3l$>.
Over one-third of the revenue (366) came from the taxes on societies'
profits and income from moveable property; salaries yielded about one-
fourth; the proportional tax on other schedules supplied 1 and
3
the progressive surtax produced one-fifth. These proportions may give
a vague idea about the distribution of income tax in 1950 according to
the type of income but do not reveal what class pays most of the burden.
The distribution of the national income in 1947 and the yield of
income taxes on the main schedules as seen in the following table shows
that the rate on salaries was more than double that on agricultural
profits. One has to remember that the agricultural section of the people
are largely favoured, and that in 1948 about 8^6 of the taxpayers in
that section were assessed at a lower rate.^"
In Mid. Frs.
Salaries & Wages Industry & Commerce Agriculture
Amount of Income 1500 9^0 500
Taxes paid 78.7 87.9 1 2,5
Proportion 5.2 9.2 2.5
Sources: Inventaire de la Situation Financiere et Brochier op. cit.
1. Duverger, op. cit. pp. 53 et seq.
2. Laufenburger, op. cit. p.81 and Inland Revenue Report 1950
3. Inventaire de la Situation Financiere
4. Duverger, op. cit. p. 54
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Hie surtax is not even graduated as sharply as in Britain. It
starts from a comparatively low margin, Being 1Q6 on incomes between
120,000 frs. and 250,000 frs, (£1 23-255) and 6Qo on incomes exceeding
A
3 million frs. (Over <£3061), This maldistribution of the tax burden
is contrary to the main principle on which the French system was
originally based,
II, Income Taxation and the Redistribution of Income and Wealth;
An equal distribution of income and wealth has been advocated at
different times for different ends. Some ideologists would consider
such an equality as synonymous with justice and admit that only in a
classless society can socio-economic harmony be expected. Others
attribute our social difficulties and economic disequilibrium to the
prevailing state of inequal distribution which is far too deeply
2
implanted in our economy. Those who are less extreme are cautious
about talcing such a^hypothesis for granted; for if inequal distribution
can be criticised "equal distribution is at least questionable",-^
Absolute equality is not only quite impracticable but would also inflict
vast damage on the economic welfare of society as it would tend to
check production and disappoint the legitimate expectations of individuals.^1"
Whatever our view, the growth of resentment against great inequality
runs parallel with political equality. A state of affairs in which
"some live without working and others work without living", as Loria
1, Memento Fiscal, p. 62
2, Fisher, A.G.B; Full Employment and Income Inequality, Economic
journal Vol. 56, 1946, pp. 18-26
3. Smart, W: op. cit. p. 100
4. Dalton, H; Inequality of Income, p. 21
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stated, seems to contradict the basis of democratic life. Mal¬
distribution indicates that a certain amount of waste of potential
economic welfare exists, because the less urgent needs are 'over
satisfied' and the more urgent ones are 'starved'. According to
Gossen, only a definitely limited number of units or atoms has value,
and any further addition will be valueless to the individual. On the
other hand, the value of a unit to an individual in the lower strata
of society has no doubt a value much more than zero. If one assumes
that the greater the difference in the scale of distribution, the
stronger will be the conflict of individual interest, the utility of
some units in certain directions would mean a disutility to society as
a whole. In order to create by means of exchange a maximum of value,
every single article must be so distributed among all men that the last
atom of any commodity, which each receives, represents for him the same
value as the last atom of his commodity for any other - a theory
2
emphasised by Gossen.
With the existence of maldistribution of income in a society
using units of money of the same purchasing power, the factors of
production seem to be allocated not according to their utility, but
according to their position in the schedule of effective demand. Ihe
utility of a unit of income, while being subjective, yet changes according
to the status of the individual in the economic and social stratum and
the means by which the distribution of the national dividend is enacted.
1. Quoted by Dalton, Ibid p. 4.
2. Stark, W: The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought, p. 161.
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Inequality, like disequilibrium, cannot be solved by an invisible
hand within the socio-economic framework. If no social or fiscal
policy is adopted, the rich will get richer and the poor poorer with a
far reaching repercussion on the stability of the whole society. The
Classicists' fear that any redistribution of income, would result in
the multiplication of the problem of poverty, because it would raise the
marginal cost, was refuted by the Keynesians. "If fiscal policy is
used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal distribution",
declared Keynes, "its effect in increasing the propensity to consume,
2
is, of course, all the greater". This is so. The propensity to
consume in the low income groups is much higher than amongst the high
income groups. The amount of income which might possibly be left idle
in the hands of the rich would, most probably, enter immediately into
consunption, if it were given to the poor. The rise in the propensity
to consume may also prove to be "positively favourable to the growth
of capital".*'
Assuming that the consumption function has an elasticity of less
than unity, the rate of consumption would absolutely decrease as income
increases.^4" The imposition of a progressive tax in a community where
incomes are unequally distributed would reduce consumption, vis a vis,
welfare by less than the state when the same amount is paid by a
1. Wicksteed, op. cit. p. 63$
2. Keynes, J.M; The General Theory of Gmployment, p. 95
3. Ibid, p. 373
4. Hubbard, J.C; Creation of Income by Taxation, p. 44
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proportional tax. The more unequal the distribution of income, the
larger is the initial income increment as a result of a given tax
falling only on the rich. The smaller the proportion received by the
rich the larger will be the rate of the multiplier or vice versa.
But taxing the rich is not in itself an 'income-creating' phenomenon.
It depends on State policy towards expenditure and the behaviour of
income groups in the economic field. When the revenue received is
spent, there is a transference of consumption from one group to another.
When the taxes collected axe hoarded, in a kind of reserve fund, there
2
exists a case of 'income destruction*. But when they are used to
employ idle resources there will be an 'income creation'. Moreover,
if the rate of consumption is high and excess income is largely invested
as in the case of Britain, a very steeply progressive income tax would
impinge not only upon income increment but also upon private investment.
If the rate of consumption is low, and most of the income increment is
either hoarded or spent on goods and services with doubtful, if not
negative utility^ to the connunity, as is the case in Egypt, the more
steep the rate of taxation is, t}je more will be the multiplier.
Some would argue that to remove inequality of income, direct policy
attack should be made on the reasons for such inequality. The root of
the evil lies with inequality of opportunity, inequality of inherited
wealth, monopoly obstacles against freedom of access to the market,
1. Ibid, p. 107
2. Ibid, p» 98
3. If one can consider the utility of expenditure on drink, gambling
and unsocial functions as very small or negative.
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and non-liquidity of the factors of production. Observations have
shown that the distribution of income through the factors of production
2
and by income classes needs a comparatively long time to be altered.
The objections raised against a corrective tax, are based on; (1) the
economic and psychological supposition that a punitive levy discourages
the incentive to work and enterprise and puts a premium on evasion,
(2) the social understanding that such a policy is partial and assumes
the unproved superiority of the behaviour of certain sections of the
people over others which would eventually result not in bridging the gap
4
between the existing classes but in widening it; (3) the political
viewpoint that it is not the role of the State to be the master of
ideology but to be a servant of citizens, initiated to assure their
security and further their welfare with the least possible interference.
In spite of all the controversy there is wide agreement in a
democracy that a certain minimum standard of living should be attained
and that equalisation could be tried up to a point so as not to destroy
5
the differences which are due to natural ability and vocation, , or to
let the productivity of the community deteriorate. Besides, if we wish.
to remove the obstructing bureaucratic controls and achieve an equitable
monetary and pricing system, argues Meade, "it is necessary to take
radical measures to ensure a tolerably equitable distribution of income
»»6
and property.
1. Marshall, A: Principles, p. 23, Memories p. 9, Wicks teed op. cit.
pp. 636-7 and Dalton op. cit. p. 10
2. Hicks, J.P.: Theory of Wages pp. 127-31
3. Hicks, U.K: Public Finance, pp. 231-2
4. Croome, H: Liberty, Equality and Pull Employment. Lloyds Bank
Review, July 1949, pp. 14-32
5. Green, A.R: Social Reconstruction by the Regulation of Income.
Economic Journal Vol. 52, 1942, pp. 37-44
6. Meade, J.E: Planning and price Mechanism, p. 35
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a* Income taxation and the redistribution of income in Britain;
Since the inter-war period, radical steps have "been taken in
Britain, and in less degree in France, towards achieving a kind of
equitable distribution of income through taxation and public expenditure.
After the last war a very steep progressive taxation was applied in
Britain, accompanied by a wide scheme of social security and welfare
allowances. This policy reduced the relative spread in the distribution
of income and improved the comparative position of the low income groups.
In 1949-50, the income groups over £20,000 retained less than 1l$> of
their income while the income group ranging between £135 - £250 retained
about 9d/o of theirs, before counting the various indivisible benefits,
which they received in the shape of health services, food subsidies,
child allowances, and the like.
The curve of income distribution is becoming flatter by the
narrowing of the gap between the income groups, as one can observe in
the following table.
Distribution of income according to ranges of income
Range of Ko. of Incomes Amount of Income Proportion of Income
Income Before Tax After Before Tax After Tax Before Tax After
in 1000 Tax £ M * Tax
135-250 6953 7647 1522.6 1481.2 18.3 20.6
250-500 9290 9470 3551.1 3349.5 42.8 46.5
500-1000 2972 2460 1890.3 1608.3 22.8 22.3
1000-2000 600 384.8 753.9 523.0 9.1 7.3
2000 and over 235 88.2 582.1 240.0 7.0 3.3
Total 20,050 20,050 8300 7202 100 100
Source: Inland Revenue Report, 1951, Crnd. 8436, p. 117
The repercussion of such a system of squeezing the number of high
income groups and soaking their income is the reduction in the rate of
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accumulation of wealth and the unavoidable curtailment of future receipts
from capital taxes and the excess levy on unearned incomes. With every
decrease in the revenue from the high income groups the sliding scale of
taxation should be reset to compensate for such a loss by directly taxing
the groups which are already exempt or indirectly through consumption
taxes. This may explain the decrease of those entirely relieved of
taxation from 6 millionsin 1937-8 to 5 millions in 1950 andthe increase
of the 'actual income' subject to taxation under Sch. E frcm £1694 M.
to £6885 M. The trend towards the equalisation of income explains also
the emphasis given to the indirect taxes and the insistence of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer on retaining the purchase tax which was
thought to be a temporary measure.
With only 60 receiving an average net inccme of £8333 in Britain
one cannot expect much to be saved. The structure of society is bound
to change and the diversion from risk-taking and the reliance on routine
work to become the fashion. This is already reflected in the Stock
Exchange where Government securities are taking the place of individual,
ones. In 1950 the nominal value of the former was 6l$> compared with
only 35^ in 1939.2
It is feared that the continuation of the equalising process and
the limitation of income earning might depress the incentive to work
hard and might limit the gains which could be realised from the division
1, While the minimum allowance increased from £125 to £135 in the same
period, yet the cost of living increased between the dates from
57 to 115, (1948 = 100), See International Financial Statistics
and Inland Revenue Reports 1947 and 1951.
2. Wincott, H: 'The Equity in Eclipse, Lloyd's Bank Review, April 1951,
p. 43.
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of labour. One cannot rely on the super-humanity of the taxpayer, who
must have a certain amount of stimulation to function effectively.
The motive to acquite wealth is considered an indication of
"1
successful achievement, and should not be destroyed. It is a noble
emulation, the gain which originates in competition,as it demonstrates
the best quality and energy of human nature aiming at the public good
2
and not at individual selfishness. If the process of destroying the
acquisitive and profit motive goes on, "the businessman's time-horizon
shrinks, roughly, to his life expectation".-' He will be less willing
to fulfil the function of earning, saving and investing, and will drift
into an anti-saving frame of mind. The direct aim towards equality
should be to rid the community first of the social waste due to in¬
equalities of distribution. After achieving such an end, it will be
for the people to decide through the ballot-box what kind of alternate
4
goods they want to have.
b. Income taxation and the redistribution of income in Egypt.
In the case of Hgypt the position is completely different. Income
taxes are not designed from the beginning to serve as a weapon for re¬
distribution of income and wealth. They were imposed by a vague
criterion of ability to pay, leaving enough room for the rich to escape
paying even their legitimate share to maintain public needs. The
existing state of affairs gives the impression that it is deliberately
1. Marshall, A: principles, p. 331
2. Ibid, pp. 6-14
3. Schumpeter, J.A: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 161
4. Meade, op. cit. p. 3&
273.
planned to make the rich richer and the poor poorer. One dare not
discuss the defects of the extreme inequality in Egypt or how taxation
should he implemented to achieve sane kind of equality, because any
criticism of the socio-economic order is considered a crime.
In spite of that, fear of the growing tension and possible uprising
has forced the Government to relax somewhat its rigid policy. The
rates of income taxes are raised to keep pace with the mounting outlay
taxes. But taxes of 12$ on the under-estimated rental value of land,
on income from profit, 1C$ on liberal earnings and a progressive
tax ranging from to 10/o on the general income, are ,not sufficient
to plug the gap between the income classes. The margin between the
2
average wage of £1. 10. 0 per week of 51 hours in industry and incomes
of over £150,000 a yeais so great as to create a kind of disequilibrium
in the economic, social and political fields.^1"
The proportion of profits and interest out of the national inccme
is increasing. It reached hCji in 1945 compared with an average of
1. The estimated revenue from income taxes in 1 951-2 is ,£348.6 m. and
the outlay taxes; is £3111.3 m» compared with £37 m. and £318,7 m.
respectively being their actual yield in 1938-9. See Ihe National
Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, op. cit. pp. 280-1 and the
Pocket Book of Statistics, Egypt, 1949.
2. The Pocket Book of Statistics, pp. 118-9
3. This amount being the reported inccme of seme of the commercial and
industrial magnates. It was not exceptional to find one individual
holding 30 directorships and 21 had more than 10 directorships in
1941. Sl-Gritly, A.A.I; The Structure of Modern Industry in Egypt.
Published in L'Egypte Contemporaine, 1947, p. 411.
4. Income differences in agriculture are even greater for the labourer
may get a minimum of three shillings a day for a period less than
a full year, -vdiile a landlord may get as much as £250,000 for
renting his land.
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according to Anis's calculations.1 At a state of nearly full •
employment with the majority of the people workers, the proportion of
salaries and wages was only jS.So in 1945. She tremendous increase
in profits of two leading hanks between 1938 and 1951 gives an idea of
the widening gap between the income groups. The net profits of the
National Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr (their shared capital is £E 4 m)
2
increased from £E587,000 in 1958 to £E1,525,000 in 1951. In the
meantime the increase in wages could not even cope with the mounting
cost of living.
The main drive behind the fiscal measures is the swelling of the
class of civil servants. The estimated expenditure on salaries and
wages in the Budgetary year 1951-2 is £E49.3 m, being about 22o of the
total estimated revenue of that year. This amount is about 31$ more
than the total State revenue in 1938. The wisdom of this policy of
civil service expansion is often debated but successive Governments
which come to power have declined for political reasons to alter it.
c. Income taxation and the redistribution of income in France;
There is little indication that income taxation in Erance will be
employed for income redistribution. Such a policy if it were adopted
would not find much support among French people, perhaps because the
mass of the population is middle-class and not proletarian and their
1, Anis, M.A; The National Income Output and Expenditure of Egypt,
Ph.D. Thesis, London,
2. T^e official figure of the cost of living was 322 (1939 = 100) in
October 1951; at the same time, the average weekly wage increased
by less than three times. See. N.B.E. Economic Bulletin, op. cit.
The Pocket Book of Statistics and Issawi, op. cit. p. 93
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interests lie in restricting State interference in their affairs.
The political instability and the quick shifts of Governments from right
to left and centre parties could not be expected to lead to income
taxation being directed from its main object, ■which is to supply revenue.
It seemed possible only in the short interval following the last war Mien
the leftist groups planned their policy on equalisation of income and
■ capital levies.
The welfare state is based mainly on employers' contributions
for social security and the budget deficit. The fact that employers
2
pay about 294 of their basic wages' bill tends to increase the cost of
production, a result which does not improve the conditions of the
workers in the long run. The deficit budgeting and the reliance on
loans free of tax undermine any intentional flattening of income
distribution. The welfare benefits do not even increase with the
decrease of income. On the contrary, up to the limit of 408,000 frs.
or £416 a year, certain benefits are calculated on a proportion of the
individual's income, such benefits as old age pensions, sick leave and
3
maternity allowances and death grants.
The application of progressive taxation has, no doubt, a re-
distributive effect but in a much less degree than in Britain. The
high income groups, earning over 1.5 m. frs. retained in 1946 about
63.56 of their income and the very low income groups earning up to
1. Baney, L.H; History of Economic Thought, p. 6o2
2. The Economist, 22.3.52, p. 736
3. Ibid.
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20,000 frs. retained 96.^0. The main income group whose incomes
ranged between 20,000 frs. and 150,000 frs. and contributed Ufa of the
taxable income, retained 95.4° of their income after the tax. Their
comparative position was slightly increased by the tax as their income
1
became 13>> of the net aggregate. The relative position of the tax¬
payersbefore and after the tax does not change markedly between 1 958
.. 2
and 1946, the the two years of comparison analysed by Brochier, No
recent data are available to show if the new measures since 1948 have
altered that position; but the impression one gets from the 'new' reform
indicates that it is still the same.
Moreover, it is of great importance to study the distribution of
income as a whole, not only the taxable part, in order to understand
the position of different income groups since some types of income are
either exempt or under-taxed. It is also of great importance to assess
the degree of evasion to evaluate the equity of any redistribution
criterion in income taxation.
III. Tax Evasion
What is meant here by evasion is the act of depriving the State of
the sums it ought to receive according to law. By evasion, the tax¬
payers pay less than they are liable for, thus upsetting the distribution
of taxation, and increasing in consequence, the burdens of conscientious
taxpayers. The more widespread the evasion, the more is required from
taxation, a matter which is very clear in Egypt and Prance; and as
1. Brochier, op. cit. p. 45
2, Ibid, pp. 44-6
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evasion corresponds to the rate of taxation, the more the resulting
evasion, the greater the inequality in tax distribution and so on, in
a vicious spiral. Apart fran the non-payment of tax through legal or
illegal means, the intentional delay in paying taxes can also he con-
■\
siaered as a form of evasion, and its serious effects are mostly felt
when the value of money falls over a continued period.
The problem of evasion is very complicated, and discovering its
cause is a step towards removing it. One has to go to the mind of the
tax evader; his action is not exactly an indirect robbery or indirect
O
defrauding of individuals, provided we agree that our actions are not
absolute, and honesty and dishonesty are different degress of one thing.
".Then a taxpayer evades or intends to evade his tax liability, he usually
does so with the sense that he is acting properly and with self-justification
flie taxpayer, on being asked to declare his returns, will be in the
position to judge for himself what is the just share that he has to con¬
tribute for public purposes. His behaviour is mostly caiditioned by
his attitude towards the real meaning of his 'returns' and what the
terms 'State', 'taxation', and 'public purposes' convey to him. The
taxpayer is a human, social organism, and fundamentally different from
3
a machine, and he can never act exactly as the State requires him to
act. The imposition of a tax reducing his purchasing powep, and of
necessity probing into what he feels is his privacy, has a reaction upon
him which differs according to his position and character.
1. Tranter, A.V; Evasion of Taxation, p. 5»
2. Ibid, p. 19
3. Joad, C.E.M; Guide to Modern Thought, p. 21
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A tax may be imposed on the taxpayer against his consent, he may
consider it a means of oppression and a method of enslaving him, there¬
fore he resists it through fraud, and with force, if he considers that
the imposition is unjust. On the other hand, he may agree with the
principle of taxation, but disagree with the method of expenditure by
the State, thus he tries to evade the tax which may be wasted, or
A
which, in expenditure does not profit him directly or indirectly.
In such cases the remedies against evasion lie in embodying real
representation of the taxpayers, with powers to legislate for taxation
and plan expenditure and supervise both.
The writer was not surprised, when investigating tax evasion in
Egypt, on questioning a number of taxpayers, to find that nearly all of
them justify evasion for the already mentioned reasons. In some cases
it was found that the taxpayer evaded tax because he found others doing
so, or to show his intelligence and cleverness against the tax collectors.
Similarly, a taxpayer persuades himself by the convenient illogicality
that since he is not richer than the State, what he is asked to pay is
a negligible addition and that his evasion will do no ham. His duty
to the State is not developed to the extent that it could combat his
tendencies to evasion. Evasion, as has been mentioned, is a
1, In a reported speech by N. Tranter, a Scottish Nationalist con-plained
that Scotland is not getting her fair share in Government
expenditure and advocated the withholding of income tax payments
to ensure fairer treatment for Scotland in such spending.
Scot. Daily Hail, 19.4.1952.
2. Stamp, op. cit. p. 104
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psychological as well as an economic condition; it increases or
diminishes according to the change in these two factors, hut there is
no evidence that race is a factor affecting the rate of evasion, Iio
confirmation is forthcoming of Formery's assertion the tax evasion in
p
Mediterranean countries is higher than in other countries; but
association coujd, however, be found between the kind of government
and the degree of evasion.
We shall never reach a state of zero evasion unless each taxpayer
owes a concrete allegiance to the system of government, the system
of taxation, and the ways of State expenditure. One has to impress
upon the taxpayer his responsibilities and the burden he and others must
carry. Teaching and propaganda can hardly affect conditions as they
stand; however, by considering equity in imposing and collecting the
taxes, by removing any kind of corruption in the State departments, by
giving the taxpayer the right to suggest and amend the taxes, and by
spending the public revenue wisely to achieve the maximum social advantage,
much can be done in this direction. Punitive and severe acts against
fraud^ do not check it completely; they may lessen it, but on the other
hand, they may be calculated to do more harm than good, and increase
the social cost of the tax,
1. Formery, op. cit. pp. 83-4
2. Laufenburger, Finances Comparees, pp. 196-197
3. As early as the twenty-sixth dynasty of Ancient pgypt it was
enacted that men who failed to make an annual declaration of
their means of subsistence would be liable to be executed. See
Tranter, op. cit. pp. IX and X
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a. Tax evasion in Britain;
In Britain the civic sense of the people is very high and the
degree of evasion seems to "be small in spite of the excessive rate of
taxation. The response of the people to the appeals of the Chancellors
of the Exchequer during the crises of the last two wars reveals this
fact. In his Financial Statement of April 23, 1940, Sir John Simon
paid a tribute to the taxpayers who "have behaved nobly in paying up so
promptly the increased sums demanded of them". Even those of quite
modest incomes who were in need of every penny of it and whose sacrifice
in paying was comparatively high "made a very special effort with the
first request for payment". This high sense of responsibility cannot
be forced upon people, but their response to it is largely related to
their belief that what they pay is honestly spent for their common
interest and welfare.
Bjxt no Government can depend solely on the civic sense of its
people however high for the payment of taxation, because one must
remember that paying taxation is quite contrary to the profit urge. The
Revolutionary Government of France received only one-half of the taxes
2
due in 1792 when the department of tax collection was closed. A
high civic sense can be utilised to facilitate the job of an efficient
and honest machine of tax collection, but not to supersede it. Britain
acquired this efficient machine after long years of trial and error.
The British Tax Commissioners have a wide power to investigate all
1. Hansard, Vol. 360, 1939-40, p. 52
2. Allix, op. cit. p. 86
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accounting books, and bank accounts and to check on property transference
through inheritance or otherwise to find out if any taxable income has
leaked out. Any person who is found fraudulently evading the tax
through the refusal to submit sufficient accounts of his income from
all sources, forfeits a sum of £20 and pays a treble amount of the tax
-j
which he ought to be changed under the law.
The assessment of tax evasion is a matter of guess work and the
margin of error is bound to be great. It was estimated before World
War I that the amount of income evading the tax ranged ranged between
£37 m. and £75 m« ^ In 1949 a. member of Parliament alleged that income
tax evasion could be put at £100 m. a year, a figure which was refuted
by the Financial Secretary."5 In May, 1949, the Board of Inland
Revenue appointed a Departmental Committee to examine the outstanding
balances of Inland Revenue duties, to analyse their causes and to
ascertain what steps could be taken to reduce them<A The Committee
disclosed that £588 m. out of the total balance of £675 m. in 1949 were
5
non-collectible arrears. These arrears cannot be counted as evaded
but rather as unsettled liabilities. Some of these liabilities are
related to unsettled terminal allowances, are based on unascertainable
assessments, or are due to differences about the interpretation of the
law or to arguments about the facts, and so on.
In 1951, the drive against under-assessment and other sorts of
1. Draft, Income Tax Consolidation BiJ.1, pp. 12 and 15
2. Tranter, pp. 23-5
3. The Economist, 19.11 #1949
4. Inland Revenue Report, 1950 Cmd. 8103, p.12
5. Inland Revenue Report, 1951, Cmd. 8436, p. 17
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tax evasion resulted in raising about £7.5 m. including the penalties
imposed, which is a very small proportion of the tax collected (less
than 0.1$). Most of the evaders were small traders whose sense of
objection to income tax is very strong. Such people feel that taxation
impinges upon their legitimate earnings and that they are justified in
under-estimating their income or in deliberately failing to submit any
declarations. On the whole one cannot consider tax evasion a real
problem in Britain, if not because of the small rate of evasion, then
because the excess profits taxes and the death duties absorb most of
the money unremitted for income taxation,
b. Tax evasion in Egypt;
1
In Egypt, fraud and tax evasion are rampant. The people as
yet are not taxation-conscious, and this defect accompanied by their
hazy understanding of the conception of the State contributes to the
widespread evasion. 'When the Schedular income taxes were imposed,
the Government took little pains to explain the fiscal change to the
people, but was merely satisfied in promulgating the law. The tax
regulations, for some inexplicable reason, were kept semi-confidential
and the Ministers of Finance, from time to time, made changes in the
law, often in an unconstitutional manner, confusing not only the tax¬
payers, but also the tax collectors; in some of these instances, the
1. The amount of tax evasion is estimated in April i 952 to range
between £E100 m. and £E150 m. since the Schedular Taxes were
first imposed. The aggregate revenue from all inccme taxes
between 1955 and 1950 was only £E120 m.
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•new' regulations were given a retrospective power. It is not
strange, therefore, that a large number of taxpayers did not pay their
share. In some cases, the lack of definition on some points of the
law were also responsible for evasion, as it is natural that the tax¬
payer always interprets the more obscure regulations to his osvn
advantage. This kind of non-deliberate evasion is by no means disturbing,
as it can be remedied by fiscally educating the people.
.Another psychological reason for the widespread evasion, which
took place during the last war, was the desire for easy and quick
enrichment. Such a pressing desire, accompanied by the understanding
that no one was obliged to conceal the means by which he produced his
wealth, has driven a large number of taxpayers to fraudulent evasion.
The allegiance of these people to society is weak, and the politico-
social conditions cannot stir their conscience to a sense of the
gravity of their behaviour. The Government in its turn has not met
this sweeping tendency by the swift measures needed, such as intensifying
the investigation of the taxpayers accounts or imposing an enrichment
.tax after the war. A standing order prevented any individual from
getting an exit visa from the country before submitting a declaration
from the Taxation Department that he had paid all the taxes due. This
order seems to have been ineffective; it was only applicable when such
an exit visa was necessary to leave the country. Even then some big
taxpayers escaped the net and managed to slip out without their tax
1. The Audit Department Report on the Financial Accounts of the Tear
1945-6, Egypt.
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bills ever having been paid.
What is a rather alarming and obviously flagrant kind of evasion
is the reported process of "writing off all the tax arrears due from
any company when it is Egyptianized. This is an exploitation of the
nationalist feeling which insists on increasing the Egyptian share in
foreign companies and only means a transference of money from the State
to the wealthy section of the people.
Tlie worst kind of evasion from which the country is suffering,
is that carried out through political influence. Such a high-handed
attitude, which the writer met with during his experience in the Taxation
Department ten years ago, aggravates the inequality of an already,
existing unequal tax distribution. Successive Governments have never
tackled these problems and, indeed, have often used the income tax as
a punitive weapon against their opponents. The unavoidable effect of
such abuses on the tax-collector himself is calculated often to render
him unfit to pursue his work impartially and fearlessly.
To combat tax evasion which arose through other means, the
Government is satisfied with some administrative and punitive measures
which show little success. These measures can be simplified as
follows; (1) the time after which the right of the State to claim the
unpaid tax expires was extended from five to eight and thai to ten
years; there is a great reluctance to approve a suggestion made by
1. In a reported case a 'Cabaret' owner left the country without ^a4$;ax
on accumulated profits of about £3500,000. Another 'Cafe-Bar'
proprietor disappeared paying no tax on about £350,000.
the Taxation Department that such a right should he extended to an
indefinite period; (2) the fines for any contravention of the
provisions of the law were increased to .-£250 and an amount ranging
between one-quarter of and three times the amount of tax evaded;
(3) the amount of bonuses for employees was fixed at a maximum of
two months pay; the special remuneration granted to the appointed
directors of the joint stock companies is fixed at £323000 per annum
2
for each directory which should not exceed two; and the expenditure
allowed for charitable and other benevolent societies is restricted
to a maximum of 3° of the net profit of the concern; (4) the practice
of not using taxpayers' account books and documents as evidence against
evasion on the part of another taxpayer was terminated in 1951*
During the war, the pressing need for revenue compelled the
Government, instead of going through the tedious process of passing
a lav/, to issue a Military Proclamation, ITo. 3^1, of 1942, fixing the
period of the presentation of the declarations relating to the
commercial and industrial profits tax, E.P. f. and demanding the payment
of the taxes due. The proclamarion penalised any contravention by an
imprisonment of three months and/or a fine of £2100 for the supply of
(
any false indications in the declarations and other presented documents,
in addition to a fine equal to three times the unpaid tax. This
measure proved to be effective, for the revenue collected fran E.P.T.
1. In one case the "writer was told by one of the Taxation Department
principals that a company which tried to evade the E.P. T. had granted
an employee, in one year, a bonus equivalent to 10 years pay.
2. Payments to companies1 appointed directors are subject to the tax on
salaries which is lower than the tax on moveable property.
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increased from £330.6 m. in 1941-2 to £25.5 m. in 1942-5 and to £236.5 m.
the following year. Moreover, the yield of the tax on commercial and
industrial profits increased from £331.1 m. to £233 m. and to £24 m.
respectively.
This improvement does not imply that all the taxes due were paid,
but, rather, the amounts represent the liability of most of those who
were known to the Taxation Department and so could not avoid payment.
An investigation carried out by that Department in July, 1943, showed
that the above-mentioned Proclamation was not only successful in
lessening tax evasion but also that it helped to lessen the lag of tax
payment. It was found, for instance, in Alexandria (the second
important commercial and industrial centre), that those who presented
their declarations for commercial and industrial profits tax numbered
22,500 and those who presented them because of the former measure
amounted to another 12,340, whilst those who paid according to their
declarations numbered 7100 compared with a further 3970 who paid under
the obligation of the decree.''
The wide-scale evasion in Dgypt results in a maldistribution of the
tax burden, penalising the most conscientious people and those who were
liable to pay at source. It is feared that even this minority might
succumb to evasion unless a quick remedy is forthcoming. The number
of tax-collectors has had to be increased but their specialised training
1. Taxation Department Investigation about the effectiveness of the
Military Proclamation of 1942.
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in finance and taxation still leaves room for improvement. It may "be
urged that failure to submit return statements and to pay any administrat¬
ive additional expenses increased by such action, as well as the interest
to offset loss of interest. This last point is important especially
in periods of inflation when the delay in tax payment contributes to
the increase in the rate of inflation. Transfer of any foreigner's
wealth from the country as well as his personal departure should not
2
be permitted before evidence that his taxation liability is cleared.
Investigations should be made about the increment in the wealth
of 'suspected' people especially since the war. The recent law giving
the State the right to confiscale all illicit profits resulting from
the misuse of Government posts might be applied to other tax evaders.
If, for any reason, such an action cannot be taken, a special tax on
the increment of wealth since the war should be imposed, Moreover,
the exclusion of fraudulent evaders from Government tenders may prove
very effective. They can also be denied facilities of import and
export licenses as well as any Government subsidy.
c* Tax evasion in France;
Tax evasion in Prance creates moral, political and penal problems
of grave concern.^ To the Ministers of Finance it presents an awkward
problem of first magnitude. Fraudulent evasion is like cancr deep-
rooted in French fiscal structure. According to Bareau, the attitude
of the French citizen towards his Government has been tainted frcm time
1. Tranter, op. icit. pp. 89 and 171-182
2. Ibid, p. 89
3. Laufenburger, op. cit. p. 198
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immemorial by certain grudges and suspicion which are reflected in
his conscious attempt to evade his responsibilities and defraud the
1 p
revenue departments. In spite of Former;/!s and Laufenburger's
attempts to treat the problem in isolation and pick out some parts of
the country as less willing to defraud compared with others, yet the
inherent cause for such a wide-scale evasion is not in the people
themselves but in the tax structure and other politico-social and
economic defects in the community.
lie have noticed before how the French system, like its Egyptian
counterpart, is based on favouritism and inequality in distributing
the tax burden, and how France is politically, economically and even
socially unstalbe. The increasing resistance of the public to pay the
tax is also influenced by twisted thinking in praising the intelligence
3of the evaders. All these factors have their repercussion in rendering
the problem more dominant.
No accurate estimates are given to explain the degree of tax
evasion. Hinting at the problem, Laufenburger gave the number of
electorates and the taxpayers in different areasbut such figures
cannot indicate the degree of evasion unless the tax is imposed on
each person. The under-estimation of the income of some classes of
taxpayers is clear and may give an impression of the degree of evasion.
1. Bareau, op. cit.
2. Formery, op. cit. pp. 83 et seq. and Laufenburger Traite, op. cit.
p. 291
3. Laufenburger, Finances Comparees, p. 197.
4. Laufenburger, Traite, p. 283
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In 1944, only 165 physicians, dentists and advocates were enlisted as
having incomes over 500,000 frs., and only 1473 were enrolled in the
-j
category of 200,000 to 500,000 frs. In the whole of Prance only
429 taxpayers were tabled as earning over one million francs. The
amount of evasion can be assessed from past experience. In 1923 it
was estimated in one case by the present President of the Republic
that less than one quarter of the returns from securities were declared
3
for tax payment.
The penalties against fraudulent evasion are comparable with and
even more severe than those applied in Britain. Before 1948 the
penalties were somewhat lenient. Inexactness in the documents presehted
to the Taxation Department was penalised by doubling the tax on the
omitted amount, providing it did not exceed one-tenth of the taxable
amount or 20,000 frs. If the evaded amount was less than that, the
fine ranged between 1000 frs. and 5000 frs. Since 1948, any fictitious
entries in the accounting books in order to drfraud the Taxation Depart¬
ment is penalised by a fine ranging between 10,000 frs. and 2 m. frs.
and by six months imprisonment.^ But it does not seem that such
penalties succeeded in stopping this mass tax evasion.
In an attempt to solve this harrassing problem, the present
Government of Pinay has passed a law giving amnesty to past tax-dodgers,
1. Ibid, p. 285
2. The exchange rate at that time was considered as relatively high
was 200 frs. for
3. Tranter, op. cit. p. 30
4. Memento Fiscal, p. 21
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The amnesty is granted for all offences committed before January 1, 1952,
unless the frauds have already been detected. If they avail themselves
of this privilege, the taxpayers are given until May 5, to correct
their declarations submitted to the Taxation Department. It is made
clear that in the interests of defrauders it is important to give proof
that it includes all the 'wealth they have acquired before July 1;
otherwise they may be prosecuted on the ground that such wealth was
realised after the granting of the amnesty.
This measure may give the Government a rough idea as to the
extent of fraudulent evasion, in what ways it is usually conducted
and by what section of taxpayers it is usually practiced. According
to such an investigation the Government might be able to build its
future policy on a more concrete basis. The immediate reaction of
issuing the lav/ is the sharp recovery in the gold and foreign currencies
on the Paris Exchange. Its reaction on income tax returns remains to
be seen.
Prom past experience of French reaction towards fiscal measures,
the amnesty law does not seem to have much success as it does not
cope with the main evil deeply rooted in the politico-social and economic
structure. Fraudulent evasion is a crime not against the Government
as such, but against the whole community, threatening its foundation,
and it has to be dealt with accordingly. Amnes ty to tax-dodgers is
morally and socially objectionable. It offends the salaried workers
1. Daily Telegraph report 18.4. "1952
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who pay their tax in full and "benefits the non-salaried who do not
meet their obligations. . Such a measure penalises the honest and
conscientious taxpayers, and there is no proof that tax-dodgers
will refrain from behaving in the old way in the future. The French
fiscal problem can be solved if the political and social problems are
tackled and the taxation structure is purified.
An easy target for evasion is the income obtained from foreign
investment and belonging to taxable individuals Yd thin the country.
But such evasion is not so alarming that it cannot be met by bilateral
conventions. In the Anglo-French agreement of December 14, 1950,
it was agreed that the taxation authorities of the contracting parties
can exchange information at their disposal for the purpose of preventing
fraud and evasion in relation to the taxes which are subject to the
•i
convention.
1. U.N.O. International Tax Agreements, Vol. II, p. 120
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CaTCLUSICW
From the previous study one may accept the idea that income taxation
reflects the economic conditions which prevail in a country and the
dominant politico-social forces within a certain period. When the
internal components are at equilibrium one can expect the existence of
an equitable tax system. It is doubtful whether any practical tax
formula, however ideal, can solve our social evils and construct an
equitable income distribution before dealing directly with the politico-
social forces which influence them. It is quite obvious that one cannot
expect to have a good taxation system before having a good Government.
She natural order demands putting the wagon in front of the horse and not
the opposite. The development of a taxation system towards achieving
a just distribution of common needs is the result of politico-social
changes; but tax formulae in themselves can never determine the social
framework of a community.
Taxation cannot be treated in a vacuum or isolated from other
measures of State expenditure and the manner in which price mechanism
works. The point is not to impose a tax but how it is conducted, and
to what extent it is levied to serve the needs of the community and to
achieve a maximum social advantage and not to benefit a particular section
of the people. The taxpayers will be more willing to contribute if the
impost is intended to meet a common end than if it is destined to satisfy
only a part of the community. Moreover, the value of what is left to
the taxpayer is as important to him as the tax itself, for the value of
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the residue indicates to him the value of his work and enterprise.
Any limitation of the individual freedom to use the part of income
left after taxation is also equivalent to an excess tax on him.
According to the view that any taxation system is an outcome of
the prevailing conditions in a certain country at a certain time, the
copying of any country's taxation system "by another may not "be helpful
and may rather "be disastrous. But it is of great importance when
looking at any kind of tax reform to examine the effect of certain tax
formulae on similar conditions in another country, A certain rate of
taxation on a highly efficient industry as that of Britain's will have
mucAless repercussion on the structure of industry than the same rate
on a less efficient industry or in a country seeking some kind of
industrialisation, as is the case of Egypt, Also, the imposition of
a certain tax on income derived from agriculture in a country short of
foodstuffs and raw materials and finding difficulty in the world market
of getting thou in exchange for its industrial products, will have a
strenuous effect on the economy of that country, far more serious than
a similar tax imposed in a country producing more than its needs and
finding difficulty in selling them. In the same manner the imposition
of a high tax on the part of income which is used to increase the
accumulation of idle balances, or destined for expenditure of doubtful
or small utility to the community, in a country suffering from un¬
employment or short of capital investment, can be considered as "income
creative", while in a country in a state of full employment such high
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taxation may tie "income-destructive". Hius policy to reform inccme
taxation will differ in Britain, Bgypt and Prance, as their politico-
social and economic structures are different and their needs are
different too. But the study has clarified our ideas as to the varied
slips and loopholes in the income taxation systems of the three countries
and their degree of success in coping with and their flexibility in
dealing with ever-rising problems.
In Britain, the novelty of using inccme taxation for the
equalisation of income has nearly gone. With the closing of the gap
between social classes, taxation policy should have different directions.
It is becoming of little importance and hardly beneficial to the
British community with such a high rate which leaves 2.^0 out of any
amount of inccme gained after a certain figure. The number of very
high income earners is decreasing rapidly and the amount of taxation
exacted from them is comparatively small. In spite of that the steeply
increasing rate has a psychological reaction depressing on the incentive
to work and increasing socio-economic irritation and instability.
What seems to be worrying the labour section of the community is
the possibility of unemployment rather than the existence of some people
earning high incomes. So long as such high incomes do not interfere
with the state of full employment and no obstacles are erected against
their rising in society there is little reason to suggest that the
labouring class will insist on equalisation of income as an end in itself.
The two main problems facing Britain are insuring the community
against cyclical crises and maintaining an economically balanced state
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in such unsettled social and economic conditions of the world, The
vast changes which are in process in the international sphere
necessitate meeting them with well prepared and fully planned policies
rather than insisting on an old system, the reasons for whose continuation
have "been altered. The problem of unemployment needs a well constructed
process, highly productive and capable of facing the challenging
competition in the world of to-day. To restore equilibrium to the
balance of payments is urgent, too, as the continuation of a deficit
means a drain on the country's resources, threatening its economic order.
The importance of encouraging incentives to work and to enterprise
is quite obvious. This can hardly be achieved before resetting income
taxation in a formula which leaves the individual a reasonable amount
worthy of his sacrifice. With income better distributed, and the
lower strata at an assured acceptable standard, the need for high
progression is less urgent. The productivity of such a steep tax is
not so important as was formerly considered. Besides, the rate of
taxation as a whole has reached the high water-mark and one cannot
expect it to continue without shaking the economic structure in a
vicious spiral of cyclical devaluation of the currency. The existing
state of affairs urges a reduction in the rate of income taxation to
give impetus to the people and to emphasise to them that their excess
supply of effort is worth something to continue it.
If such a policy should be adopted the E.P.L. has to be reviewed
as it is burdensome to industry and a depressing factor on initiative.
There is a change taking place in the fiscal structure which one
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can feel in the insistence of successful Chancellors of the Sxchequor
on retaining the purchase-tax in spite of its depressing effect. Such
a tax may convey points; first, it may he intended to reduce the
effective demand of inflated wages; secondly, it may he a redistributing
measure of the "burden between income and outlay taxes. Whatever the
intention, the imposition of a tax on inccme equal to the amount of a
purchase tax would mean a gain in the consumers' surplus, everything
heing the same. It seems more advantageous to the whole society if
the purchase tax is terminated and the income tax rearranged on any of
the plans suggested in the last chapter.
The problems of Egypt which could he dealt with through inccme
taxation are quite different than those prevailing in Britain. There
exists a wide gap between the Egyptian community's social classes in
income, wealth and politico-social power. The pressing need is to
bridge such a widening gap. So long as a large part of income is left
idle or sunk in unproductive means while the country is suffering from
mass unemployment, and the resources are left unutilised, the community
will be better off with a veiy high progressive tax absorbing such idle
balances. The expenditure of the revenue from this kind of levy would
accelerate the multiplier and push the economic machine to work more
effectively.
The taxation system gives unrequited benefits to certain sections
and classes of the people and contains a lot of loopholes. There is
the overall tax exemption of State securities and the exemption of
297.
agricultural profits which neither justice nor economic ratiohalisia
will support. The holders of State securities are inccme earners who
should share in carrying the economic burdens of society, and the land
tax which is paid by the landlords does not fulfil the tests of a tax
on real income and its incidence is not the same as an income tax.
But to suggest a solution does not mean solving the problem.
The position of any social reformer in Egypt is awkward. With power
being concentrated in the hands of a minority, the problem is how
"a bell can be hung on the cat's neck". The writer has not much hope
of radical change in the fiscal structure before the solution of the
politico-social problem which dominates and determines the scene.
The problem in Prance is one of socio-economic disequilibrium
and solving it is not so hard as is the case in Egypt, Retaining the
balance of the French budget is a matter of great magnitude. It will
restore confidence in the people and stabilise the economic order.
But balancing the budget cannot be carried out without everyone paying
his share and the Government closing the loopholes, and acquiring an
efficient taxation machine. The French system is in theory ideal,
but in practice a scandal. It cannot be replaced by another based on
the British pattern or the fraudulent evasion would be increased.
.Again, everyone cannot pay his share and the loopholes' be closed
without politico-social stability being achieved. With three different
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Governments having different'bshad.es and policies "being in power in
the last three months, everyone would no doubt "be wandering what might
take place in the very near future. This case of political uncertainty
contains the symptoms of economic disequilibrium. How this problem
can be solved is not in the domain of the writer in economics or public
finance but is a matter for the people and their conduct in the ballot box.
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